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Military Intelligence

PROFESSIONAL BULLETIN

October-December 1996
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MI in Bosnia:

Support to JOINT ENDEAVOR

FROM THE EDITOR

Military Intelligence

Greetings! Welcome to another edition of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** (***MIPB***). In this issue we showcase military intelligence support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To refresh your memories of the Bosnian conflict's genesis, we direct your attention to the two historical articles by Major Riekse and Captain Cavazos and Second Lieutenant Powell. They start with the beginning of World War II. (Our special thanks to CPT Cavazos and 2LT Powell for writing this "on demand" article so quickly and so well.) Major Marshall, British Army Intelligence Corps, discusses British intelligence support to the United Nations from 1992 through 1995, and two Canadian allies, Captain Villeneuve and Sergeant Lefebvre talk about their peace enforcement tour in 1995. In addition, the issue features seven other articles on varied aspects of support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR peacekeepers. Most of the book reviews are also Bosnia or U.N.-related.

This issue concludes the series of Deployable Intelligence Support Element articles by several of our G2s. Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) DeFrietas explains the multiple DISEs in air assault operations, while LTC Boll, Major Holachek, and Captain Ellington discuss a recent chance to exercise the DISE concept.

We are always seeking articles. You may write about any topic that may be of interest to our readers. We always welcome articles from our sister Services, too. Upcoming issues will cover—

- ☐ More articles on Bosnia and support to or lessons learned from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.
- ☐ Information: operations, warfare, and open source.
- ☐ Tactical-level unit training, crew drills, unit standard operating procedures, and "how to" tips and hints.
- ☐ We always accept historical essays, lessons-learned articles (post-Haiti), and "think pieces."

We would like photos too, even without articles. Action shots are especially usable. Be sure to include your name, address, telephone number, and the photographer's full name. Please send caption for the photos with the names of persons, activities, and systems depicted. (Photographers would get a copy of the magazine.)



Writer of the Quarter

MIPB is pleased to announce that LTC Collin A. Agee is our **Writer of the Quarter** (October-December 1996) for the article, "Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data, Too Little Intel?" Congratulations to LTC Agee and thanks to all of our authors for their great articles, book reviews, and letters to the editor. Contributions like yours make ***MIPB*** the professional forum for military intelligence professionals.

How to Submit an Article

1. Select a relevant topic of interest to the military intelligence community.
2. Write an outline to organize your work. Put the bottom line up front and write clear, concise introduction and conclusion paragraphs.
3. Follow proper rules of grammar. Consult **DA Pamphlet 600-67** or William A. McIntosh's **Guide to Effective Writing**, if necessary.
4. Maintain the active voice as much as possible. Write "Congress cut the budget" rather than "the budget was cut by Congress." (See **DA Pamphlet 600-67**, **Effective Writing for Army Leaders**, paragraph 3-2,b[1].)
5. Send the article to Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-TDL-B, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000. Please include with your article—
   - ☐ Pictures, graphics, and crests with an adequate description and photographer credits. (We can return photos if so requested.)
   - ☐ A computer diskette with the article in Microsoft Word, Word Perfect, or ASCII. Please do not use special document templates, and separate any graphics files from the text on the disk.
   - ☐ A release by your local security office stating that your article is unclassified, nonsensitive, and releasable to the public.
   - ☐ A short biography with the full names of all authors of the article. The biography should include each author's current duty position, other related assignments, civilian degrees, and advanced military education (CGSC, War College, SAMS, MSSI, SEIP, PGIP). (Tell us if we can print your telephone number and E-mail address with the biography.)
   - ☐ A cover letter with work, home, and E-mail addresses and telephone numbers, stating your wish to have the article published.
6. Remember, content is the most important part of your article. When in doubt, **send us your article**—we can work out the details.

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VANTAGE POINT

by Brigadier General John W. Smith

This issue of ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** focuses on intelligence support to Bosnia. As Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR approaches the one-year mark, there will be a flurry of observations about lessons learned that will probably include the need for new doctrine, improved interoperability, etc.

While the "Ah-ha!" light may come on for the first time in a few areas, some problems thought to be new will simply be a re-hash of old problems. Collection management and Air Tasking Order (ATO) coordination problems come to mind as likely candidates to emerge from Bosnia as old problems in "new clothes."

How can this be? Are we not savvy enough to learn from those who have preceded us? The answer, of course, is "yes." We've got great equipment and smart, well-trained people. The sophistication of today's intelligence operations, compared to capabilities of a decade ago, are eye-watering.

Essential SASO Planning Factors

Some might argue that providing intelligence in a Bosnia-type scenario is different—different from a mid-intensity environment like Operation DESERT STORM, different from Somalia or Haiti. Others might argue that the principles of intelligence support are enduring—regardless of the operation—and differ only in detail. Regardless, there are certain aspects of planning for intelligence in stability and support operations (SASOs) which deserve special emphasis if that support is to be effective.

First is the critical importance of getting the "big idea." It is vital, I believe, that both the senior intelligence officer and his commander have a frank discussion and a shared understanding of the nature and scope of the intelligence that will be mandatory for mission success. Will intelligence be required for near-real-time support to targeting—carried out, for example, by Apaches (unlikely in a SASO environment)? Will intelligence be required to learn the identity and track the location of terrorists or other units or personalities who pose a threat to the friendly force? This type of intelligence support seems more likely. Regardless, commander-to-intelligence officer dialogue is paramount during planning as it is the single best opportunity to breathe coherence into the intelligence effort. Some lessons which have been learned from other SASOs as well as some that will probably be learned again from Bosnia may, however, only be Trojan horses—non-issues posing as problems due to the lack of clarity in planning.

The second factor of critical importance is the attention that must be given to tailoring the force to support the mission. In a mid-intensity conflict, one would expect to deploy everything in the motor pool; after all, those types of operations drove the design of the force structure. That is not the case in most SASOs. Why would a deploying MI force emplace a robust signals intelligence collection capability to work against a threat who is ill-equipped to communicate? Yet, periodically we see lessons learned about how a unit or piece of equipment did not perform well when logic would have argued for leaving the capability at home. Is this the case with Joint STARS?

*(Editor's Note: See Lieutenant Colonel Agee's Joint STARS article on page 6 of this issue of **MIPB**.)*

A corollary to not deploying what you do not need is the importance for the senior intelligence officer to guard against thinking which says in essence, *"If I don't own it, it must not be a player."* Repeatedly since Operation DESERT STORM, intelligence operations have benefited immensely from support provided by elements like the NIST (National Intelligence Support Team)—precisely because it and other supporting elements like it enable access to national or other-Service-produced intelligence that is beyond the G2's or J2's ability to obtain directly. Perhaps most notable in this category is human intelligence (HUMINT)—absolutely vital to the success of every SASO but not generally available without the reporting that comes from the Central Intelligence Agency or the embassy's attaché.

Interoperability—or architecture—is, of course, a third factor that deserves a great deal of attention in planning for intelligence support to SASOs. Not only are equipment and communications key, but so, too, are databases—the raw material laboriously saved and catalogued over time—without which predictive intelligence and definitive answers to the commander's hard questions are impossible. Although interoperability or architecture issues typically prompt the vast majority of lessons learned, they are especially key in SASO intelligence operations because of the near certainty that we will not only be operating with other U.S. Army intelligence organizations, but with other Services and countries as well. In many cases, equipment interoperability disconnects will not be remedied overnight. However, hardware issues should not be used as a crutch to avoid seeking clarity and simplicity in procedures or creating databases—areas that with some thought can add real value to a coalition intelligence operation, or alternatively bring it to its

knees. Though not technically part of interoperability, but certainly central to the ability to operate is the issue of information sharing. While seemingly only of peripheral interest, **information sharing** will be an issue for the intelligence officer in a SASO. This **will occur one hundred percent of the time** so it must be addressed at the onset. Not sharing information with an ally (even a new one) is a non-solution. Information is what the intelligence officer brings to the table as part of what it takes to build trust with our coalition partners. A word of caution though: be prepared to champion your cause—the bureaucrats will trip you up at every opportunity.

Finally, a fourth factor which deserves special emphasis in SASOs is the threat. It is no less important than knowing the threat in any other military operation; what is key is to focus on the unique things about the threat as it pertains to the SASO mission. In the four-power peace observer force (United States, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina) that oversees the peace along a 100-mile jungle section of the Peru-Equador border, some aspects of the threat are preeminent. Weather and landmines, for example, are issues that are immediately relevant to observer force protection. Because potential Peruvian and Ecuadorian unit redeployments from garrison might signal a return to hostilities, it is also important to consider this possibility in assessing the threat. Yet, in carving up the intelligence workload, the task of monitoring the larger issue of potential force mobilization might very well be conducted from sanctuary—in this case, by the J2 at United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). A clear understanding of what aspects of the threat are uniquely relevant to the mission can facilitate effective structuring of the intelligence support mission for success from the onset.

Conclusion

The number of things which can influence the effectiveness of intelligence support to unconventional military operations such as Bosnia is seemingly limitless. However, the point of this discussion has been to suggest that what appears to be a lesson learned or a problem may not be just an equipment or doctrinal shortfall, but in fact, flawed planning or inadequate conceptualization of the effort.

The views above are offered both to stimulate and provide a framework for your own thinking. As you read the articles which follow, you will encounter a number of issues. Answer to your own satisfaction whether the issue under discussion is really a problem deserving a long-term fix or simply a reflection of a lack of hard-nosed thinking and coherent planning.

I look forward to hearing your comments. I think it is important that we be able to talk frankly about the challenges that we face in the SASO arena. Send E-mail to me at smithj@huachuca-emh98. army.mil.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Prior to assuming his current position in October 1995, Brigadier General Smith was the Director, Intelligence Directorate (J2), SOUTHCOM, in Panama. He has commanded the 207th MI Brigade, VII Corps in Germany and later in Saudi Arabia during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; the 104th MI Battalion, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colorado; the 1st MI Company, 1st Infantry Division, Fort Riley, Kansas; and the Pittsburgh Field Office, Region III, 109th MI Group.

CSM FORUM

by Command Sergeant Major Randolph Hollingsworth

"On the field of battle all soldiers' lives are equally precious, as they are in the sight of God, and each soldier's job, no matter what it is, is as important as another, for it is the sum of the efforts of many soldiers, doing their jobs, that determines the success of an army's mission."

—General Matthew B. Ridgeway

The theme of this issue of the ***Military Intelligence Bulletin*** is MI support to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. In keeping with this theme, I discuss preparing your unit for combat.

Preparing Your Unit for Combat

Preparing your unit for combat, as all leaders know, does not start with receipt of the Warning Order. It commences with realistic training and continues with a physical training program that tests the endurance and stamina of every soldier in the unit. It begins with soldiers having faith in their leadership, their equipment, their individual skills, and in themselves. But most of all, it is cemented by the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) tasked with training and leading soldiers into battle.

I believe three vital areas must be integrated to successfully prepare units for war. When fully integrated, they will produce soldiers who are able to fight and win in any environment. These three components of victory are *training*, *faith in leaders*, and *mental and emotional preparation.*

Training

The first component is training in accordance with **FM 25-100, Training the Force,** and **FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training.** All NCOs must understand these references inside and out. These field manuals must not rest in a bookcase gathering dust.

The same is true with our **FM 34**-series; our NCO Corps must read and understand them and then implement the training that supports MI doctrine. All NCOs must understand that when they conduct training, they must train on tasks that are critical to the unit's wartime mission. When you train soldiers on their individual and crew-served weapons and all our MI systems, ensure that they train to standard.

FM 25-101 discusses several important facts. These include—

- ☐ NCOs have the responsibility to train sections, squads, teams, and crews.
- ☐ Soldiers, leaders, and units must be proficient in the basic skills required to perform their missions under battlefield conditions.
- ☐ The command sergeant major, first sergeants, and platoon sergeants must also actively participate in leader training and development.

In addition to all the information the two FMs and our 34-series manuals give, I believe that NCOs should be able to operate every piece of equipment under their span of control. It is not good enough to say, "I am the Analysis and Control Element NCO in charge." The ACE NCOIC must **know** single-source, all-source, and remote work stations. Training still is, and always will be, the responsibility of the NCO.

Faith in the Leaders

My second integral element of victory is that soldiers must have faith in their leaders. When soldiers see NCOs who are always there with them, who know their jobs, are honest and fair, have integrity, and care for them, then they have faith in those NCOs.

A true "war story" will show you what I mean. In 1973, I was a young soldier at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Every Monday morning the company went to the motor pool to perform preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS). At the motor pool, the soldiers conducted PMCS; all the NCOs—except two—went inside to drink coffee. The two NCOs who observed our PMCS and made sure we performed our tasks correctly were the same ones who went on every field training exercise and were always the range NCOICs. Those NCOs were the ones in whom every soldier in the unit had faith. We cannot expect soldiers to have faith in our NCO Corps in combat if they do not have faith in or respect us during peace. When your soldiers have faith in your leadership ability, you have the battle partly won.

Mental and Emotional Preparation

My final component of victory also involves the NCO Corps. Your task is to prepare soldiers for war mentally and emotionally. This element may be the hardest part of my trio.

When was the last time you honestly evaluated your platoon, company, and battalion to determine if your soldiers are mentally ready to deploy tomorrow? And how would you change your soldiers' lack of confidence in a piece of equipment? Would you start working on a plan to improve your soldiers' confidence in the equipment? As NCOs, we must project confidence in our soldiers' technical and tactical skills and in the equipment that collects intelligence for the commander.

One other thing you (as NCOs) must remember is that soldiers have more faith in their leaders when they know that someone is looking after their families. Be sure they know who will help their families if they need it. When soldiers believe that their leaders have confidence in them, faith in those leaders, and are well-trained, then they will be as close as they can get to being mentally prepared to go to war.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

LETTERS

To the Editor:

The April-June 1996 issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*** (***MIPB***), contained many interesting articles on Force XXI and Intelligence XXI. Many of the articles stressed the importance of understanding emerging technology and its application to the intelligence battlefield operating systems' (BOS) support to the warfighter. Intelligence and communications systems continue to evolve in their sophistication, application of technology, and accessibility to the commander. Their increasing capabilities create an unprecedented volume of information available to commanders at all echelons. A basic understanding of these communications systems and how they contribute to the intelligence BOS is required so that intelligence professionals can continue to contribute to the tactical commander's decisionmaking cycle. Successful operations at the tactical and operational levels require an increased ability to synchronize fires, have faster access to intelligence, enhanced situational awareness, and effective force protection. It is increasingly important for intelligence professionals to support a seamless intelligence architecture between and across all echelons.

Understanding the principles of many emerging technologies, even when limiting these to only

those applicable to the military intelligence (MI) community, is a daunting task for any individual. In an effort to assist my fellow military intelligence professionals, I have written **The Warfighter's Guide to Communications Architecture**. The purpose of this manual is to provide a framework in order to support the intelligence professional in the development of an effective intelligence communications architecture.

This manual gives a brief overview of programs which have concerned themselves with the modernization and support of the intelligence BOS. These programs include, but are not limited to, the All-Source Analysis System, the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal system, and the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities (TENCAP) program. The manual provides guidance for intelligence staff officers, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and analysts at all skill levels and echelons.

Literally thousands of possible relationships can be established between hundreds of communications support architectures. This document focuses on the many specific relationships between intelligence-related communications processors and will give the reader a better understanding of the Army common user system. Many specific integration techniques have been outlined. Each technique was chosen for inclusion in this document to expose the reader to a wide variety of common protocols. Although all the possible relationships between intelligence-related communications processors are not represented in the manual, the techniques and protocols used provide the tools necessary for the intelligence professional of today to accomplish the greatest of dissemination challenges.

The **Warfighter's Guide to Communications Architecture** has been approved by the Department of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT), the National Security Agency, and the Army Intelligence and Security Command. The proponent of this publication is the 743d MI Battalion, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. Distribution of the document was in July 1996; if you did not receive a copy and need one, contact S3 Operations at the 743d MI Battalion or CW2 Al Smith at DSN 644-5892, or E-mail your request to alfreds704@ aol. com. The document will also be available on the DCSINT Home Page on the INTELINK.

Chief Warrant Officer Two
Alfred Smith
Fort Meade, Maryland

To the Editor:

Kudos to Major Daniel Smith of the Virginia Army National Guard and DCSINT staff for his article, "Force XXI: An Army IMINT Concept," in the April-June 1996 issue of the ***MIPB***. He concisely laid out a strong vision for Army imagery intelligence (IMINT) under Force and Army XXI. Hopefully, our MI leadership will focus on what Major Smith has written and make appropriate decisions. Below, I offer a few personal observations, because I think we (i.e., Army MI) are not doing enough in the "big picture" IMINT arena. (I define "big picture" IMINT as being able to talk coherently about, and handle issues concerning, all aspects of IMINT, from national to tactical systems and from collection, exploitation, analysis, processing, and dissemination to budgetary and policy matters. Overall, IMINT has a diverse range of components.

From 1990 through 1993, I had the tremendous opportunity to work and learn a lot of "big picture" IMINT in the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and Central Imagery Office (CIO). Although I had no formal IMINT training prior to the assignment (I am a 35B, not a 35C), I was able to interact daily with IMINT experts in DCSINT; the Army Space Program Office; our sister Services; the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (OASDC^{3}I); the National Photographic Interpretation Center; Defense Mapping Agency; National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); and just about every element of the intelligence community, as well as myriad civilian contractors. By far, this has been the most demanding assignment I've had in the Army. Unfortunately, during this assignment I saw at first hand just how few Army experts there are who understand "big picture" IMINT. Granted we have good Army IMINT analysts, good Army IMINT collection managers, and even good Army IMINT experts in specialized areas, such as the imagery from the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System and unmanned aerial vehicles, but we are woefully short of experts in the "big picture" IMINT arena.

Whereas the Army practically dominates in the signals intelligence, human intelligence, and counterintelligence arenas, our performance in IMINT is not as strong. I would argue that the Air Force tends to dominate the "big picture" IMINT arena, while the Army and Navy tend to operate more in a "small picture" IMINT mind set, where they focus on specific aspects of IMINT but never bring it all together. A lot of this is mission-driven, but much of it is by choice. Just as Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM showed and contingency operations continue to show today, IMINT is perhaps the most technical of intelligence disciplines and it is perhaps the most in-demand form of intelligence. We simply can and should do better in the "big picture" IMINT arena.

I believe our biggest downfalls are in the areas of IMINT training and IMINT assignments. We need to do a much better job of training folks in the IMINT field. For example, based on a 1993 through 1995 assignment to Goodfellow Air Force Base as a company

(Continued on page 60)

Joint STARS in Bosnia:

Too Much Data
Too Little Intel?

by Lieutenant Colonel
Collin A. Agee

On the heels of great success in Operation DESERT STORM, a more mature Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) deployed in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in December 1995. The system was technically a quantum improvement from its desert-tested predecessor. However, the intelligence community struggled to constructively apply the system to peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. This article examines the application of a technologically advanced system to stability and support operations (SASOs) and documents lessons learned—specifically for our doctrine and force structure—and delves into the complexities of combined operations and the implications for intelligence operations.

DESERT STORM—A Tough Act to Follow

Joint STARS was justifiably lauded as one of the star performers during Operation DESERT STORM. U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill A. McPeak gushed, *"We will not ever again want to fight without a Joint STARS kind of system. It is just terrific."* Major General Stephen Silvasy, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Concepts, Doctrine and Development at the Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) seconded, *"Joint STARS worked. It saved countless Allied lives and proved to be critical to the outcome of DESERT STORM."* The VII Corps Commander, General Frederick M. Franks, Jr., provided this ground commander's assessment—

Joint STARS' power and flexibility provided the United States Army with a new dimension of battlefield surveillance which made a significant contribution to the overwhelming victory in Southwest Asia.

Given that the system was in its infancy, just two days in theater when the DESERT STORM ground campaign commenced, this performance was incredible. But a more favorable scenario could hardly have been conceived:

- ☐ A largely armored enemy that moved in mass formations.
- ☐ A clearly defined line separating the forces, at least at the outset.
- ☐ Limited civilian vehicular traffic.
- ☐ Virtually no terrain sufficient to cause radar masking.
- ☐ Minimal vegetation or built-up areas.
- ☐ Uniform, flat soil.
- ☐ Air supremacy and the freedom to use airspace for military purposes.
- ☐ The mission, assets, and capability to destroy identified targets.

This last bullet may be less obvious and certainly less benign than the others, but provided immediate tangible feedback as to the system's contributions to the war effort, usually in the form of burning tank hulks.

A Challenging Operational Environment

By contrast, Bosnia was much more problematic for the Joint STARS application:

- ☐ A non-standard enemy, at dispersed locations. The most immediate threats to the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) was mines and snipers, neither of which Joint STARS could detect.
- ☐ A zone of separation (ZOS) that plotted on the map like a drunk serpent.
- ☐ Extensive civilian traffic along the same routes used by the military. In fact, freedom of movement was one of IFOR's measures of success, so as the mission succeeded, the use of Joint STARS to track military movement got harder. Of note, however, is the fact that Joint STARS excelled at documenting this increased freedom of movement, both quantitatively and geographically.

General Joulwan wanted Joint STARS at his disposal...to gauge and enforce compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord

- ☐ Truly rugged terrain, with 70 to 80 percent of the land mass of the former Yugoslavia covered by hills and mountains.[1] In the French sector, radar shadowing was 84 percent. Smooth surfaces on some of the mountain faces generated false returns that were interpreted as moving target indicators (MTIs); a software fix is in the works.
- ☐ Considerable forested areas.
- ☐ Varied terrain ranging from mountains to karst, with numerous basins and valleys.
- ☐ Air supremacy, but active surface-to-air missiles and significant impediments to the most favorable orbits and aerial refueling locations due to civilian air traffic.



Figure 1. Locations of Joint STARS Ground Station Module Teams.

- ☐ A SASO environment in which a conventional attack was a last resort.

At one point, this accumulation of obstacles led the Ground Station Module (GSM) Task Force Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Steve Rotkoff, to call the system *"a nuclear sub in Kansas."*

The Vision

Despite this group of obstacles, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General George A. Joulwan, without question wanted Joint STARS at his disposal for peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. His vision was that Joint STARS, in conjunction with cross-cued collectors, most notably the Airborne Reconnaissance Low (ARL) system, would serve as his tools to monitor the ZOS, allowing him to gauge and enforce compliance with the Dayton Peace Accord. He articulated this vision to Colonel Robert DeBusk, the commander of the Joint STARS Squadron, Joint Task Force (JTF) 4500 (Provisional), on 2 January 1996. He made these comments during a rampside visit to the operational base for the Joint STARS aircraft at Rhein Main Air Force Base, Germany.

General Joulwan's intent was to confront factional leaders with hard (photographic) evidence of noncompliance. In fact, he proposed taking them for demonstration rides in the collection platforms to make clear that we were watching. I will discuss the ability to satisfy this intent later.

Multinational Operations

One of the most significant challenges of the Joint STARS deployment was integration into a combined operation, with support rendered to British and French Divisions as well as various combined headquarters. Potential consumers of Joint STARS products included both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and non-NATO members of IFOR, including the Russian Brigade.

Upon arrival in theater in late November 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Rotkoff and his staff began a frantic series of coordination visits to plan for a dozen GSMs at eleven sites in four countries (see the map in Figure 1). Unfortunately, the soon-to-arrive systems, with more than a dozen personnel and their complement of vehicles at some sites, had not been coordinated at national levels nor their acceptance articulated to the supported units. This placed the GSM coordination teams in the undesirable position of being traveling salesmen.

For those systems in "the box" (Bosnia), the European Command (EUCOM) assigned logistical responsibility to the U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), a logical arrangement since these teams were supporting ground units. For the two GSM teams outside the U.S. sector, USAREUR's ability to provide daily supply of the most mundane necessities—food, fuel, water, laundry and a place to sleep—was virtually impossible due to the distance to the nearest U.S. unit or line of communication (LOC).

The British Headquarters (HQ) at Gornji Vakuf provides the most dramatic example. Though located only about 40 kilometers as the crow flies from U.S. elements in Sarajevo, there was no connecting LOC. Resupply was only available via the British convoy from the port city of Split, Croatia. It soon became obvious that life support could only be obtained from the supported unit. In an immature theater with scarce re-

Photo provided by CPT Nielsen

Graffiti and destruction along the road leading to the Sarajevo Airport.

sources, this initially appeared to be a problem. The USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) discovered that there are implementing arrangements for mutual logistics support in effect with our Allies. This means of solving the logistics problem would have entailed tracking all the costs of support provided to the Americans by their British hosts—every meal, gallon of gas, and load of laundry. In turn, the Americans could have attempted to quantify the cost of the intelligence provided via their GSM. Fortunately, this bureaucratic, legalistic solution was not necessary as the Brits treated the Yanks as their own.

The Allied reception of the GSM teams was not just a logistic concern, but a force protection issue as well. The French initially rejected the team that arrived to support them in Sarajevo, in the face of severe space limitations. The team soon learned that Sarajevo was not a good place to be "homeless." In the words of the GSM Task Force (TF GSM) Commander:

> *We...ended up stranding a team in Sarajevo without a life support sponsor for several days. What made this particularly distressing was that Sarajevo was not a safe place. During our tenure, sniping incidents were almost a daily occurrence and on one occasion GSM soldiers...were in a vehicle hit by shrapnel while driving to the Sarajevo airport.*[2]

An additional factor in the background of all dealings with our Allies was the impending NATO selection of a ground surveillance system. The French entrant in the competition is the Horizon, an MTI radar which lacks Joint STARS' synthetic aperture radar (SAR) capability. The Italians have a comparable heliborne platform called CRESO. The British Airborne Stand-Off Radar (ASTOR) is on the drawing board, with a 2001 projected service date.[3] With two of these competitors supported by GSMs, tactical considerations potentially conflicted with national-level military and economic agendas.

Despite the aggressive efforts of all elements...the raw volume of hard intelligence was not impressive

A final hurdle that the United States stumbled over on this deployment was the foreign release of Joint STARS-produced intelligence. Our joint doctrine calls for two categories of shared intelligence:

- ☐ Level 1, which can be shown to but not retained by coalition and United Nations (U.N.) forces.
- ☐ Level 2, which has been properly cleared for release to coalition and U.N. forces.[4]

It further states, *"The methodology for exchanging intelligence should be conceived and exercised well before operations begin."*[5]

Early verbal guidance from the Joint STARS Squadron to the GSM crews was consistent with Level 1: they could permit their NATO partners to view data on their screens, but were prohibited from providing hard copies, which reduced the utility of the product.

The original written guidance in December 1995, promulgated by the U.S. Air Force's Disclosure Policy Branch, was ambiguous.[6] EUCOM did not publish definitive guidance until mid-February, a month and a half after initial operating capability was declared.[7] In the absence of such guidance, elements at British, French, and multinational headquarters had to make their own, localized decisions on releasability.

In any coalition undertaking, coordination is more complicated and time-consuming. In this instance, NATO, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, EUCOM, U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and USAREUR were involved in planning for the deployment, not to mention the HQ at each GSM site.

Lessons Learned

We learned many lessons for multinational operations. Among them are—

- ☐ Task organization should be established at the HQ which controls the military elements of both nations. The arrival of a system should not be a surprise to the recipient. The product must be validated within the intelligence framework at each supported HQ.
- ☐ Logistics arrangements should be agreed upon in advance. Strive for a relationship that approximates our own concept of attachment for logistical support. With this goal in mind, a U.S. element should be as self-sufficient as possible, and arrive prepared to in-

itially self-sustain in an immature operational area or when coordination for support has not been locked in.

- ☐ GSM crews serve as subject matter experts and liaison officers (LNOs)—"point men" for the system.
- ☐ Attachments must be sensitive to other factors which may impact on Allied receptiveness to their intelligence support.
- ☐ Foreign disclosure guidance should be established and disseminated prior to deployment.
- ☐ Planning for coalition operations is inherently more complicated and time-consuming.

Joint STARS Collection Management—A Decentralized Process

Tasking the aircraft occurs in two modes, not unlike preplanned and immediate calls for close air support. In the latter mode, the GSM crews transmit Radar Service Requests (RSRs) directly to the aircraft. (Although slave sites communicated with the aircraft via the master site, this was merely a relay, with no processing of the request.) In Bosnia, few targets could be identified far enough in advance for inclusion in the Air Tasking Order. More often, Joint STARS would be cross-cued via the supported unit's S2.

When these requests reached the aircraft, they were managed by the Airborne Target Surveillance Supervisor, an Army senior noncommissioned officer, and the Airborne Surveillance Officer, an Air Force officer. But they usually dealt with rather cryptic RSRs without knowing the context of many of the requests they were servicing. This was somewhat disconcerting to the air crew, the Combined Air Operations Center, who perceived themselves as the clearing house for all requests, and various entities who sought to document the contributions of the system.



Photo provided by LTC Grainer

A destroyed building along a rural route in Sarajevo.

This decentralized collection management, however, is consistent with our doctrine, which advocates broadcast intelligence to facilitate command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence for the warrior.[8] In essence, the Joint STARS downlink is a form of broadcast intelligence in that the vast quantity of data continuously provided in the MTI mode overwhelms any one element's ability to digest it all. However, it does allow an individual GSM to focus on specific named areas of interest. If the supported commander gets a timely response to his priority intelligence requirements, that is success, even if the air crew or a higher HQ collection management cell is oblivious to the success. If the information warrants, it can be passed to other users or fused into an all-source product that results in a more complete picture of the battlefield.

Freedom to Maneuver (More Accurately, Freedom to Collect)

While the skies above the former Yugoslavia would intuitively seem a permissive flight environment, with air supremacy and only minimal risk of engagement from ground weapons, the Joint STARS squadron's use of airspace was significantly restricted. This hampered their efforts to overcome the limitations of the rugged terrain. Even over Hungary (which provided access to substantial ground facilities, airfields, and LOCs), safety concerns for civilian air traffic routes constrained the airspace.

Unless we return to the desert (a flat one at that), we will confront radar shadowing by both natural and man-made objects in any future contingency. Flexibility in orbit selection and adjustment, based on a sound risk assessment and early planning, will lessen this obstacle by permitting the sensors to look down at terrain features rather than across them.

Synchronizing Operations and Intelligence

One of the seven basic principles of intelligence espoused in our joint doctrine is that we must "synchronize intelligence with operations."[9] Our military intelligence doctrine more specifically prescribes that our "intelligence analysis is best done in the context of understanding the relative friendly-adversary situation."[10] In the initial stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the flow of the IFOR into the theater was of great concern. For S2s, factional reaction or potential interdiction of those movements was of obvious interest. Unfortunately, the Joint STARS mission planning cell and air crews had poor visibility on friendly dispositions, plans, and movements.

Since battlefield management is one of the major advertised capabilities of Joint STARS,[11] we need to integrate operators into the Joint STARS planning team. For

this deployment, the integration could have taken the form of LNOs assigned to the JTF 4500 mission planning cell at Rhein Main to provide insight into planned friendly activities and assess changes in the friendly situation during mission execution.

Force Structure Implications

The doctrinal size of a GSM team comprises two shift leaders, four operators (military operational specialty 96H), and a maintainer (MOS 33T).[12] The actual size of the deployed teams for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, including the contractors, LNOs and supervisors, ranged from 9 to 15. That operational complement of six was designed to support 24-hour operations. For this mission, with two aircraft available, data flowed less than 12 hours daily, yet the teams were stretched to the limit. In addition to the time spent at the console, these teams must also conduct their personal hygiene, system maintenance, and pre- and post-mission analysis (including extensive replay and manipulation of data). They must also perform their fair share of guard duty and other details. The JOINT ENDEAVOR crews accomplished this for 56 consecutive days without a day off. In total, the operation lasted three months.

The projected fleet of E-8 Joint STARS aircraft will number as many as nineteen, depending on budget decisions. This means that sustained, 24-hour data flow is on the horizon. This will overtax our crews as currently comprised, degrading their performance.

The days of the GSM company are numbered according to the modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) due to be implemented in September 1996. It will delete B Company from the Operations Battalion of corps military intelligence (MI) brigades. During JOINT ENDEAVOR, company commanders from both Fort Bragg and Fort Hood were gainfully employed supervising the employment and sustainment of the dozen teams at widely separated locations. Had this deployment occurred a year later, after the MTOE change, the GSM deployment could not have happened, at least not in the fashion executed by TF GSM. Downsizing notwithstanding, this role for the company HQ, while deployed, reinforces what we already knew about the company's role in training at the home station. The GSM company is essential for command and control as well as logistical support.

Looking ahead, our force structure experts should carefully consider the manning and skill requirements for the impending Common Ground Station (CGS). We learned that the GSM crews were not just system operators, but were expected to interpret their data and synthesize it into the known intelligence situation. This requirement will be magnified by the addition of unmanned aerial vehicles, signals intelligence, aviation, broadcast intelligence, and secondary imagery on the CGS. The Army Intelligence Center advertises the following capabilities for the CGS:

- ☐ Situation development.
- ☐ Battle management.
- ☐ Targeting.
- ☐ Force protection.
- ☐ Limited battle damage assessment and target damage assessment.
- ☐ Operations planning.[13]

This impressive access to intelligence cries for an information manager who is part system expert, part analyst, and part collection manager. The information manager should be trained and employed on the battlefield by the MI brigade at corps level, and by the MI battalion at division. The abundance of information carries with it the risk that it will not be massaged into intelligence, and this incredible technology will fail to deliver to the commander a coherent, tactically useful product. As we evolve toward Intel XXI, we must be mindful that the intelligence task "present" is just as dependent on our expertise as it is on emerging technologies. The right combination of staffing, training, and equipment will result in our goal of helping the commander to *"understand the impact of what is being presented and use that understanding to make knowledge-based decisions."*[14]

the ultimate "consumer" of their intelligence may well be a potential belligerent

This operation also suggests reassessing the composition of the mission planning cell within the Joint STARS squadron. The majority of this cell is comprised of air crew members who are not flying, on a rotational basis. Doctrinally, 3 to 5 members of a 21-person crew are Army.[15] A small, permanent intelligence cell had no Army representation and was augmented by two Army analysts from the USAREUR Combat Intelligence Readiness Facility.

While the Air Force is likely to continue to outnumber the Army on the air crew, we need a permanent Army presence in the intelligence cell, in the form of three to five 96B analysts. This modification will better equip the mission planning cell to provide accurate mission briefs. In this contingency, despite the wings on the collector, the collection targets were almost exclusively ground targets.

Digesting the Data

Perhaps the biggest challenge to effective use of the system was data overload: the inability to distinguish significant MTIs from the voluminous data stream. From the first training mission, it became apparent that the screen would quickly fill with MTIs, making it difficult to determine those of military significance. As the

(Continued on page 40)

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations

by Lieutenant Colonel George K. Gramer, Jr.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The challenge to provide intelligence to the commander is not isolated at tactical units or just with the United States Army. In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) faces a unique intelligence challenge. It is developing tactics, techniques, and procedures to ensure that the Commander, IFOR (COMIFOR), receives the proper level and amount of intelligence to accomplish his mission. This article will examine several aspects of IFOR combined and joint intelligence in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Collection Priorities

Intelligence is for the commander. The COMIFOR was extremely cooperative in approving and updating the commander's critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. The dynamic situation in the former Yugoslavia demanded continual refinement and proper articulation of IFOR requirements to higher as well as subordinate headquarters. The nature of the Bosnia-Herzegovina peace implementation scenario dictated that these requirements focus on both traditional and less traditional intelligence requirements. Force protection for IFOR personnel and the safety of personnel working for non-governmental organizations was always paramount. Close behind in importance was entity compliance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace, also referred to as the Dayton Peace Accord. Intelligence and operational information on compliance issues was the predominant topic of daily reporting and briefings at the four-star level, and was generally the most easily obtainable information through military intelligence (MI) collection capabilities.

There were, however, several areas in which traditional MI collection capabilities were less prepared to collect. They included—

- ☐ The stability of the Bosnian Federation.
- ☐ Predictive intelligence information concerning the Bosnian elections.
- ☐ Political issues concerning the three former warring factions.
- ☐ The possibility of tampering with mass grave sites identified by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

Each of these demanded new perspectives on the intelligence mission and the manner in which we collected and reported military information and intelligence.

Split-Based Out Of Necessity

Although originally envisioned as a robustly staffed headquarters, necessity dictated that Headquarters (HQ) IFOR maintain an austere seven-person intelligence staff consisting primarily of augmentees from the participating NATO countries. The Sarajevo intelligence team comprised—

- ☐ The combined J2 (CJ2), the Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, a Turkish brigadier general.
- ☐ A director (essentially the deputy), usually a U.S. or British colonel or lieutenant colonel.
- ☐ Two or three Joint Operations Center (JOC) intelligence watch officer-briefers, from the entire range of participating NATO countries.
- ☐ A tasking coordinator, a U.S. or Canadian major or captain.
- ☐ An intelligence noncommissioned officer (NCO), normally a British signals intelligence (SIGINT) sergeant augmentee.
- ☐ A British, Italian, or U.S. administrative NCO from the AFSOUTH staff.

Also on the intelligence books—but working for the Combined J3 (CJ3) Operations Directorate—were three intelligence planners.

Due to the small Sarajevo staff, the AFSOUTH Intelligence Directorate in Naples with about sixty assigned personnel became the de facto split-based intelligence rear support element (IFOR Rear). Most important, AFSOUTH provided the pool of qualified personnel, principally augmentees, who deployed into Sarajevo for two- to six-week work rotations in the CJ2. Further, the permanent staff in Naples was able to provide the long-term assessments, collection management, counterintelligence and force protection support, briefings, and staff actions. This enabled the CJ2 staff in Sarajevo to perform its indications and warning functions and meet the day-to-day current intelligence needs of the COMIFOR.

Knowledge of English and automation was essential

Differences in Personnel

NATO and IFOR nations' intelligence personnel differ in their training and experience and how they employed their NCOs. Each member of the intelligence team had differing background skills and strengths in intelligence. This ranged widely from the completely untrained to the MI officer with extensive formal schooling. The latter were generally the Canadian, British, and U.S. personnel. Regardless of parent Service or rank, however, most NATO nations provided quality personnel to support the HQ IFOR and AFSOUTH intelligence missions. Because of the austere personnel staffing, the CJ2 could not afford to retain those who could not contribute fully in Sarajevo. The lesser qualified remained in Naples and participated from there.

Only the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) provided intelligence NCOs to AFSOUTH. Because most of the other IFOR nations did not have a developed, professionalized NCO corps, there was hesitancy to use the NCOs in HQ IFOR to the extent they would be in a headquarters comprised of only U.S. or UK personnel. All of the NCOs contributed significantly and could well have contributed as much as the commissioned officers present. However, their duties were limited in scope and level of responsibility by the overall NATO tendency to inhibit the role and responsibility of NCOs.

Personnel Qualifications

Knowledge of both English and automation was essential. The single most critical requirement for personnel assigned to the COMIFOR's intelligence staff in Sarajevo was the ability to read, write, brief, think, and react in the English language. All briefings and reports to COMIFOR were in English; to support COMIFOR adequately required a 3/3 English language capability. Second only to English language capability was one's ability to use the automation resources available to ensure mission accomplishment. As with language and intelligence training, the levels of automation skills brought to the table by the team members varied.



Photo provided by LTC Gramer

Destruction of resort building atop Mount Igman.

At HQ IFOR, the two main automation systems used were the Linked Operation–Intelligence Centers Europe (LOCE) and the NATO wide-area network (WAN) E-mail system. The LOCE is definitely not a user-friendly system. It had difficult operating instructions, and the LOCE systems were limited to one at HQ IFOR and two at IFOR Rear. The WAN was at times clogged with message traffic or downed by system mechanical problems, weather, or maintenance. While both systems served well in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, both caused challenges provoking at times extraordinary systems-remediating procedures.

When faced with the dual challenge of operating in a foreign language (English) and operating complicated technical systems for which they had little background, some personnel were clearly in over their heads. They were thus essentially rendered mission ineffective in Sarajevo.

The ARRC INTSUM And Its Impact

The Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) serves as the ground component of IFOR. Without a doubt, the single most important intelligence product in the theater was the daily ARRC Intelligence Summary (INTSUM). This product, released each morning at approximately 0400 hours, was more of an operational INTSUM of the previous 24 hours than exclusively an intelligence summary. In fact, the mix of operational and intelligence information and the INTSUM's rather awkward format made immediate use of the document sometimes difficult at best—again impacting the non-native English speakers at HQ IFOR.

With blurred lines of reporting, the ARRC INTSUM often provided better operational reporting than that produced by the ARRC G3. As a result, there was frequent confusion or disagreement in the early morning hours in the HQ IFOR JOC as the CJ2 and CJ3 watch officers debated which directorate would report the information in the JOC Situation Report (SITREP) and in the morning briefing to COMIFOR.

The impact of the ARRC INTSUM was considerable. It was clearly the premier releasable intelligence information in theater. There were other daily products of importance, notably the Joint Analysis Center Molesworth Balkan INTSUM and the ARRC Commander's Assessment Report and SITREP. HQ IFOR also received infrequent products from the national intelligence agencies of several NATO nations, includ-

redundant reporting added the impression of multi-source validation

ing the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Unfortunately, most releasable reporting subsequent to the ARRC INTSUM was a regurgitation of the ARRC INTSUM in a variety of other formats. This led to redundant reporting of the same data by multiple reporters which can add an impression of multisource validation. To add to this confusion, some theater and national intelligence agencies reported data as soon as possible, whether corroborated or not, often requiring retractions. There was relatively little analysis or assessment in most of the releasable intelligence products. As a result, some of these products and the intelligence centers producing them were extensively criticized by the IFOR leadership.

A considerable surprise was the paucity of releasable intelligence information reporting reaching the HQ IFOR level considering the presence of nearly 60,000 potential intelligence collectors throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and the array of intelligence assets and personnel deployed in theater. Because all three of the multinational divisions had their own national agendas in addition to their NATO responsibilities, it is likely that significant portions of their intelligence collection were siphoned off to national command channels or national intelligence agencies rather than being reported to the ARRC and HQ IFOR.

Mini Intelligence Fiefdoms

Contributing to the intelligence frustration in the theater was the proliferation of intelligence entities by nations and agencies. At HQ AFSOUTH in Naples, no less than six separate intelligence entities existed in addition to the AFSOUTH Intelligence Directorate. In Sarajevo, there were at least ten national intelligence centers primarily dedicated to providing intelligence releasable only to their own nations. With one exception, these centers were at the ARRC, fifteen minutes across town from HQ IFOR. It was clear that not only were they providing data of limited releasability, their focus was away from HQ IFOR.



Figure 1. Areas of Ethnic Control.

Some of these intelligence entities did not even readily and easily share their intelligence information with consumers from their own nations. Three U.S. intelligence agencies shared an office adjacent to the COMIFOR's office. It is natural that COMIFOR, as a senior U.S. flag officer, would rely heavily on his own nation's premier intelligence agencies. Each of these entities ensured that their agency's product was prepared, packaged, provided to, and seen expeditiously by the COMIFOR. Cleared members of the HQ IFOR intelligence and operations staffs, however, sometimes received this information incidentally or accidentally and generally not in a timely manner.

Contributions of the Intelligence Disciplines

Human intelligence (HUMINT) was clearly the number one collector in theater. Nearly one hundred percent of the information in the ARRC INTSUM was from HUMINT collection. Additionally, counterintelligence programs in the ARRC appeared to be robust and fully functioning.

NATO-releasable SIGINT reporting consistently was a day late and a dollar short. It often comprised only marginally useful information as much as three to four days old. SIGINT not releasable to all the NATO and IFOR partners existed in fairly large quantities; however, its limited distribution decreased its ultimate value to HQ IFOR significantly.

Imagery intelligence (IMINT), particularly when applied to intelligence requirements such as mass graves or entity cantonment

of major weapon systems was sufficient and satisfactory. It appears, however, that to accommodate NATO national agendas, an excess of tactical reconnaissance assets deployed in theater, and the resultant products were often less than satisfactory.

Change To Predictive Assessment Briefings

The twice-daily briefings to the COMIFOR were occasionally intelligence bloodbaths. It is not that the information provided was necessarily wrong nor untimely. Considering the NATO Confidential/IFOR Releasable information available, the intelligence briefers performed extraordinarily well. Because the COMIFOR and his staff had already received intelligence from U.S. national sources, he could be told little new from existing NATO-releasable information.

The original briefing methodology was threefold: to provide highlights to the COMIFOR, to provide current intelligence information to the HQ IFOR staff, and to obtain decisions from the COMIFOR. By April 1996, however, a change in the way the CJ2 prepared and produced the daily briefing was clearly necessary. The morning production expanded from a summation of the previous night's Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps INTSUM to a three-part presentation consisting of—

- ☐ A quick analysis of the activity of the last 24 hours.
- ☐ A 72-hour assessment looking ahead through the next three days in theater.
- ☐ A special assessment, usually long-term and predictive in nature.

This major change in our method of presenting intelligence information to the COMIFOR was an impossible task for the seven-person intelligence staff in Sarajevo to do alone. The CJ2 tasked the efforts of the IFOR Rear (AFSOUTH in Naples) to assist the austere forward CJ2 team to prepare intelligence products. This proved difficult on those occasions where the writer-researcher in Naples was not fully up to date on the situation from the Sarajevo perspective. Nonetheless, using this split-based formula, a considerable number of outstanding think-pieces were provided to the COMIFOR and his staff using the full intelligence strength of the AFSOUTH Intelligence Directorate.

Recommendations

Several major points should be examined when NATO ends its mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1996. Initially, while Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR should have been a come-as-you-are peacekeeping operation, based on the organic expertise, assets, and capability within NATO, it was obvious that HQ IFOR could not have operated day in and day out without heavy, extensive augmentation. NATO must be able to do it on its own in the future without augmentation.

Next, the intelligence assets and their capabilities must match the requirements. Due to the non-military nature of many of the COMIFOR's intelligence requirements, HQ IFOR should have had the ability to impact more extensively on non-military collectors and receive releasable products in return. Concurrently, the abundance of intelligence assets in theater produced a relative shortage of intelligence reporting for HQ IFOR. Further, NATO remains a political organization, and as such, sixteen national agendas must be satisfied. The correct political spin was needed, even on intelligence—a product which generally should be devoid of specific political consideration or bias.

Progress is still needed in the classification and releasability of combined-joint intelligence information. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR led to great progress in information sharing, even with IFOR nations which a few years ago would never have intentionally received NATO intelligence. Today, we should foresee continued combined and coalition operations and plan for future releasability based on that reality. Also, NATO appears to be strengthening its post-Warsaw Pact role in Europe. We must have policies and procedures in place to ensure the widest dissemination of all available intelligence information among the sixteen NATO partners.

Finally, intelligence operations during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR have been frustrating since the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) have been so tremendously successful—in part due to outstanding intelligence and operations efforts by all of the IFOR participants. What has been disconcerting remains the much slower accomplishment of the civilian aspects of the GFAP. This is due to political entities which neither respond to nor fully cooperate with the military entities in the theater. The GFAP set up the dual military and political chains of responsibility due to the vast scope of the entire mission requirement. It remains to be seen if the civilian aspects of the GFAP will be accomplished with the alacrity and smoothness of the military aspects, and whether political necessity will dictate some form of continued outside military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the end of IFOR's mandate in December 1996.

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Joint STARS Support to Special Operations Command

by Captain Bruce A. Niedrauer

Along with the many other milestones that the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) accomplished during its time at Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, for the first time its unique capabilities were in direct support of Special Operations Forces (SOF). To promote this support, a Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM) deployed to the Special Operations Command (SOC) Implementation Force (SOCIFOR).

This Ground Station Module (GSM) provided near-real-time access via satellite communications (SATCOMs) to Joint STARS imagery being collected in the Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR area of responsibility. With the GSM, the SOCIFOR could perform wide-area collection and surveillance, including moving target indicators, fixed target indicators, and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery. In addition to the GSM prototype, a time-critical targeting aid (TCTA) remote workstation prototype also deployed.

To make this historic Joint STARS–SOC venture work, it required collaboration and initiative from both sides. The distinctive needs of SOCIFOR exacerbated the already complex employment of Joint STARS in a peacekeeping operation. SOF missions are characterized by covert, small-unit operations. The challenge was to employ fully Joint STARS' wide-area surveillance potential in support of the dynamic and complex SOF mission requirements. (Figure 1 depicts Joint STARS-SOF connectivity in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.)

Lessons Learned

Phase one of the deployment was to familiarize SOCIFOR personnel with Joint STARS' capabilities and limitations. These initial orientation briefings proved essential. No supported command can exploit Joint STARS potential unless it has a firm comprehension of the system's capabilities. All new systems, Joint STARS included, must "sell" themselves to the user. Systems that are not understood are under- or misused. Once the J2 and collection manager had the briefings, the SOCIFOR's all-source collection plan integrated Joint STARS.

One of the first lessons learned was that initial orientation and familiarization briefs must take place as early as possible. As soon as the deployment warning order is issued, a Joint STARS liaison officer (LNO) must be sent forward to the supported command. This allows Joint STARS inclusion in the command's initial entry collection plan.

Another valuable lesson derived from the SOCIFOR–Joint STARS relationship is the merit of a full time LNO. The Joint STARS GSM crew cannot show up and just say *"here we are, use us."* Rather, the LNO and crew must arrive with a draft strategy on how **they** can support the command. The supported command should not be expected to unilaterally develop the Joint STARS plan. The LNO must fully understand all Joint STARS capabilities, collection management, and the mission and intent of the supported command. His tasks include facilitating Joint STARS employment, assisting in the development of the requirements, and interaction with the GSM crew.

Once Joint STARS was understood, the next step was developing a viable collection plan. To do this, we used the procedures discussed in **FM 34-2, Collection Management and Synchronization Planning**. The most important component of collection management is to accurately develop the requirement. Collection management's major purpose is helping the commander make decisions. To do this, the proper questions (priority intelligence requirements, or PIR) must be inquired and ultimately answered



Figure 1. Joint STARS Special Operation Forces Connectivity.

during the collection process. For example, the SOCIFOR commander's number one PIR dealt with possible Mujahideen and Iranian terrorist threats. The challenge was to develop a comprehensive Joint STARS collection strategy that would help answer this PIR and provide input for the commander's decisions.

Eight-Step Methodology

The J2 staff and the Joint STARS LNO collaboratively developed an eight-step methodology to help answer this PIR. The first step was to identify all known or suspected locations of terrorist elements. Ultimately, using all-source intelligence databases, we identified well over 50 training camps and similar facilities. Most of these locations were between Tulsa and Sarajevo and had been cataloged prior to the Peace Implementation Force (IFOR) deployment by U.N. personnel. (See Figure 2.)

Step two entailed separating the more than 50 sites based on their Joint STARS collectability. Criteria used to divide the sites were threefold.

First, does the collection platform have line of sight (LOS) to the target area? Using terrain analysis, a radar visibility assessment was made. We rejected camp sites masked by terrain.

The second criteria determined whether the site was near towns or villages. If the camps were in proximity to an urban center, the collateral civilian traffic would preclude attributing vehicle movement to the terrorists. Joint STARS identifies moving targets, not the allegiance of those moving vehicles. We hoped that by focusing on sites in remote areas, we could exclude most civilian traffic.

Finally, for the same reason discussed in criteria two, we dismissed sites located near major roads or other lines of communication (LOCs). Rejection of camp locations did not imply presence or absence of terrorist activity, but rather the inability of Joint STARS sensors to accurately collect against them. The final tally reduced the total number of target locations to seven.

Figure 2. Suspected Terrorist Camps.

After reduction of the target list, we gathered archived intelligence data of each site to provide an all-source snapshot. This included intelligence reports, photographic imagery, and other data. This information provided the GSM operators (96H military occupational specialty) with a better idea of where and on what to focus their surveillance. They compared imagery to the existing electronic maps installed on the GSM consoles. The GSM operators identified and marked ingress and egress routes, allowing precise tracking.

With a historical all-source picture developed, the next step entailed updating this information. The Joint STARS SAR capability provided still radar images of each location. This furnished near-real-time updates to each of the target databases and immediate feedback on recent changes.

The near-real-time updates provided J2 analysts and GSM operators with insight to current conditions. For instance, if access to a suspected camp was via a bridge, analysts could quickly ascertain the status of that bridge by having a SAR image shot. Thus, if on days one through three, there had been noticeable movement into the terrorist camp and then on the fourth day the movement abruptly stops, a SAR showing a dropped span on the bridge would explain the absence of activity.

Identifying traffic pattern norms was the essence of this collection mission. We monitored movement of traffic into, through, and out of each target location and placed this data into a histograph that depicted movement norms for each site. Once a pattern was established for a camp, the pattern was analyzed for correlation to outside influences.

Particular emphasis was placed on tracking organized convoys. Consistent intervals, common speed, and apparent driver discipline distinguished convoys from random traffic. Convoys departing terrorist camps represented the greatest overt threat.

The GSM operators correlated the traffic pattern norms with several outside factors including—

- ☐ Weather.
- ☐ Day of the week.

- ☐ Time of day.
- ☐ IFOR operations.
- ☐ Political events.
- ☐ Unfolding of the Dayton Peace Accord.
- ☐ Freedom of movement holidays such as Ramadan.

Joint STARS alone could not determine whether this collected data represented an active Mujahideen camp or coincidental civilian traffic. Only systems which are "eyes on" can confirm specific terrorist activity.

However, we observed discernible traffic patterns within several of the suspected camps. Two particular camps were in ideal areas for Joint STARS collection. Both were in isolated areas and had relatively good LOS. If these areas were in fact occupied terrorist camps, the presence of Mujahideen fighters would likely deter civilian traffic. However, if the camps were unoccupied or used sporadically, other possible explanations for movement may include civilians hunting or wood cutting, black marketers avoiding standard LOCs, government army patrols, or IFOR units.

The next step was to determine the common destination and start points for possible terrorist traffic. Ideally, this would have been a critical step in the process; however, the mountainous terrain precluded an accurate tracking of vehicles to and from their destinations.

Joint STARS imagery and the associated databases cross-cued other tactical collection platforms. The SOCIFOR collection manager used all available national and theater assets to confirm the information Joint STARS had collected. This was crucial in the process. Joint STARS simply indicated that movement was occurring; an "eyes-on" system had to confirm the source of that movement.

Finally, we incorporated the entire process into a usable mechanism for force protection. Once the GSM crew cataloged each location's traffic norm, they established indications and warning criteria. Substantial deviations from the norm indicated a potential threat to IFOR personnel and interests.

Generally, the alarm criterion was double the normal traffic flow. For example, if the traffic at Camp X on Wednesdays between 1800 and 1900 averaged three vehicles, and on this Wednesday at 1825 seven vehicles departed, then the GSM operator would alert the J2 for cross-cueing.

Conclusion

In addition to real-world collection, the Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR deployment provided an environment for research into future Joint STARS support to a variety of SOF missions. We developed mission profiles for Joint STARS support to several SOF missions, including—

- ☐ Combat search and rescue.
- ☐ Noncombatant evacuation operation.
- ☐ Direct action.
- ☐ AC-130 Specter targeting.

During the deployment, we also conducted an examination of Joint STARS equipment capabilities for future SOF applications. The prototype TCTA remote workstation provides ample capability for most SOF missions, while at the same time significantly reducing the personnel and equipment footprints. Rather than be tied to an established package, the TCTA enables the SOF commander to tactically tailor his Joint STARS support slice.

The scope of future Joint STARS support to SOF missions is only limited by the imagination and initiative of the planners. Its unique capability can fill a current void and provide long-duration wide-area surveillance. Nurturing a habitual relationship, including comprehensive rehearsals and training missions, will ensure successful Joint STARS support to future SOF operations.

Captain Niedrauer is now working in systems automation at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania; his most recent assignment was instructing at the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, Arizona. He served as the Joint STARS LNO to SOCIFOR early in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Captain Niedrauer has a bachelor of arts degree in History from San Jose State and Master of Education degree from the University of Phoenix. Readers can contact the author via E-mail at 76355,2337@ compuserve.com.

Doctrine For Multinational Operations Due Out This Fall

The Training and Doctrine Command's office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Doctrine is writing **FM 100-8, The Army in Multinational Operations**, a doctrinal publication meant to help leaders and commanders work with other countries' armies. Distribution of the manual is slated for this fall.

This manual basically goes into some of the considerations, command structures, different areas of the battlespace, and what they should look like. One annex of the manual is a checklist based on one developed by the 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, New York, for dealing with international partners. This checklist is divided into categories. For example, what are the allied engineer elements that will be working with U.S. Army engineers? What are their capabilities? What type of equipment do they have? The checklist is probably one of the things in the manual that is a little more specific than usual. The rest of the manual tends to be more general, going through all the considerations in allied operations.

TRADOC staffed the draft manual with the Air Force, Navy, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization, and a North Atlantic Treaty Organization doctrinal working group. They received comments from members of the working group who said they like the way it is set up. They said that it gives them an idea of how the U.S. Army looks at working in the multinational environment.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR:
Logistics Supporting the GSM Task Force

by Captain James V. Hintz III
and Major Lester W. Pinkney

The logistics arena has always received a great deal of scrutiny during and after military operations. For the most part, existing techniques, tactics and procedures (TTP) have focused on the maneuver battlefield operating system. The TTP draw upon captured data to reduce the probability of a support structure lacking the personnel, equipment and supplies required to ensure success. During our most recent deployment, to Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, we identified the importance of logistics in support of intelligence teams. Our Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module (GSM) task force (TF)—we called ourselves TF Rotkoff—consisted of ten task-organized GSM teams with personnel from several different posts in the Continental United States (CONUS). This article provides an overview of how TF Rotkoff planned, deployed, and executed logistics operations in support of GSM teams deployed in Hungary, Italy, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Early and Coordinated Planning

The deployment of the GSMs in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR presented a unique challenge because it did not consist of a direct or general support intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) team assigned to a division or corps. In this instance, intelligence soldiers, civilians, and equipment deployed from seven CONUS locations. These included Fort Hood, Texas; Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Fort Huachuca, Arizona; Fort Monmouth, New Jersey; Hunter Army Airfield, Georgia; the Operational Test and Evaluation Command (OPTEC); and the Joint Test Force from Melbourne, Florida. We deployed to Europe with contractors from Motorola to form TF Rotkoff at Rhein Main Air Force Base, Germany. Each element of the task force worked with a number of Air Force and Army movement teams to execute their transition to Rhein Main.

The first elements from the 303d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion at Fort Hood deployed from Robert Gray Army Airfield within two days of receiving the order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In less than ten days, the entire task force had assembled at the intermediate staging base-main operating base (ISB/MOB) at Rhein Main. The ability of all the elements to deploy rapidly was due in part to planning meetings conducted at Fort Hood with representatives from each of the elements and units deploying as TF Rotkoff. These planning meetings provided the opportunity to discuss and develop detailed movement and load plans for deploying personnel and equipment. We considered details such as the need for additional vehicles to ensure seating for Motorola contractors, movement of the GSM-specific Prescribed Load List and Authorized Stockage List, and maintenance support. For example, as we reviewed the maintenance support options, we tailored teams based on their deployed site locations and the likelihood of cross-country movement or convoy requirements. After establishing that the team supporting the 5th United Kingdom Division would move from Split, Croatia, some 200 kilometers (km) to Gornji Vakuf, Bosnia, we augmented the team with a wheeled vehicle mechanic (military occupational specialty (MOS) 63B). Conversely, support that deployed to Italy with the GSM teams was, for the most part, centralized at Aviano. Given the essential task of conducting operations for up to 179 days, all teams were reinforced with an air conditioning and generator mechanic (MOS 52D), an IEW repairman (MOS 33T), and a Motorola technician. This decision allowed the TF to maintain systems at an operational readiness of 97 percent for more than four months.

> **After arriving at the MOB, our challenge became the deployment of the systems to their final destinations**

We next attempted to reduce our airlift requirements. During this process, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) indicated we could acquire camouflage netting in theater which helped reduce our airlift needs. Aircraft type also determined the airlift necessary. For instance, the Medium Ground Station Module (MGSM) required either C-5 or C-17 aircraft support for airlift due to the height of the vehicle with the shelter; the use of C-141s would have required crane support at locations in CONUS, the ISB/MOB, and at airfields in Hungary, Italy, and Bosnia, to mount and remove shelters on vehicles. This need significantly increased the amount of time necessary to move elements into their final sites. Therefore, the planners at Forts Bragg and Hood worked unremittingly for C-5 and C-17 support, and the Air Force delivered.

Another element that assisted in our ability to deploy quickly was the establishment of "push teams." These push teams consisted of an officer and noncommissioned officer in charge that assumed the responsibility for

executing many of the final administrative requirements needed to put our equipment on the aircraft. Push teams successfully walked GSM elements through the joint inspection, handled all hazardous material (HAZMAT) requirements, built pallets, and controlled the aircraft manifest of the unit personnel. Additionally, vehicles deploying from Fort Hood were painted with sand color camouflage the weekend before the first aircraft arrived. Again, members of the push team and the maintenance section, under the control of our very capable maintenance technician, planned, coordinated, and executed vehicle preparation, technical inspections, and a demanding cycle of vehicle painting.

One of the challenges encountered...was resupply of Class IX to the teams attached to the British and French units

Flexibility And Anticipation

Our preparation for deployment included inspections and updates of each company's Automated Unit Equipment Load documents. Beginning August 1995, the 303d MI Battalion conducted monthly movement working groups that enhanced our readiness posture as equipment requirements and operational site locations continually changed. The 319th MI Battalion from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, based its initial movement planning on data associated with the Improved GSM (IGSM). This later changed as the Department of the Army directed the fielding of five MGSMs to the unit. This change required the unit to undergo new equipment training and reconfigured the air load planning documents. The availability of on-site contractors enhanced their ability to quickly train soldiers and was instrumental in preventing any delay in the TF's deployment.

As we executed last minute planning, some confusion surrounded our ammunition-draw location (CONUS or outside CONUS (OCONUS)) for all TF elements. Although USAREUR agreed that drawing ammunition (supply Class V) OCONUS would simplify movement requirements, Forces Command directed us to move with ammunition. This requirement dictated special airlift and handling requirements for M203 (40-millimeter) ammunition and other administrative requirements to move and store Class V at the ISB/MOB. Had we drawn ammunition in theater, we would have simplified the turn-in process and the accountability of ammunition upon notification of redeployment. As it was, neither the teams in Sarajevo (319th MI Battalion) and Gornji Vakuf (303d MI Battalion) nor the supporting headquarters could identify turn-in locations in Sarajevo. Therefore, both teams coordinated to redeploy back home with their ammunition. The TF Headquarters experienced similar problems at the ISB/MOB and also coordinated redeploying with the remaining Class V. Clearly this type of deployment should allow units to establish accounts and draw ammunition upon arrival in theater.

Movement To Forward Sites

After arriving at the MOB, our challenge became the deployment of the systems to their final destinations in Hungary, Italy, and Bosnia. In reality, this meant ten mini-deployments, each with its own challenges and peculiarities. Planning the deployment of each system was slow and continually changed due to the lack of guidance concerning final site selection, supporting units, and aircraft weather delays. Once we finalized the site selections, systems deployed to locations in Italy at San Vito, Aviano, and Vicenza; two IGSMs to Rhein Main Air



Force Base; two MGSMs to Hungary at Taszar and Kapsovar; and five systems to Bosnia-Herzegovina at Gornji Vakuf, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Biejla, and Vlasenica. (See the map on page 7 in Lieutenant Colonel Agee's article.)

The 319th MI Battalion assisted in planning the forward deployment of GSMs by integrating one of its air movement planners into the TF headquarters. Her ability to quickly identify and plan for Air Force procedural requirements streamlined much of the "red tape" associated with air movement in the theater. In this instance, the dedicated air load planners and HAZMAT-certified soldiers in theater were essential. We were also fortunate in that the Air Force movements officer was a true "team player" and became dual-hatted as an Army LNO to the Air Force.

Push Packages Assisted Sustainment

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) Logistics Plan was a combination of United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) and USAEUR support. EUCOM identified USAFE to support the GSM teams in Italy and Germany, and USAEUR to provide support to those deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Hungary. This concept was hindered primarily for four reasons:

- ☐ The plan reached the soldiers and executors at the headquarters responsible for implementing the plan months into the deployment.
- ☐ There was no established memorandum of agreement for international logistics support that outlined the specifics of support required.
- ☐ Critical GSM components were not sent with the supporting headquarters because there was no established baseline for critical components with high failure rates.
- ☐ We did not have a habitual support relationship with our supporting headquarters.

Therefore, what took place initially was a mixture of using our contacts, local purchase, and sustainment supplies that we had built for 20 to 25 days rather than the normal 15 days. The key is that soldiers remained flexible, persevered and never took "no" as an answer. We also maintained supporting documentation (like the EUCOM Logistical Concept) on hand and persistently educated supporting agencies and headquarters on our mission and requirements.

One of the peculiar challenges encountered by the task force was resupply of Class IX (repair parts) to the teams attached to the British and French units. We obtained classes I (subsistence) and III (petroleum, oil, and lubricants) support relatively easily from these allies, but Class IX and GSM-peculiar parts were difficult to move to the teams. We began the practice of assembling "push packages" which were boxes or pallets with parts, computer equipment, and anything else the teams were requesting such as shower shoes or tobacco. The "push packages" were taken to the sites or put on an aircraft, flown forward with other cargo, downloaded by the airfield Tactical Airload Coordination Element, and given to a GSM team member on the ground. Certain parts (such as M998 glow plugs and batteries) were critical items throughout the deployment due to the extreme cold weather of the region.

Redeployment of GSM Teams

Planning for the redeployment home began in February 1996, two months before the last of our GSM teams would leave Bosnia. The task force staff in conjunction with Motorola conducted planning sessions and developed three courses of action (COAs) with associated advantages and disadvantages. These COAs were—

- ☐ Redeployment from the sites directly to CONUS (COA1).

- ☐ Redeployment from their sites to the ISB/MOB at Rhein Main Air Force Base (COA2).
- ☐ Redeployment through Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany, or Taszar, Hungary (COA3).

We also considered a combination of the three COAs.

The Commander, 4500th Joint STARS Squadron, decided that COA1 the most feasible. COA1 required only one airlift per team rather than the two needed with an ISB and substantially reduced the amount of coordination required. EUCOM agreed with the selection of COA1 at a planning meeting and coordinated with the Air Component Command for airlift. As with the forward GSM deployment, the staff developed a "by-site" timeline, identifying requirements as well as the EADs/LADs. With three teams moving through Tuzla Air Base, we arranged the movement of each team to ensure the availability of space for personnel at TF Eagle and the vehicles at the airfield. It was during our planning of the deployment that we determined each team might actually require an air load planner who was HAZMAT certified. Fortunately the company executive officer at Bijela, Bosnia, and the team leader at Taszar, Hungary, were both qualified air load planners who worked with Air Force movement teams at Tuzla and Taszar to resolve any HAZMAT issues. For the teams in Sarajevo and Gornji Vakuf, who redeployed via the airfield in Sarajevo, requirements were less stringent, and the team leaders coordinated most of the movement. However, to ensure a smooth redeployment home, we moved an air load- and HAZMAT-certified soldier to Sarajevo.

Although our movement requirements were less rigorous in terms of cleanliness during redeployment, the teams had to clean the vehicles and equipment as best they could. The TF Headquarters moved materials for cleaning in Bosnia and Hungary just as it had repair parts, while team leaders coordinated for areas to wash vehicles. The TF coordinated customs inspections in Hungary and Italy, and for the other teams at their points of entry in CONUS. For some teams, this reduced the amount of time soldiers had to wait before seeing their families.

As the GSM teams moved from the theater to CONUS, the TF Headquarters monitored air flow and arranged for billeting and arms-room storage at all the intermediate stops. The staff also provided information to home-station units including the flight manifest, equipment, and communications security items. Hazardous material on board was also included. This information enhanced the preparedness of the "reception team," an element designed specifically to receive returning soldiers and download the aircraft. Each day we coordinated with the GSM teams to ensure they were aware of air flow changes. When flights going into Bosnia, Hungary, and Italy and returning to CONUS were delayed, moved forward, or canceled, our coordination ensured teams were aware of the changes and, if required, were prepared to move ahead of schedule. Home-station units used flight information passed by the TF to keep family members aware of the timeframes in which the soldiers and teams would arrive. Throughout the redeployment, it remained essential for the TF to coordinate daily with home-station units, the 4500th Joint STARS Squadron headquarters and staff, USAREUR, EUCOM, the Air Force and Army movement representatives from Germany to Bosnia, and contacts at the intermediate stops.

Conclusion

Overall, our first-time deployment and integration of the MGSM and LGSM into the operation centers of major headquarters in support of a real-world

(Continued on page 41)

Soldiers weigh in prior to manifesting and departing Fort Hood (1). In the aircraft, SSG James Oliver from Fort Hood reflects on the mission (2). The antenna city atop the 1st Bde, 1st AD Tactical Operations Center (3). Among the "cast of thousands," crossing the Sava River on our way to Tuzla as part of the 501st MI Bn (4). Entering the zone of separation (ZOS) (5). Local transportation within the ZOS (6). Downtime at Tuzla Air Base (7). Colonel Nicholas Grant welcomes home the 303d MI Bn and the Test and Experimental Command at Robert Gray Army Airfield, Fort Hood, Texas (8).
Photos provided by LTC Rotkoff, CPT Baker, and SFC Reynolds.

Intelligence and the United Nations: Lessons From Bosnia- *A Canadian Experience*

by Captain Daniel Villeneuve, in collaboration with Sergeant Marc-André Lefebvre, Canadian Armed Forces

The use of intelligence in peacekeeping operations has always been a sensitive prospect. Peacekeeping operations have been defined as military operations conducted for the purpose of maintaining and restoring peace other than by the application of force, which is only to be used under extreme circumstances. On the face of it, contingents participating in a United Nations (U.N.) mission are neutral and have no enemy. Therefore, there should be no need for intelligence in such an operation. The reality on the ground, however, is quite different, as recent experiences in the former Yugoslavia have demonstrated. A U.N. mission remains a military operation, and as with any military operation, there is a requirement for intelligence support.

This article summarizes some of the particularities I encountered with respect to the employment of intelligence in a U.N. operation. I served as the intelligence officer for the 3d Battalion, Royal 22d Regiment (a French-language-speaking Canadian infantry battalion), which deployed in Bosnia from 30 April to 30 October 1995.

Background

My battalion formed the lion's share of the battle-group known as CANBAT 2 (Canadian Battalion 2) (CANBAT 1 was in Croatia) and deployed at Visoko, 30 kilometers (km) northwest of Sarajevo, in central Bosnia. The unit, with some 825 members of all ranks, had an area of responsibility (AOR) of around 900 km^2.

In the AOR, the unit found itself dealing with all three warring factions, since we had observation posts (OP) deployed along the Bosnian Serb side of the confrontation line (the only U.N. unit in Bosnia to do so). Part of the 20-km total exclusion zone surrounding Sarajevo was inside the AOR, and the area was located along some of the main north-south communication routes in central Bosnia.

The mission of the unit was—

- ☐ Maintain the freedom of movement required for the delivery of humanitarian aid.
- ☐ Help preserve the Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation (an agreement between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims.
- ☐ Freeze the confrontation line between Bosnian Serb and Federation forces.

To specifically accomplish this mission, CANBAT 2 operated a series of OPs on both sides of the confrontation line, as well as a series of check points along the main lines of communication. The unit also patrolled throughout the AOR, maintaining liaison with all three factions.

> ...the U.N. acknowledges that there is an operational requirement for intelligence...

A basic concept I observed in peacekeeping operations is that the longer the warring factions do not fight each other, the more opportunities they have to talk.

The more numerous these opportunities, the more likely a compromise solution becomes. The U.N. forces are there to help the factions maintain the cease-fire and to prevent or resolve disagreements. If this concept is to succeed, a need exists for the warring factions to cooperate, both among each other and with the United Nations.

CANBAT 2 started its tour employed in a typical peacekeeping role. Less than a month after their arrival in the theater, however, the situation started to deteriorate. The warring factions were not yet ready to negotiate, still considering the military option to be a better solution to their problems. The first crisis involving the unit was the Bosnian-Serb hostage-taking of U.N. personnel following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) airstrikes at the end of May 1995. CANBAT 2 had 53 members taken hostage; the last of these were not safely released until 17 June. No sooner had the hostage crisis ended than the unit found itself in the middle of a major Bosnian Muslim-Croat Federation offensive to open Sarajevo. This offensive, which started on 15 June, lasted approximately one month. Although the offensive was a failure, it did cause CANBAT 2 to lose its freedom of movement for approximately 10 days, followed by a slow return to normal by early August. While the AOR was quiet during the last three months, the U.N.-NATO airstrike campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in September kept the unit on its guard, with the potential for renewal of hostilities always present. The air offensive resulted in a ceasefire at the beginning of October, with the Dayton Peace Agreement following by the end of the month.

Intelligence Becomes Military Information

As I discovered in Bosnia, the United Nations tacitly acknowledges that there is an operational requirement for intelligence in support of a military unit deployed on a mission. To reduce the negative impact attached to the word "intelligence," however, we used

the term "military information" instead. My title in Bosnia, for example, was Military Information Officer; intelligence summaries became military information summaries, and so forth. The terms "warring factions" or "belligerents" replaced "enemy." Despite these cosmetic changes, the intelligence process remains unchanged. The United Nations does require, however, that collection be done with more discretion, using only overt means.



Photo s provided by CPT Villeneuve

Due to the warring factions' confrontation lines, some of the main roads were inaccessible to the United Nations.

The CANBAT 2 Military Information Cell

As with any tactical military operation, the role of the intelligence function in a U.N. context is to advise the commander on how the warring factions, the ground situation, and the weather could affect the accomplishment of the mission. During the training phase prior to deployment, the basic concept the battle-group developed for the employment of intelligence to support its mission saw the section given the task of establishing what was the normal state of affairs, if any, in the AOR. The idea was to determine a baseline for the area in terms of the warring factions' deployment, movements, firing incidents, and so on. Once established, all events could then be compared to this baseline to determine if they were a threat to the cease-fire. The rationale behind this was to have as much warning as possible of impending events in order to be proactive instead of reactive. This concept was based on the static nature of the operations both in terms of the non-changing AOR and the reduced level of military action expected when the planners developed the concept. As previously mentioned, the rapid and active evolution of military events during the tour prevented the full application of this concept.

The Military Information Cell had three main tasks. They were—

- ☐ Indications and Warning. The first task was to predict potential crisis situations inside the AOR before they occurred. We sought to give as much time as possible to the battle-group to diffuse situations before they led to incidents. It is always easier to prevent incidents than to patch them up afterward
- ☐ Situation Development. The intelligence section was to follow the evolution of events both tactically inside and around the AOR and strategically-politically throughout the Balkans, with the aim of keeping the unit informed of the evolution of events. Once again the aim was to put the events occurring inside the AOR in context, and to predict potential future crises in advance.
- ☐ Threat Assessment. The section continually monitored the situation throughout the AOR to determine the level of threat against the United Nations and to immediately inform the unit of any changes. The threat came mainly from modifications in the warring factions' attitudes, the presence of mines, and the effects of weather on road conditions.

The Intelligence Cycle

The following are some observations I made with respect to the employment of the NATO intelligence cycle[1] in a peacekeeping operation. The first thing I would like to mention is that the cycle is very flexible, lending itself easily to adaptation to any situation. We developed at least six contingency plans during the tour to deal with the different crises which confronted the unit. In some cases, the level of conflict went from low- to almost mid-intensity overnight. Some of the contingency plans targeted potential actions of particular warring factions, which could have put us in direct confrontation with that faction had it been necessary to execute the plan. Being in a peacekeeping context does not obviate planning for a worst-case scenario. Flexibility is very important.

Direction. In the direction phase of the cycle, the main problem which faced us was the lack of order of battle (OB) information and tactical templates of the different warring factions in the AOR. This resulted in difficulties with the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. The only way to make up for these shortfalls was to create our own OB and tactics databases for each of the warring factions. This approach took time, however, and a continuous effort was necessary to keep the information up to date. We learned that all possible efforts should be made to compile as much data as possible while the opportunity exists. When a crisis occurs, it is usually too late.

Another problem that confronted us on many occasions

The Canadians used this former Olympics hotel as their camp. The vehicles seen are Grizzly wheeled armored personnel carriers.

was a limit to the reconnaissance possible on the ground due to movement restrictions imposed on the unit. When this occurred, the maneuver troops turned to the intelligence section for support. The presence of a terrain analysis (TERA) team with the unit was a significant help, and went a good way toward making up reconnaissance shortfalls. The team produced TERA products to provide answers to many specific questions, and to respond to intelligence requirements with respect to the terrain and the combined effects of terrain and weather on military operations. Periods of movement restriction also demonstrated the priceless value of the unit database of air photos and route studies. The photos must be of a very large scale in order to show useful detail of ground characteristics. We recommend study of aerial photographs showing the main communication routes in the AOR and the area of potential crisis prior to deployment.

Collection. In the collection phase of the cycle, human intelligence (HUMINT) sources proved the main (almost exclusive) source of information. The numerous contacts that a unit has with the warring factions on an almost daily basis must be put to good use, as exploiting this source yields excellent information. The troops must learn that information can be gathered from different levels, and sensitized to the role they can play in building the intelligence picture. Information could come from—

- ☐ The unit commanding officer meeting one of the warring factions' local commanders.
- ☐ A liaison officer meeting a belligerent counterpart.
- ☐ A soldier at an OP talking with a local soldier performing the same boring guard duty.
- ☐ A cook in the unit kitchen chatting with a local employee.

A good debriefing process must be in place to gather this information.

In addition to the warring factions, numerous other sources and agencies could provide information. I was in regular contact with the flanking military contingents regarding the factions' activities in their specific areas. The U.N. military observers (UNMO) were a very good source as they traveled extensively throughout the area. I talked with them on a regular basis. It was the same with the European Community monitoring mission. The U.N. political affairs officers were a good source for the overall political picture and the detailed peculiarities of the unit AOR. Finally, the nongovernmental organizations are also potentially good sources of information as they dealt extensively with the local population.

During the operation we found that HUMINT sources could be very good; we noted, however, that they also had the potential to offer bad or misleading information. Other sources must corroborate all information received from this type of source. We received numerous reports that later turned out to be false. I learned, as a result, to be very careful with single-source information.

Processing is the phase of the intelligence cycle that was least affected by the situation. To make sense, information must be analyzed and put into context, even in a peacekeeping operation. We learned that a good collation system is essential if you hope to avoid being lost in the mass of data received almost daily. Vetting of files on a regular basis is also important. I found a good rule of thumb was that if you were in doubt about keeping something, throw it out. Analyzing and interpreting what was left became easier, and was very important. It put things into context, and gave them significance. As obvious as this might seem, our section was actually doing something new. Too often, I found that the U.N. intelligence chain passed mostly unanalyzed data, leading to potential misinterpretation of the situation.

Dissemination of the information used U.N. report formats. Sensitive information should not be put on wide distribution, as numerous leaks exist in the U.N. system and there was a good chance that the information could end up in the hands of the warring factions. This could result in the unit's losing its impartiality in the eyes of one or all of the warring factions. We disseminated sensitive information on a need-to-know basis, avoiding large distribution channels. We also tried, as much as possible, to protect the source.

A good way of exchanging information is to develop a good liaison visit program. With face-to-face discussions, the potential for better exchange of information improves. Another technique that we used was to have conferences on a regular basis with all the parties involved in the "information"

business. At these meetings, we exchanged information; above all, we established reliable contacts. In a U.N. operation, rotation occurs every six months and the turnover of personnel is very large. Basically, you almost end up with a new crew every six months. These meetings give you the opportunity to know the persons with whom you are dealing.

Conclusion

In conclusion, a peacekeeping mission remains a military operation and intelligence has an important role to play. During our tour in Bosnia, the many crises the unit faced provided a constant challenge to the intelligence section as we worked to provide the commander with the information he required.

Endnote

1. The Canadians use the NATO four-step intelligence cycle which does not have a clearly defined "production" process. Production occurs within the processing phase . See the NATO Standardization Agreement on **Intelligence Doctrine, STANAG 2936(AIntP-1(A)) Edition 2**, dated 16 May 1995. The doctrinal U.S. intelligence cycle has changed. It now contains five parts: plan and direct, collect, process, produce, and disseminate. (See **FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations**, dated 27 September 1994.)

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Operation GRAPPLE: British Armed Forces in United Nations Protection Force

by Major Roger D. Marshall BEM[1], Intelligence Corps, United Kingdom

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not to be regarded as official United Kingdom assessments.

Agreed to on 13 August 1992, United Nations (U.N.) Security Resolution 770 called on member nations to take all necessary measures to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was to coordinate this humanitarian aid. The Headquarters Bosnia-Herzegovina Command (BHC) was set up to implement this mission by protecting the UNHCR aid convoys. The BHC was the predecessor of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).

Operation GRAPPLE

In October 1992, the British force (BRITFOR) deployed in the form of a brigade staff, infantry battalion, logistics battalion, reconnaissance squadron, and an engineer squadron. Royal Navy Sea Kings provided helicopter support. With a headquarters (HQ) and logistics base at Split on the Croatian Coast—interestingly in an abandoned former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) Signals Intelligence Training Facility—and other units deployed throughout central Bosnia, the task of escorting UNHCR convoys began. In January 1993, Lance Corporal Edwards became the first British fatality, the victim of a sniper attack.

During 1993, these escorts continued with differing levels of success usually depending on local compliance. A humanitarian convoy headed for Muslim areas was invariably halted if it had to pass through Bosnian Serb areas. The big advantage that BRITFOR had over other U.N. contingents was our deployment of the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and armoured reconnaissance. This enabled more effective "escorts," and meant that, when fired upon, we could return fire with some impunity. (Many colloquialisms came out of the U.N. acronyms; the deployed battalions were normally referred to by their country of origin—for instance, SPABAT from Spain. The BRITBAT soon became known as "SHOOTBAT" by the other U.N. contingents!)

In January 1994, Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose was appointed of Commander, BHC, and has been credited with leading the United Nations' effort to take a more robust stand. This included a subtle change in the mandate to creating the correct atmosphere for effective delivery of humanitarian aid. This was embellished by the implementation of civil affairs projects designed to improve the infrastructure and help rebuild the country.

In February 1994, a suspected Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) mortar round killed 66 civilians in a Sarajevo market place, triggering the removal of BSA heavy weapons and the formation of a total exclu-

Photo provided by MAJ Marshall

British humanitarian convoy on U.N. route PACMAN.

sion zone around the city. After heavy fighting between Croats and Muslims in central Bosnia, a ceasefire was finally coordinated and the Muslim-Croat Federation was established. However, the turbulence continued. While wishing to be seen as having very robust response capabilities, the UNPROFOR rules of engagement were not robust. The local joke was along the lines of *"if you make a wrong move, I will speak to my colonel who will ask the general to ask our national defence minister to ask the prime minister to ask the rest of the U.N. to order me to open fire, so be warned."*

This situation continued through 1994 with more negative than positive issues coming to the fore. The reality was that two of the warring factions (the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Muslims) continued with their ceasefire, while humanitarian conditions continued to improve, resolution of human rights issues proceeded, and the UNPROFOR continued to achieve its mission wherever conceivably possible. In 1995, the international resolve moved more and more against the Bosnian Serbs, despite the "ethnic cleansing" of the Serbs from Krajina by the Croats. A major problem confronting the newly appointed BHC commander, Lieutenant General Rupert Smith, was the requirement to obtain United Nations approval for combat air support . After a number of operational "challenges" in this area, the situation slowly resolved itself and the use of combat air support was delegated to the military commander. Also in 1995, we witnessed the eventual defeat of the Army of the Republic of Serbian Krajina (ARSK), which prompted a large scale refugee movement into Bosnia-Herzegovina. In addition, the BSA, augmented by the ARSK, changed its name to Vojska Republike Srpska. Then, the belligerents implemented the Dayton Peace Accord. The accord did not come about in isolation, but in fact was only possible due to the patience and perseverance of the UNPROFOR's laying the groundwork for this agreement along with other diplomatic efforts.

So What Did We Learn?

Well, what did we, the Brits, learn from all this? Certainly the fact that British troops have gained from demanding operational environments elsewhere and that soldiers under stressful conditions learn very important lessons which were put to effective use in Bosnia-Herzegovina and will continue to be with the Implementation Force (IFOR). Soldiers must be well trained and equipped to do the job. Some of the more specific lessons learned are as follows:

Intelligence Manpower. All of a sudden, the requirement for military intelligence personnel went down to battalion level and requirements elsewhere increased. Operating constraints existed due to the U.N. abhorrence of "intelligence," hence the setting up of "milinfo" sections. (This has been somewhat resolved as long as the intelligence is gathered to enhance the mission.)

Intelligence Preparation of **the Battlefield (IPB).** We discovered that some aspects of IPB were especially useful. The following are some IPB-related observations:

- **Population** really is key terrain! When separating the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in Central Bosnia, local issues could often be resolved with prior knowledge of historical perspectives and emotive locations such as former battle sites, burial sites, religious sites, homes of local

(Continued on page 57)


UNPROFOR
ZAGREB
HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Force Operational Staff (ARRFOS) KISELJAK
UN Confidence and Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) ZAGREB
Multinational Brigade (MNB) T5G
24 Airmob Bde
Task Force Alpha (UK)
Task Force Bravo (France)
HQ UNPROFOR Sarajevo
Sector Sarajevo
Sector Southwest (SSW) Gornji Vakuf
Sector Northeast (SNE) Tuzla

Figure 1. The United Nations Protection Force Command Structure during Operation GRAPPLE.

Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR:

Joint STARS in the Balkans

by Captain Kristin M. Baker

On 27 December 1995, the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) became fully operational in the Balkans. Our deployment was a series of planes, trains, convoys, and one ferry ride across the Rhein River. The soldiers became system experts and are fully trained on air- and rail-loading, and convoy procedures. They were tested on their operator skills and troubleshooting skills, and they did an outstanding job integrating the Ground Station Module (GSM) into operations at every level from brigade through division and providing support to a multinational peacekeeping force. We had an opportunity over the next three months to review the data the Joint STARS GSM could provide and analyze its capabilities given the order of battle, operating environment data, and tactics used by the former warring factions. This article discusses some of the key operational lessons learned and tasking techniques we developed.

The Environment

First, I would like to clarify the environment in which we operated. The terrain in Bosnia-Herzegovina presents a challenge to all of our intelligence collection systems. It is primarily mountainous, making signals and imagery collection difficult. The three major landforms in the Task Force Eagle area of responsibility are the Sava river valley (also known as the Posavina Corridor), the mountainous highlands, and the narrow river valleys. The lowland south of the Sava River consists of small dissected plateaus. As you move south toward Tuzla, you encounter the foothills of the central highlands. Hills rise with elevations averaging 400 to 800 meters. The Bosna, Spreca, and Jala river valleys are narrow and support extensive agriculture. These river valleys lay within linear depressions called *polje* and are ideal for assembly areas, helicopter landing zones, and low-level drop zones. The central highlands region from Tuzla to Sarajevo consists of mountain ranges heavily dissected by narrow streams and river valleys.

Collection Challenges

The Joint STARS' capability to track moving target indicators (MTIs) in this area of responsibility (AOR) is hindered by this type of terrain. Movement is channeled into the few trafficable roads; however, the roads wind in and out of the mountain ranges leaving them "radar shadowed" in many places. Radar shadowing is to a radar system what terrain masking is to an electro-optical (visual) system. Radar-shadowed areas are ones where the radar cannot "see" due to the terrain and vegetation blocking its view. For example, we were able to track a convoy at its start point, but it was difficult to track it all the way to its destination as it moved into and out of radar-shadowed areas along its route. If the convoy maintains a steady rate of movement, the operator may be able to compensate for the radar shadow, predict when it would come out of that shadow, and pick the convoy up again. This is not an easy task and often it is easy to lose the track if the convoy's next appearance is in the middle of a highly congested area.

Another factor contributing to the challenge of tracking convoys is that there are few trafficable routes and these routes are used extensively by both the military and faction forces and civilians. We do not have the ability to distinguish between the two. The roads are narrow and traffic that appears to be a convoy may actually be two-way traffic passing at a point on the route or just route congestion. In addition, the members of the former warring factions were more than likely traveling by bus rather than by military vehicle.

Combat in the AOR prior to the Dayton Peace Accord generally involved attacks by battalion-sized groupings of light infantry and tank companies. They were supported by heavy direct and indirect fires from light- and medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery, automatic cannon, and antitank weapons. Irregular forces cooperated directly or indirectly with regular forces and were armed primarily with small arms or infantry support weapons.

Army soldiers in the military occupational specialty 96H operate the GSM. It is capable of receiving electronic intelligence information at the Secret level via a Commander's Tactical Terminal (CTT) and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery via a hardwire link into the UAV Ground Control Station. These capabilities normally give us a very robust internal cross-cueing capability. In this environment, however, we could not rely on the CTT due to both the environment and security issues; also the UAV ground station was not in theater with the GSM during most of our mission.

The fact that the factions abided by the Dayton Peace Accord posed yet another challenge to Joint STARS collection. They did not employ their heavy weapons systems using definitive, targetable formations (such as echelon left and wedge). There were reports of a single tank at a given grid location, a group of towed mortars at a collection point, or more commonly, reports of seven soldiers occupying a

bunker along the zone of separation (ZOS). We received this type of reporting from helicopter pilot debriefs, by reviewing the helicopter gunship tapes, and by reviewing reports from soldiers on the ground. We could not always identify and track the movement of this equipment using the Joint STARS MTI, due to the small number moving at any time and their methods of movement (see Figure 1).

The formerly warring factions had a number of military and paramilitary elements. These include—

- ☐ The Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (VJ) is able to conduct extended brigade-sized, combined arms operations.
- ☐ The Croatian Defense Council (HVO) is capable of limited, multiple-battalion-sized operations, and is a militia-type organization, usually structured according to local requirements and resources.
- ☐ The Army of the Serb Republic (VRS) can muster about 90,000 soldiers and is capable of battalion and brigade-sized operations. The VRS normally conducts coordinated platoon and company-sized partisan operations.
- ☐ The Croatian Army (HV) has demonstrated the capability to conduct rapid, extensive, multiple-brigade combined arms operations. The HV can mobilize an additional 200,000 soldiers by mustering on short notice.

Using the Joint STARS MTI, we would be able to detect the initiation of hostilities by any of the former warring factions, if they had decided to revert to their pre-Dayton Accord tactics. Since they abided by the agreement during our deployment, we primarily focused on confirming the locations of weapon storage and cantonment areas, garrison locations, and any significant movement of vehicles or equipment in the area of operations.


GROUND CONTROL STATION
ROTATING ANTENNA (CTT HITS)
COMMAND POST
SECTOR SEARCH
MOVING VEHICLES (MOVING TARGET INDICATORS HITS)
REFUEL POINT
ATTACK PLANNING
Radar provides surveillance during level flight
CONVOY (MOVING TARGET INDICATORS) MIXED WITH CIVILIAN TRAFFIC
COLLECTION POINT (STOP HITS)
COMMAND POST
GROUND CONTROL STATION
HELICOPTERS, SLOW-MOVING FIXED WING AIRCRAFT (CTT, MOVING TARGET INDICATORS)

Figure 1. Current Employment of Joint STARS and the GSM.

When we arrived in theater, the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) was not fully operational. As a result, our Joint Operations Center (JOC) located in Rhein Main Air Base, Germany, initially managed all Joint STARS tasking from the multinational divisions. The communications architecture was still in its infancy and it was difficult to contact the JOC to provide the taskings. The JOC also assumed the burden of prioritizing taskings, although they were not formally part of the theater intelligence cycle.

The GSMs that were within line of sight (LOS) of the aircraft were capable of sending dynamic tasking requests to the aircraft during the mission over a secure datalink antenna. Those GSMs not located within LOS received retransmitted data over a "receive-only" satellite communications (SATCOM) link and could not send dynamic taskings. The SATCOM sites had to send all their preplanned taskings to the JOC. If a target came up during the mission that required better coverage, the site officer-in-charge would contact the JOC and send the tasking through them to the aircraft. There were quite a few "growing pains" with this method of "dynamic" retasking.

Once the ARRC was operational, a captain from the JOC took over the Joint STARS liaison officer role in Sarajevo. As a team, the liaison officers at the British, French, 1st Brigade, 2d Brigade, Task Force Eagle Main, and ARRC sites worked with their respective collection managers and G2s through several tasking procedures before finding one that worked. The ARRC LNO determined each of the division's named areas of interest (NAIs) for Joint STARS collection, and prioritized them in a matrix. He forwarded this matrix to the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) which, in turn, added the Air Force priorities, and sent them as a formal tasking to the JOC back at Rhein Main Air Base. Each of the multinational divisions (MND) had a different focus for the Joint STARS missions and, as a result, the aircraft flew at different times over different areas throughout the deployment area to satisfy all user requirements. Because there were only two aircraft in theater, we could not satisfy each MND's requirements simultaneously and had to compromise. The schedule that the ARRC LNO arranged was based on each MND's predicted time they would have the greatest need for Joint STARS coverage based on the former warring faction's activity in their sector.

Conclusion

Clearly the Joint STARS system had applications in this theater unlike those it had during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Operation JOINT

ENDEAVOR does not have an ominous enemy threat that fired SCUD missiles and rolled tanks across the battlefield. Here, there was no standard conventional enemy. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, we watched the ZOS and the known and suspected weapons systems collection facilities for movement.

We were able to report each day that there were no gross violations of the Dayton Peace Accord. The former warring factions moved equipment in the country, but not in "hostile" formations.

We spent a great deal of time researching the benefit of monitoring traffic rates on the major routes in the theater to determine average movement of traffic. We discovered that it would be beneficial to have a capability to automate the "counting" of movers through a given NAI. As a joint Army-Air Force task force, we learned a great deal about how to task Joint STARS in a multinational environment. This is knowledge we have captured in our after-action review and will apply it to future deployments of the Joint STARS GSM via updates to internal standard operating procedures, doctrine, and field manuals distributed throughout the intelligence community.

Captain Baker graduated from the U.S. Military Academy in 1990 with a bachelor of science degree in Human Factors Engineering. She is currently the Assistant Plans Officer in G2 Plans, III Corps and was recently the commander of Bravo Company, 303d Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, 504th MI Brigade. Readers can reach her at (817) 287-6813, DSN 737-6813, and via E-mail at bakerk@hood-emh3.army.mil.

The Hall of Fame Celebrates MI History

by Major General Charles W. Thomas

During the last week of June, it was my pleasure to host the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps Hall of Fame. This annual event, and all of the activities associated with it, has become one of the special highlights of the year, and well it should be. The Hall of Fame ceremony is a celebration of our history. The tradition and esprit which are so much a part of this celebration serve to strengthen the fiber of the MI Corps.

Much of what our Corps has accomplished in the last half of the twentieth century is attributable to pioneers such as those we honored in this year's ceremony. Their collective contributions helped lay the groundwork which enables us to meet the challenges of the 21st century. They represent the very best of our past history and serve as a beacon for the future. Their enshrinement in our Hall of Fame is recognition of their accomplishments and years of dedicated, selfless service!

The impact of the Hall of Fame on our Corps and to the home of MI was made very clear to me in a letter from one of our recent inductees. I quote, in part—

...your words (at the ceremony) reminded me again of the importance of tradition and the power of memory to teach and inspire. I am mindful that with my induction, I join the company of some of the most illustrious men and women in MI history and so have become a part of that tradition. I don't believe that I fully deserve this singular honor—many others are more deserving—but I am grateful nevertheless.

Again, thank you for this great privilege—for a few precious days, my 78 years fell away, and I was young again. Please extend my personal thanks to each and every member of your command who worked so hard to make the ceremony such a wonderful experience...

The annual Hall of Fame ceremony seems but a very small compensation for the countless achievements, years of service, and sacrifice represented by the inductees. Yet, it is our collective expression of appreciation and gratitude to the MI professionals whose accomplishments mean so much to the future of our Corps. The comments conveyed above, and similar ones from many other folks, suggest that the effort put forth to make our Hall of Fame a success is truly an investment in our heritage and a cornerstone for our future.

For all who have been, and continue to be, a part of the Hall of Fame process, I add my sincere thanks for a job well done.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

Major General Thomas is currently Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and Commander of the MI Corps. He has previously served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army Europe, and as the Deputy Director for Current Intelligence, Joint Staff and Command Support/J2 at the Defense Intelligence Agency.

75th Ranger Regiment Wants MI Officers

The 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Benning, Georgia, is looking for MI officers meeting the following criteria: lieutenants in year groups 1993-1995 (battalion S2/assistant S2 or platoon leader experience), and captains in year groups 1989 and 1990 (battalion S2 and company command experience). Eligible officers wishing to apply should contact Major Schweikert or Captain Compton at (706) 545-5669 or DSN 835-5669/5124 for more information.

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

Visions of Sarajevo During Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR

A sunlit Sarajevo with a sense of normalcy (1). Religion is one of the major factors in the conflict (2). Out in the suburbs, Serb families in mass exodus of an area transferring to the Federation (3). Destruction downtown behind the tramway (4) and in a neighborhood with large "welcome to Sarajevo" and "help Bosnia now" reminders (5). A Federation police patrol in Sarajevo (6). The former NATO IFOR HQs, in Corimex containers with a sandbag-protected entryway (7). Reminders of the war abound with remnants of destroyed vehicles lying by the roadside (8). It is estimated it will take 10,000 work-years to clear the mines in Bosnia-Herzegovina to humanitarian standards (9). A cemetary in Sarajevo... one of too many (10).

Our thanks to LTC George Gramer Jr. for the photographs.

Eyes of the Eagle:
101st Airborne Division (AASLT) DISE

by Lieutenant Colonel John DeFrietas, III

As with any division today, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) is ready to project its force anywhere, any time. Providing intelligence during force projection operations requires a tactically tailored military intelligence (MI) element capable of conducting split-based operations. Doctrinally, this element is called a deployable intelligence support element (DISE). Its composition is based on mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops, and time available (METT-T) and on the division, corps or joint task force (JTF) commander's intelligence requirements.

This is the next in a series of articles concerning the DISE. (See Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Brian A. Keller's article, "Building a Division DISE," in the January-March 1996 issue of the ***Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB)***; LTC Victor M. Rosello's article, "The Airborne Division's Initial Entry DISE," in the April-June 1996 ***MIPB***; and in the same issue, LTC John R. Brooks' letter to the editor on the 4th Infantry Division (Mech) DISE.) Consequently, I will not further review the basic concepts governing DISE employment. I will focus instead on the requirement to use multiple DISEs to support deep air assault operations.

Background

To understand how we employ the DISE concept, you must first understand the unique capabilities and requirements associated with a deep air assault operation. A deep air assault is conducted approximately 300 or more kilometers (km) from the division's tactical assembly area (TAA) (see Figure 1). Its purpose is to strike deep in the enemy's operational or strategic rear at a geographic point or against a force that will unhinge the enemy's efforts. The corps, JTF, or theater commander designates the target(s) of the deep attack.

To be successful, the air assault force commander must synchronize several actions occurring simultaneously in time and space. First, the commander must have precise battlespace visualization in depth to enable him to locate, track, and kill the enemy. He must gain and maintain information dominance to enable him to concentrate lethal and nonlethal fires from joint and organic aviation and artillery against designated high-payoff targets. He must be able to quickly assess the effects of his fires to determine where and when to concentrate future fires.

The air assault force commander must build and protect a forward operating base (FOB) to use as a springboard in launching the air assault deeper into the enemy's rear area. (The force establishes the FOB no deeper than 150 km, the maximum range of the CH-47 helicopter.) While the FOB remains operational, the commander must protect the force located there. As forces and equipment flow into the FOB, the commander must simultaneously conduct deep attacks, coordinating Army aviation assets with joint assets to set the conditions for future air assaults.

The air assault commander must focus simultaneously on the threat—

- ☐ To the TAA.
- ☐ To the air routes between the TAA and the FOB.
- ☐ To the FOB.
- ☐ To the air routes between the FOB and the objective.
- ☐ In and around the objective area.

These threats include special purpose forces, artillery, air defense artillery (ADA), and maneuver forces.

Multiple DISEs Lead to Success

As you can imagine, the demand on the intelligence battlefield operating system (BOS) is tremendous and constant. To succeed in satisfying the intelligence demands of the force, the G2 and the analysis and control element (ACE) must fuse information from organic resources with information received from corps and higher-level resources. (These resources include the cavalry, scouts, Apache helicopters, acquisition radars, airborne warning and control system (AWACS) downlinks to the ADA battalion, the long-range surveillance unit, and the MI battalion.) The G2 and the ACE must tailor the products to satisfy the intelligence requirements of subordinate commanders. They include the aviation brigade commander conducting the deep attack focused on one threat, the infantry brigade commander located in the FOB focused on another threat, and the commander of the division support command in the TAA worried about yet another threat. The G2 and ACE must then push the required information where it is needed throughout the division area of operation, most of which is on the enemy side of the forward line of our own troops. Pushing information to three locations spread over an area of 300 km or more requires us to integrate multiple DISEs into the operational scheme of maneuver.

While the division is in the TAA, information comes into the ACE, is processed, and is pushed to the All-Source Analysis System Remote Workstation (RWS) located with each brigade and the assault command post. At this point, it is easy to ensure everyone has a common view of the battlespace due to collocation and access to a mature communications structure. However, when we assault to establish the FOB, maintaining a common intelligence picture requires an additional DISE.

Depending on the size of the force used to establish the FOB, at least two RWSs, a TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal (SPIRIT) II (TS II), and additional analysts as required move with the assault force. The TS II provides the critical conduit through which the commander at the FOB re-



Figure 1. Depiction of a Deep Air Assault Operation.

ceives intelligence updates. Augmenting the DISE with more RWSs, the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal (MITT), a Commanders' Tactical Terminal (CTT) for Guardrail Common Sensor feeds, or a Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) Ground Station Module (GSM) would depend on the mission, threat, and available transportation. Establishing the FOB around a flight landing strip clearly provides the commander with greater DISE configuration options than if all resources must arrive by heliborne means.

The S2 of the assaulting brigade, supported by the MI battalion's analysis and control team (ACT) and any other tailored intelligence resources, provides intelligence support to the forward location. They maintain connectivity with the G2 and the ACE, still located in the TAA, for intelligence and database updates passed in the form of external database coordination messages. Initially, the S2 passes information to the assaulting force and receives reports over tactical frequency modulated (FM) radios. When the FOB establishes the tactical local area network (TACLAN), the S2 is then able to pass record traffic and graphic products over the Mobile Subscriber Equipment. By August 1996, all battalion S2s in the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) will have laptop computers that tie into the division TACLAN.

A third tailored DISE supports the assault on the final objective. At this time, the commander must decide where he is willing to accept risk in his intelligence architecture. Since there is still a need to receive and process intelligence at three different locations (the TAA, the FOB and the objective) and since there are only two TS IIs in the division, all the locations cannot receive equal support. Consequently, the evolving situation will dictate whether the assaulting force at the final objective receives a TS II, and if it does, whether it comes from the TAA or the FOB. At a minimum, the S2 of the assaulting force assaults with his supporting ACT and his organic RWS, updated with the latest database information from the ACE. Tailoring the DISE with a CTT, MITT, GSM, and so forth will also depend on METT-T and available transportation.

Conclusion

A DISE embodies two tenets of MI operations yet it is not a section found on the modified table of organization and equipment. Consequently, anyone who participates in split-based operations uses a DISE. Most leaders today understand that the DISE is a natural outcome of tactical tailoring required to support force projection operations. Within the air assault division, forming a DISE is not only necessary to support force projection into a theater of operation, it is also required to enable the intelligence BOS to fully engage in deep air assault operations.

LTC DeFrietas is attending the Army War College. He has held a variety of command and staff positions including G2, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), at Fort Campbell, Kentucky; and Commander, 519th MI Battalion at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and deployed with the unit to Haiti. Readers can address questions concerning intelligence support to air assault division operations by calling the G2 office at (502) 798-4802/3022, DSN 635-4802/ 3022 or sending E-mail to afzb-gs@campbell-emh1.army.mil. You could contact the author at defrietj@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

MI Corps Hall of Fame Nominations

The Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) accepts nominations throughout the year for the MI Hall of Fame. Anyone can nominate an individual for induction into the MI Hall of Fame. Commissioned officers, warrant officers, enlisted soldiers, or civilians who have served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for nomination.

A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI which reflects favorably on the MI Corps. In certain isolated instances (particularly in the case of junior soldiers), the nomination may be based on heroic actions rather than other documented contributions.

Nominees cannot be employed by the U.S. Government in any capacity at the time of their nomination. Individuals cannot be self-nominated. An annual Hall of Fame Board convenes to review nominations and make recommendations to the Chief of MI who is the final approving authority for inductions into the Hall of Fame.

The OCMI provides information on nomination procedures. If you wish to nominate someone, contact OCMI, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca, ATTN: ATZS-MI (Hall of Fame), Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000; or call (520) 533-1181 or DSN 821-1181, or contact santiste@pentagon-hdss.army.mil.

Victory in Egypt:
3d ID (M) DISE

by Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth H. Boll, Jr., Major Jeffrey S. Holachek, and Captain Jennifer A. Ellington

There's no doubt about it—deployability is the name of the game. We live in a force projection world. And it is not who gets there the "fastest with the mostest" that counts; today's reality is that you can only deploy a limited amount of intelligence equipment and soldiers. This is especially true during the initial stages of an operation. Based on mission analysis, you must determine the precise mix of capabilities and skills to best get the job done. This is what the Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE) concept is all about.

The 3d Infantry Division (ID) (Mechanized (M)) Analysis and Control Element (ACE) recently had the opportunity to exercise the DISE concept during Exercise Bright Star 95. This article details some of the more important lessons we learned during our deployment to Egypt.

FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations, sets the doctrinal framework for the DISE concept. It is an intentionally broad concept that recognizes the fact that missions in today's post-Cold War world vary dramatically. Each separate mission dictates the specific makeup of a DISE.

Split-Based and Tailorable

Whatever the mission, at the heart of the DISE is the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated Remote Intelligence Terminal II (TS II). The TS II is a highly reliable intelligence communications satellite system. It provides the forward-deployed tactical commander with impressive capabilities. The system allows him to "pull" vast quantities of national-level intelligence and provides him connectivity to both non-deployed intelligence assets at the home station and other providers such as a theater Joint Intelligence Center. In other words, the TS II gives the commander the capability to conduct split-based operations.

Being the Army's premiere rapid deployment heavy division, the 3d ID (M) takes the ability to deploy rapidly very seriously. Our division deployment standard operating procedure (SOP) defines a "baseline" DISE that forms the core of the deploying intelligence package (see Figure 1). The SOP also lays out the different "Force Enhancement Modules" (FEMs) that allow the commander to **quickly** tailor a DISE to meet specific mission requirements. Depending on the mission, the commander can send a diverse array of intelligence assets. Figure 2 shows the 3d ID (M) DISE FEMs.

In a stability and support operation (SASO) scenario, such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement, the counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence FEM would be a key capability of the DISE. In a more conventional scenario, the DISE would almost certainly include the Mobile Integrated Tactical Terminal. Again, the mission dictates DISE tailoring. Whatever the mission, it is important to keep the DISE as small as possible for it to deploy quickly. During Bright Star, we deployed only the Division's baseline DISE.



Figure 1. 3d ID (M) Baseline DISE.

Bright Star DISE Deployment

The Bright Star 95 scenario allowed us to replicate deployment of the DISE during the initial entry and lodgment phases of force projection operations. We transported the DISE via a C-141 Starlifter. This was the first time that the 3d ID (M) DISE was air-deployed. We required some additional training to ensure that our deployment went smoothly—specifically, hazardous material (HAZMAT) and airload training. It is also a good idea to conduct an airload dry run in advance of deployment and to maintain this skill and ensure efficient deployment.

To be ready for short-notice deployments, advance coordination with the installation transportation office (ITO) is critical. The Fort Stewart ITO and the 3d ID (M) Division Transportation Officer (DTO) were very helpful with all of the details that go into movement planning. All



Figure 2. Force Enhancement Modules to Augment the Basic DISE.

the DISE vehicles, generators, and trailers must be weighed and measured in accordance with airload planning regulations. You must then calculate the centers of balance and mark each piece of equipment appropriately. Your unit movement officer can then create a specific airload plan for the DISE, along with an Automated Unit Equipment List and Deployable Equipment List. The 3d ID (M) DTO maintains these documents, and the ACE keeps a copy for the DISE SOP. This advance planning will allow you to conduct airload operations quickly to meet deployment timelines (the 3d ID (M) DISE can deploy in only 18 hours).

TS II Communications

The Army fielded the TS II at the 3d ID (M) in June 1995. With our Bright Star deployment only two months away, we were concerned whether we would have sufficient time to train our crew and configure our system before deployment. Although we had some initial "new technology" anxiety, the TROJAN SPIRIT II proved to be a relatively easy system to master.

The "SPIRIT" is a highly capable and reliable system. It can receive up to 512 kilobits (kb) of satellite bandwidth, divided into as many as 14 separate circuits (8 sensitive compartmented information (SCI) and 6 collateral). Two shelters house the system. They are the primary high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) system (PHS) and the spare equipment module (SEM), on M1097 Heavy HMMWVs. It also includes a specially designed satellite antenna trailer, the Mobile Antenna Platform. The system can operate in the Ku or C satellite bands, in the Continental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS) respectively. At echelons above corps, the system also includes an X-band antenna. Housed in the shelters are two SunSPARC 10 workstations (SCI), a 486 notebook computer (collateral), two TROJAN system phones (one SCI, one collateral), and two TROJAN facsimile machines (again, one SCI, one collateral). The TS II also comes with an International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) telephone, and four LST-5C ultra-high-frequency satellite communications radios.

However, it is essential that some modifications be made to the system to allow users to take full advantage of its capabilities, especially in a joint environment. Our SPIRIT came with All-Source Analysis System remote workstation Warrior software already installed on the workstation in the PHS. We the installed Joint Deployment Intelligence Support System (JDISS) software on the workstation in the SEM to allow the system to communicate with joint intelligence agencies. (JDISS is the joint intelligence standard.) Also, to use the INTELINK on-line system, the terminals must have MOSAIC or NETSCAPE software. We also expanded the TROJAN SPIRIT local area network (LAN) adding additional terminals. See Figure 3 for the configuration we used during Bright Star.

Additionally, to operate OCONUS, you must convert the system from Ku- to C-band satellite reception. The DISE's 33T IEW maintenance technician can perform this conversion, which takes about two hours when mastered. We recommend hav-



Figure 3. Exercise Bright Star 95 Configuration.

ing contractor assistance the first time you attempt the conversion, to talk your 33T through any trouble spots. We also recommend that you conduct a C-band test prior to deployment, if time permits. The TROJAN Switch at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, can assist in coordinating the test.

When we initially hit the ground in Egypt, we experienced some coordination problems with the TROJAN switch at Fort Belvoir. Expect some challenges getting the circuit established. To resolve any problems, you will need a means of communicating with the TROJAN switch. The INMARSAT telephone fielded with the TS II will prove an essential piece of equipment.. The INMARSAT has a satellite telephone that allows you to communicate via commercial satellite anywhere in the world. INMARSAT requires at least three months to activate so we suggest you start coordinating as soon as possible for its commissioning.

During our deployment, we experimented with dynamic routing, which allowed us to have two pathways into the DISE's SCI LAN. In addition to the TROJAN SPIRIT's satellite antenna, we established a redundant pathway via a 32-kb line from the theater intelligence architecture of the U.S. Army Forces Central Command (ARCENT). We put an additional router on our LAN, and connected it to the ARCENT 32-kb line. This provided us with a backup communications link should we have problems with the TROJAN Wide Area Network (WAN).

Conclusion

The first actual deployment of the 3d ID (M) DICE was a success. We validated the DISE concept while practicing the tenets of split-based operations and broadcast dissemination. Despite some initial coordination problems with the TROJAN switch, the TROJAN SPIRIT II proved a highly reliable and capable system.

The 3d ID (M) DISE gives our commanding general the capability to provide his force projection commander an intelligence umbilical cord to both national- and theater-level intelligence, as well as to division- and corps-level resources in sanctuary or at our home station. This is a revolutionary advance in division-level MI capabilities.

Lieutenant Colonel Boll is currently the 3d ID (M) G2, at Fort Stewart, Georgia. Among his previous assignments are command of the 103d MI Battalion, 3d ID (M), and Chief, Counternarcotics Analysis Division, J2 U.S. Southern Command during Operation JUST CAUSE. He has a bachelor of arts degree in History from the University of Texas, El Paso, and a Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence from the Defense Intelligence College. Readers can reach him at (912) 767-2202, DSN 870-2202, and via E-mail at afzp-gs@stewart-emh3.army.mil.

Major Holachek currently serves as the 103d MI Battalion S3. His previous assignments include Chief, 103d MI Battalion ACE , and Commander, U.S. Army Special Security Detachment, Fort Meade, Maryland. Major Holachek is a graduate of Xavier University and the Command and General Staff College, and holds advanced degrees from Johns Hopkins University and Columbia University. Readers can reach him at (912) 767-8755, DSN 870-8755, and through E-mail at afzp-vmi-t@stewart-emh3.army.mil.

Captain Ellington is currently the SSO, 3d ID. Her previous assignments include Chief, Collection Management and Dissemination in the 103d MI Battalion ACE; Battalion S2 in the 199th Infantry Brigade; Executive Officer, B Company, 14th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation); and Assistant S3 in the 201st MI Brigade. Captain Ellington served as the DISE Chief during Bright Star 95. She has a bachelor of science degree in Engineering Management from the U.S. Military Academy. Readers can reach her at (912) 767-8335/8336, DSN 870-8335/8336, and E-mail at afzp-vmi-cmo@stewart-emh3.army.mil.

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Lord Mayor:
Life as the Mayor of Tuzla Air Base



by Major David B. Lorenz

Let's start with a good war story. There I was on a C-130 Hercules flying to Tuzla Air Base, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a member of a group of soldiers later known as the "Tuzla-10." We were one of the first elements deployed in support of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. I am a member of Task Force Eagle (TFE) on the first fixed-wing plane to try to land at Tuzla Air Base since June 1994. The date is 5 December 1995. I am an intelligence-planner augmentee on a 90- to 120-day loan to the 1st Armor Division. It is the main element in the "Multinational Division North," one of three multinational divisions comprising the Implementation Force (IFOR) supporting stability operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I am to be the key intelligence link on the ground in Tuzla until the arrival of TFE's intelligence section.

Within days of my arrival, I discovered I was not the key American intelligence point of contact in all of northwestern Bosnia-Herzegovina. Instead I became the unelected mayor of a small air base which was a former MiG and later United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) base. Tuzla Air Base would soon become ground-zero for thousands of American soldiers, who were waiting across the Sava river and collecting at U.S. Air Force bases throughout Europe. As "Lord Mayor" ("Slum-Lord 6" on the radio), my function was to prepare Tuzla Air Base to house and fully support up to 3,000 soldiers, on a base built to hold 425 during the Cold War and 850 under the United Nations. My dreams of being "Mr. Intel" in Bosnia were now shattered, scattered in the endless mud of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

A Typical Day

I usually began a typical day as mayor of Tuzla Air Base around 0530 with a run to the front gate on a mile-long stretch of road. Then I am off to the office and my early morning meeting with the leader of the "Bosnovian Rangers," a group of 40 local workers supporting missions for the air base mayor's office. This group filled general construction and labor requirements throughout the air base. The Rangers were paid 10 German Deutsch Marks and one French ration box per day. We often broke the Rangers up into groups of three or four and took them to locations around the base where their tasks included filling thousands of sand bags in support of the infantry's requirements and clearing small shrubs and trees from areas around buildings. TFE followed the same policy used earlier by the United Nations. If you asked the Rangers to go into an area and they went, it was safe to assume that the location was clear of mines and safe to enter. If the Rangers shook their heads from side-to-side, then you knew the areas were, in all likelihood, mined. Not a very scientific approach to mine clearing, but useful given the mine clearing assets available.

Next on the daily agenda was a meeting or a phone conversation with the Commander of the Norwegian Logistic Battalion (NORLOGBAT), the primary resident of the air base before the arrival of TFE. His outfit was a very professional military organization which logged up to 300,000 kilometers per month hauling supplies during the UNPROFOR period supporting all the U.N. forces in Northern Bosnia. My conversations with the NORLOGBAT Commander involved a number of issues, including—

- ☐ Turning over facilities from the United Nations to TFE control.
- ☐ Inventory.
- ☐ Key control.

However, more often than not we talked about trying to find materials belonging to his battalion that seemed to have disappeared. For example, there was the case of the storage connex containing 4,520 French rations. Shortly after the arrival of more units to the base, the connex turned up empty and the rations were nowhere to be found. However, empty French rations boxes by the hundreds were found in dumpsters all around the base.

NORLOGBAT had a number of other issues, some small, some large involving TFE personnel over the first few weeks of the deployment. Examples include—

- ☐ Someone had broken the lock on their ammunition storage point.
- ☐ A steam cleaner may have left the base for parts unknown.
- ☐ The sign in front of their enlisted club moved one day, pole and all.
- ☐ The sand bags around their satellite dish were redistributed one night.
- ☐ Someone used their shower facilities and did not clean up afterward.

The Norwegians for the most part took these incidents in good humor. I pointed out that the TFE was like a 5-ton elephant, sometimes you control the elephant and sometimes the elephant controls you.

While relations with the Norwegians were good most of the time, relations with the other U.N. personnel were often a bit more strained. The main problem involved U.N. vehicles. These included pickup trucks and some old 5-ton trucks. When elements of TFE began to arrive, these vehicles were parked in a number of locations around the base. There was a plan for TFE to take control of some of these vehicles to support operations in and around Tuzla. The request had to go from Tuzla to Sarajevo to Zagreb to New York and back. The United Nations is not known as a very quick-response kind of organization and processing this request was no exception.

As we waited to hear from the United Nations' higher-ups, some interesting events started to occur. These "borrowed" vehicles started to move and reappear all around the base. Every few days, the U.N. transportation manager would provide me a printed list of the numbers of the "borrowed" vehicles. The list started small, four or five, but grew rapidly, maxing out at about 45. Some elements within the United Nations at Tuzla Air Base stated that the vehicles were stolen, but I pointed out that since the vehicles never left the air base, they had just "temporarily relocated."

This logic worked for the most part. No one was charged with grand theft auto, and the United Nations finally got all of their vehicles back. However, a large number seemed to have had their spare tires permanently moved to other locations. After much delay the United Nations said it would not sell many of the requested vehicles to the IFOR, but did bill IFOR $2.5 million for the use of the "borrowed" vehicles.

Latrines and Gravel

When not playing seasoned diplomat with the Norwegians or United Nations personnel, my main concerns were latrines, gravel and tent floors, in that order. The contracting officer, a key player in the Tuzla-10, found two local contractors who wanted to build latrines in support of TFE. They each had their own style. There was the top-of-line latrine with separate stalls, nicely slated roofs, blue toilet-seat covers, and more. The other was the "Beverly Hillbilly" style, a open-bay 3-holer with a tar-paper roof and a bent nail for a lock. We needed lots of latrines, so we purchased many of both styles. The first delivery of latrines was a major media event, covered live by Cable News Network (CNN) and a number of other media giants. Two local nationals, whom I called Larry and Moe, produced the Beverly Hillbilly-style latrines. They built these latrines in an unheated, cement building with dirt floors, using chain saws to cut the wood, because the power to the building had been cut during the war. Larry and Moe would show up at all hours with latrines loaded on a flat-bed truck. I would then have to find a forklift and driver to unload the latrines.

Almost as important as getting latrines was cleaning them. One option was to burn the latrine pots like they did in the Gulf War. For those who had witnessed this event, it was not the preferred option, so we worked with the United Nations to use a vehicle we called an SST. The "S--- Sucker Truck" was driven around the base 24-hours a day by some local nationals under TFE contract. This was **not** the best job in the world, and the SST crews were more than willing to make sure that I was aware of it. Using a large amount of sign language and much pointing, these crews would visit me each day asking for more money, new boots or gloves, and more American cigarettes. Arranging the supply, installation, and cleaning of latrines occupied a fair amount of my time as mayor of the air base.

Word had come down from the "Death Star." This was the name the soldiers used for the large German Fest tent which held the Task Force Eagle Tactical Operations Center. The word was the leadership wanted to see a "sea of gravel." With that order, we set to work to make that happen.

We signed contracts with a number of local gravel companies for thousands of tons of gravel. Detailed coordination was made with NORLOGBAT for the heavy equipment needed to push the gravel around to build the parking lots and sites for the tent cities. We used the "Bosnovian Rang-

ers" to help find the locations at which to dump and spread the gravel. When all was in place, we called for delivery of our gravel. Nothing happened. We waited for the gravel trucks to arrive, but no one came. The Norwegians sat on their heavy equipment waiting to support our efforts, but no trucks rolled through the front gates. Where was our "sea of gravel?"

Soon NORLOGBAT moved its equipment back to support its own missions. While we made calls to the local companies about the status of the contracts, high echelons within the Death Star questioned us. Bosnian workers are very much like other workers from this region of the world. This is not to say that these workers do not work long and hard, because indeed they do. It is just that the sense of urgency is sometimes not as great as it is, for example, with the Germans or Americans. When we ask for delivery of something on a Tuesday, we expect it to come on Tuesday. In Bosnia, if you ask for it on Tuesday, any day that week is close enough.

Over a 72-hour period, well over one hundred gravel trucks passed through the front gate of the air base. With the Norwegian equipment temporarily relocated to other projects, we just piled the gravel wherever we could find a spot. Soon there were mountains of gravel all around the air base. The "Sea of Gravel Days," as it was known, also created the first ever traffic grid-lock situation in the history of the Tuzla Air Base. At times during those days, the main road of the air base looked very much like any freeway in southern California during the morning rush hour. Tuzla finally had its "sea of gravel."

Media Circus

Another of my many responsibilities as mayor was dealing with members of the media. Early in the deployment, there were fewer than 50 Americans inside the air base and more than 300 members of the media outside the front gate. The major news organizations all built large platforms near the gate and placed cameras on them, trying to see what was going on inside the air base. Interview requests poured in to the Joint Information Bureau set up by TFE to handle the media. During my brief tenure in office, Swedish television, the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and the CBS Morning News all interviewed me. In general, the media was most supportive of all the efforts being made to bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina. I found the vast majority of the media representatives to be just average people, trying to do a job like everyone else. However, I offer the following observations about the media in no particular order of importance:

- ☐ If it is a slow news day, they ask much harder questions.
- ☐ Their understanding of how the military does business is often quite extensive.
- ☐ People do not look like they sound on the radio.
- ☐ CNN is everywhere.
- ☐ Someone outside U.S. Army Europe really does know the ratio of latrines to the number of soldiers.
- ☐ Lastly, if you do not know the answer to a question, don't try to fake it—you will get caught.

The "Breezes" and A Texas Honky-Tonk

In closing, I offer two short stories as a way to show the many different types of situations I had to deal with as mayor. One day the phone rang. "*Sir, we have someone here from the State Department.*" I found two gentlemen dressed in black overcoats, wearing civilian clothing and unpierceable dark sunglasses on a cloudy, rainy and foggy late afternoon. They had emerged from a dark-colored 4x4 jeep with tinted windows and German license plates. These two certainly did not look as if they were from the State Department. They really were members of a multi-letter organization and were here to "help me." I pointed out that unless they could build latrines, drive a gravel truck, or had about 1,000 tent floors in that 4x4, they were of little use to me. However, I did link them up with people who could use their help.

Over the next few weeks, during their comings and goings, I noticed that they were always wearing those dark sunglasses, no matter whether it was day or night. Whenever I recall my first encounter with those two, I remember a recurring character named Lieutenant Colonel Flagg in that old sitcom, "M*A*S*H," who called himself "The Wind" because he came and went unseen. These two became "Breeze One" and "Breeze Two."

I was sitting at my desk on a chilly afternoon, when the door opened and in walked a member of the Tuzla City Council with a businessman from Denmark. The businessman explained that he is half-American and half-Danish and he has "a grand opportunity" for me. He went on to explain how he planned to help all the soldiers that would soon arrive by building a 2,000-seat Texas-style honky-tonk bar and restaurant in downtown Tuzla. The gentleman

wanted me to assure him that all the soldiers would be allowed to leave the air base to support his venture. He went on to say that he had all the required permits from the Tuzla city government, and he showed me a set of plans as he continued to explain his well-thought-out plans. During his very serious presentation, it took everything in me to keep from laughing. I directed them to the Civil Affairs Office and decided to let them break the bad news.

Finale

In closing, I would like to say that my time as the mayor of Tuzla Air Base was a very interesting and unique military experience. I had a job totally different from any other that I have had in my 15-year military career. The hours were long, but the rewards were tangible. I could actually see and touch the results. I had a great time meeting a lot of interesting people from nations around the world. I really enjoyed helping construct a base camp from the ground up. It was a unique opportunity that I will long remember.

Major Lorenz is currently an Intelligence Exercise Planner for the Joint Training Analysis and Simulation Center at Suffolk, Virginia. His education includes bachelor of arts degrees in both Political Science and History from the University of Northern Colorado. Readers can contact him at (757) 686-7719, DSN 564-9100 extension 7719, and E-mail lorenz@jtasc.acom.mil.

Too Little Intel

(Continued from page 10)

comparison of Operations DESERT STORM and JOINT ENDEAVOR revealed, the classic mass formations of armored vehicles moving across uncluttered terrain simply did not exist.

Questions posed to the system had to be more specific. Use of Joint STARS confirmed or denied movement in towns thought deserted. It monitored suspected mass burial sites, often in isolated areas where any movement in the dead of winter was suspect.[16] Recalling that General Joulwan saw Joint STARS as the cornerstone of peace treaty compliance, the JTF 4500 Commander had each ZOS digitized so that they were readily available on every GSM monitor as well as aboard the aircraft.

An effort is ongoing to apply automation to the process to help sort the wheat from the chaff. Lieutenant Colonel David Anhalt of JTF 4500 is developing software enhancements that would use automation to monitor traffic at selected points.[17] Over time, traffic patterns can be discerned; deviations from historical averages will alert analysts to unusual activity.[18] Unfortunately, this capability was not available in time to impact on JOINT ENDEAVOR, though it holds great promise for future missions.

One capability that is wedded to conventional warfare is Joint STARS' ability to distinguish between wheeled and tracked vehicles. Using a differential Doppler, an algorithm detects the proximity of radar reflective surfaces moving at different speeds (like a track on a tank) and marks the MTI as a track. In Bosnia, this resulted in many more false icons than accurate ones. For example, two vehicles that pass in opposite directions on a highway provide the requisite radar returns to generate a track symbol. In this environment, we would have been well served to turn the capability off and remove the misleading "information."

Despite the aggressive efforts of all elements of JTF 4500 and their supported S2s, the raw volume of hard intelligence provided to commanders was not impressive, certainly not in comparison to DESERT STORM. For GSM operators living in austere conditions and interacting with their supported units daily, this was a hard pill to swallow. But the real measure of success was not directly proportional to the number of hard reports rendered.

Success or Failure?

At the tactical level, it would be difficult to justify the expense of this sophisticated system and its 450-person squadron. At the operational level, and not readily apparent to these beleaguered soldiers, there was a much more significant contribution.

We must keep in mind the ultimate goal of the commander: enforcement of the Dayton Treaty. If selected violations could be documented, IFOR would benefit from the deterrent effect of the factions' knowledge that they were under observation. General Joulwan strove to present an aura of omniscience. That the aircraft did not have 24 hour coverage was not critical—complete coverage was not required. The use of Joint STARS in conventional warfare may have a chilling effect on enemy commanders because their desire to achieve mass and mobility will be counterpoised by the certainty that such formations will be immediately detected in all conditions of light and weather. So too will a potential Bosnian combatant think twice about traversing a forbidden area if he thinks that someone is observing him.

Joint STARS' recording capability also alleviates the requirement to catch him in the act. An MTI history can be replayed to track a suspected mover, identifying his origin, his destination, and his rate and route of movement. The Joint STARS' SAR was used to verify the existence of equipment collection sites, define to a limited

extent the contents of those sites, and track changes over time.

In the Cold War era, intelligence professionals constantly sought to distinguish capabilities from intentions. In the post-Cold War era, Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR suggests that we must now understand the difference between perception and reality. Intelligence has become a force multiplier, not only in allowing the commander to effectively employ his assets to parry the enemy, but it now also serves an important deterrent role. If our main goal is to provide perfect intelligence, SASOs will give us perfect frustration. Even the term "enemy" has become outdated in the context of rival ethnic groups in a region grasping for peace. But if Joint STARS or any system can contribute to preventing hostilities, it has accomplished the mission.

The challenge for intelligence professionals is to learn the dissimilar lessons of both Operations DESERT STORM and JOINT ENDEAVOR. They must understand that their commander's role may be equal parts political and military and that the "consumer" of their intelligence may well be a potential belligerent that the commander strives to keep in check. By synthesizing and moving beyond the experiences of these two contingencies, we will be better prepared to provide intelligence for the next.

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Lieutenant Colonel Agee is the XVIII Airborne Corps Analysis and Control Element Chief. His most recent assignment was as Deputy Commander of the 525th MI Brigade (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. During the early stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, he was the 525th MI Brigade S3, serving as an augmentee to USAREUR. He has a bachelor of arts degree in National Security and Public Affairs from the U.S. Military Academy and a Masters of Military Arts and Sciences from the School of Advanced Military Studies. Readers can reach the author at (910) 396-1530, DSN 236-1530, and via E-mail at ageec@emh5.bragg.army.mil.

Logistics Support

(Continued from page 21)

mission was successful. The characteristics of logistics (anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation) were no less important during this deployment and employment of GSMs than they would be to a maneuver force. A combination of "push packages" and support coordinated by USAREUR and USAFE sustained our soldiers supporting major headquarters some 200 to 700 km apart. To the greatest extent possible, the Task Force attempted to reduce the burden of the logistics on the company commanders. Sometimes that support was not as timely as we would have liked, but it was effective and allowed the teams to sustain operations. Hopefully, our future deployments of this nature will incorporate some of the suggestions and information presented here and help to avoid some of the barriers we encountered.

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All-Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team

by Captain James R. Stone

"Sir, both Aegis cruisers have checked in, we have comms with AWACS and Rivet Joint, both OPFOR and BLUFOR helicopters are in the area, the F-15s are ready to engage, and it's 'Fight's On.'" These words initiated the spin-up to the All-Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team (ASCIET) 95, a live, joint evaluation held 4 through 15 September 1995 in the Gulf of Mexico near Gulfport, Mississippi.

ASCIET is a joint program designed to improve combat identification and thereby minimize fratricide among the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps while maintaining or increasing the lethality of our Services' weapons employment. The evaluation was designed to assess and improve the abilities of each of our Services' combat identification to operate effectively in a joint environment. In addition, they assessed various concepts of combat identification in a broad spectrum of areas to include doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); combat systems; and training.

Evaluation Participants

Organizationally speaking, the ASCIET works directly for the General Officer Steering Committee for Combat Identification and reports to the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC). The ASCIET program is lead by an Air Force colonel whose deputies are lieutenant colonels (or equivalents) from each of the four Services. The following list describes the makeup of the remainder of the ASCIET staff:

- ☐ Representatives from F-14 Tomcat, F-15 Eagle, F-16 Fighting Falcon, AV-8 Harrier, E-2 Hawkeye, RC-135 Rivet Joint, E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and UH-60 Black Hawk elements.
- ☐ Infantry, armor, field artillery, engineer, air defense artillery (ADA), and Army aviation officers.
- ☐ Officers specifically affiliated with the PATRIOT, HAWK, and Aegis missile platforms from each of the Services.
- ☐ Command and control (C^2) experts on the Marine Corps' Marine Air Command and Control System and Tactical Air Operations Center (TAOC), as well as the Air Force's Control and Reporting Element, Control and Reporting Center (CRC), Air Operations Center, and the ADA Brigade Fire Direction Center.

Additionally, ASCIET had contractor support from CAS, Inc., the Center for Naval Analysis, MEVATEC, and Science Applications International Corporation. Also, many of the participating weapon system groups comprise seasoned, tactically oriented noncommissioned officers (NCOs).

Evaluation Operations

In preparation for the annual live exercise, ASCIET first conducts a simulation exercise (SimEx) where they connect the crews from the C^2 platforms, such as Aegis, TAOC, CRC, HAWK, E-3 Hawkeye, ADA TSQ-73 Missile Minder, and Rivet Joint, and the crews from the fighters in a distributed interactive simulation of what happens during the actual exercise. Use of the SimEx verifies the scenario and TTP used during the live exercise and to conduct integrated joint crew training.

The air-to-air and surface-to-air battle took place in a littoral airspace over and around the Gulf of Mexico, while air-to-ground and ground-to-ground engagements occurred on the Camp Shelby, Mississippi, range complex. This environment created a realistic joint battlespace with very likely opportunities for fratricide. Here is a sample of a day's activities:

- ☐ The high-performance opposing force (OPFOR) aircraft—the F-16s, F-111s, and an airframe created to represent an antiship cruise missile—launched from Eglin Air Force Base in Pensacola, Florida. They flew southwest to a warning area off the Gulf Coast with the mission of performing air interdiction and close air support (CAS) on the Camp Shelby range complex before returning to Eglin.
- ☐ Blue Force (BLUFOR) high-performance aircraft—AV-8s, F-14s, F-15s, and FA-18s—were launched from Gulfport, Mississippi and represented the *"good guys."* They challenged the OPFOR over the Gulf of Mexico as the first belt of an established, joint, integrated air defense (AD).
- ☐ The Aegis cruisers, PATRIOT, and HAWK missile systems assessed all the aircraft as they moved toward their land, shore, or sea-based targets. These weapons systems exercised datalinks with the fighters, AWACS, E-2, and E-3 aircraft for a coordinated joint battle.

- The mission of the BLUFOR jets was combat air patrol to deter strikers intending to attack the Camp Shelby range complex. Other jets simulated carrier launchings by departing from a ground base and flying along a predetermined route to a designated point in the Gulf. From there, they flew to Camp Shelby via the beachhead for their close air support (CAS) mission.
- Concurrently, the Aegis class cruisers; the HAWK and PATRIOT missile elements' command, control, communication and intelligence nodes; Army forward area air defense; and the Marine Corps low-altitude air defense elements started sorting the good guys from the bad and engaging all applicable targets.
- CAS aircraft then proceeded north to the Camp Shelby range complex.
- After the CAS mission, the ground battle started with former Soviet Bloc T-72 tanks and BMP armored vehicles, supported by HIND and HOPLITE helicopters and an AN-2 COLT, facing Abrams tanks and some Bradley fighting vehicles. M113, light armor vehicles, and high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) acted as distracter vehicles that wandered onto the battlefield.
- Army Aviation provided the OH-58DKW Kiowa Warriors and UH-60 Black Hawks for scout and air assault missions to reinforce the ground battle.
- Navy SH-60 Sea Hawk helicopters were also working over water in the vicinity of the Aegis cruisers and transitioning northbound to operate on the battlefield.

Photos provided by Lisa Chandler

The Light Amphibious Reconnaissance Carrier.

Off-Line Participants

To keep an eye toward the future, emerging technologies in ASCIET 95 participated as designated off-line and on-line systems. Some had subsystems with broad, expandable applications in the joint environment. The following list enumerates the off-line systems that participated in ASCIET 95:

- Situational Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER).
- Air Defense Communications Platform (ADCP).
- Situational Awareness Data Link (SADL).
- Collection of Broadcasts from Remote Assets (COBRA).
- Automatic Target Hand-Off System II (ATHS II).
- Forward Observer/Forward Air Controller (FO/FAC).
- Battlefield Combat Identification System (BCIS).
- Forward Area Air Defense C^2 ($FAADC^2$).
- Non-imaging infrared.
- Appliqué Six, Bloodhound, Radiant Mist, and Eyecatcher systems for enhanced situational awareness of the battlespace.

Other systems had classifications that restrict them from being addressed in this paper. ASCIET staff evaluated some systems for future fratricide avoidance applications. Other systems were still in the embryonic development phase, brought by the individual program managers, and evaluated only by their internal program team.



Figure 1. ASCIET 95 Overview.

Result

ASCIET 95 was an unparalleled joint training event coupled with data collection in support of a combat identification evaluation. ASCIET was not evaluating the operators in this exercise; data



Aegis missile system during near-land test.

was the product. This data will be analyzed and evaluated with the following questions in mind:

- ☐ How did each Service use its complex systems in a joint battle?
- ☐ How can each Service and weapon system modify its TTP for optimum employment?
- ☐ How can we apply these lessons learned to the future joint battle environment?

Our successful mission will provide the answers to these questions. The resulting ASCIET 95 Evaluation Report will go to JROC, evaluation participants, and will be available through the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC).

What is next? ASCIET 96 will be held in the fourth quarter of FY 96. The SimEx will be larger because it will include ground maneuver elements for the first time. This will prepare us for a larger Army slice with a bigger ground maneuver element consisting of M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley tanks, fire support team vehicles, and a Marine light armored vehicle platoon facing real Soviet T-72s and armored BMP-2s, BTR-70/80 personnel carriers, and BRDM reconnaissance vehicles. Distracter vehicles will include a "Gray Force" of M60 tanks, M113s personnel carriers, an M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle, and M9 Armored Combat Earthmover. In addition, AH-64, OH-58DKW, Marine AH-1W, and UH-60 helicopters will support this maneuver element while the fixed-wing fighters provide CAS and ground AD elements protect the force. The goal is to continue learning how to improve combat identification among all the Services so that fewer incidents of fratricide occur in future conflicts.

Captain Stone is currently attending the Georgia Institute of Technology to attain a graduate physics degree with a follow-on assignment at the U.S. Military Academy. His previous assignments include Engineer Operations Officer for the All-Service Combat Identification Evaluation Team at Eglin Air Force Base in Pensacola, Florida; Commander, Alpha Company, 91st Engineer Battalion, 1st Cavalry Division; and Platoon Leader and Executive Officer of the 9th Engineer Battalion in Germany. He served in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Captain Stone holds a bachelors degree in Applied Mathematics from Appalachian State University. Readers can contact his former unit at (904) 882-9046/7 or DSN 872-9046/7.

Do You Want To Train Some International Soldiers?

by Larry E. Ogden, Edward A. Giarusso, and Lieutenant Colonel Stephen W. Bross

The Army provides training to more than 5000 international military personnel annually under the security assistance (SA) training program. The Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Army for International Affairs and the Training and Doctrine Command Security Assistance Training Field Activity (SATFA) execute the SA program. Authorization of this training is under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, or the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended. Foreign military training is conducted through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, including the violation of national security, other Federal or state criminal laws (except for the Uniform Code of Military Justice), requests for political asylum, public affairs management (requests for interviews), purchase and possession of firearms and motor vehicles, indebtedness to the U.S. Government and private third parties, the presence in the Continental United States of dependents and their management, unauthorized absences, and living arrangements, access to military facilities like quarters and hospitals. These students have no special status that would insulate them for claims by third parties or allow them to make claims against the U.S. Government. These rules may not apply if the trainee is from a country covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Status of Forces Agreement, if a similar agreement is in effect between the trainee's country and the United States, or if the trainee has valid entitlement to diplomatic status.

By law, all training must be paid for by either the IMET or FMS program. U.S. Army personnel are not authorized to enter directly into training arrangements with international students or foreign governments unless specifically authorized to do so by the FAA/AECA. Under no circumstances may an invitation for training be offered by U.S. Army personnel or Service school to a foreign national. Foreign military personnel must request IMET or FMS training through the host country's U.S. SA officer (SAO) assigned to our Embassy. The SAO has the responsibility and authority to coordinate country training requirements with the Director, SATFA, at Fort Monroe, Virginia. SATFA ensures that the training is properly funded by the foreign government and all disclosure issues are satisfied. All requests for training received at an installation should be referred to SATFA for resolution.

Mr. Ogden is the International Training Officer in the Office of the Deputy Secretary of the Army for International Affairs; readers can reach him via E-mail at ogdenle@hqda.army.mil. Mr. Giarusso is an Intelligence Specialist in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Lieutenant Colonel Bross was an Intelligence Law Attorney with the Office of Judge Advocate General.

The Former Yugoslav Area:
Religious and Ethnic Strife



by Major Max J. Riekse, USAR

World War I began in 1914 with two bullets; the heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife were assassinated during a parade on the streets of Sarajevo in what is now the former Yugoslavia. Sarajevo is the Bosnian capital and is also the location of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters. World War I (WWI) set the stage for WWII and the recent troubles in Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia.

The primary players in the former Yugoslavia are the people of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia. In December 1918, Yugoslavia was created by the fusion of the Kingdom of Serbia with the former regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia. Known initially as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, it took until 1929 for this new country to officially adopt the name "Yugoslavia." It was an unstable union from its inception.

The Roman Catholic Croats resented the dominance of the Greek Orthodox Serbs with their "Eastern" habits which are quite different from the Croats' Vienna-oriented "European" outlook on life. Friction between Croats and Serbs threatened the very existence of Yugoslavia from the start. Religiously, Greek Orthodox Serbia is an ancient enemy of the Catholic Croats who trace their history back 13 centuries. Croatia's thousand-year-old parliament dissolved after WWI to create the new state of Yugoslavia.

World War II

After the WWII German invasion of Yugoslavia, Serbia was reduced in size and placed under a German military governor. Slovenia was partitioned between Germany and Italy. Germany then recognized Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia were part of Croatia at that time. Croatia's WWII Fascist government was allied with Nazi Germany. Croats killed tens of thousands of Serbs during WWII. Many were "Chetniks," the Serb guerrillas (see drawing). This carnage is just one of the causes of today's conflict. Many of these Serbs died resisting the Germans and Croats. Memory of the Fascist WWII government of Croatia which killed so many Serbs remains. Serbs comprised 11 percent of Croatia's population of 5 million prior to the recent hostilities, and they fear renewed persecution.

On the other hand, Croatians recall what happened after the Germans were defeated and expelled. In June and July 1990, the remains of roughly 40,000 Croatian soldiers, army nurses, and others were found in a mass grave near the village of Sosice, located about 45 miles west of the Croatian capital of Zagreb. They had been shot and thrown one by one into a narrow 40-yard long pit. Victorious Serb Communists had executed them in 1945. Apparently, the Serbs killed them after they surrendered to the Communist partisans or after they were deported to Yugoslavia by the Western Allies from Austria (where many had sought refuge at the end of WWII).

The WWII Allies included Great Britain, France, and the United States, the same countries which are sending troops into this area to maintain peace. The Croatian people have little reason to put their full faith and trust in either the British, French, or Americans. Hundreds of thousands of Germans and those who fought with them, including thousands of Croats, surrendered to the Allies at the end of WWII, only to be repatriated to their former nations. This was

done despite what governments or political entities were in control. The Communists summarily executed many of these people. The American policy after WWII of turning over foreign nationals to their Communist adversaries, was an arrangement these people still remember, especially since many of them were killed or worse. Marshall Tito, the modern day leader of Yugoslavia, held his country together by force with the help of his Communist party and army for decades. When he died, so did the concept of a peaceful, united Yugoslavia.

During WWII, the Germans raised several "Foreign Legions" from the area of the former Yugoslavia, mainly for antipartisan warfare against Serb Chetnik guerrillas who were fighting the German occupiers and for their own independence. Most of the Yugoslav resistance that fought the Germans were Serbians with Tito's Communist-dominated partisans. Croats and Slovens began to flow into Tito's Serb- and Communist-dominated armies only late in the war. The Chetniks were dominated primarily by the Communists. The "Foreign Legions" who fought on the German side were made up of Croats, ethnic Germans from the Balkan area, and Muslims from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Many of the "Foreign Legions" evolved or were assimilated into the German Waffen SS, the most notorious being the "Prinz Eugen" 7th Waffen SS Division. The majority of the Division's personnel were ethnic Germans from Croatia and surrounding areas. There were also Croat and Muslim Waffen SS formations as well. Anti-partisan warfare was particularly brutal in the Balkans during WWII, and all sides committed atrocities. These people have good reason to hate each other and the allies and supporters of their adversaries.

The bulk of the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina are of the Muslim faith, but are ethnically identical to their Christian neighbors. Their forefathers once belonged to a much-persecuted Christian sect known as the Bogomils. The Turks overran the Balkans in the 15th century. The Bogomils, in gratitude for the more tolerant attitude the Turks extended towards them, adopted the religion of their Turkish conquerors. Their conversion to Islam was thus a unique phenomenon. These European people embraced the Muslim faith along with its dress and social customs.

The main religious groups American forces will have to confront are the Roman Catholic Croats, the Greek Orthodox Serbs, the Bosnian Muslims, and possibly Mujahideen fighters (Muslim extremists) who recently fought at the side of the Bosnian forces. The Mujahideen want to bring their Muslim fundamentalism to Bosnia. They come from the same type of people as those who killed the U.S. Marines in Beirut, Lebanon, with a truck bomb, and also tortured and then killed an American colonel working for the United Nations. Know one thing: these are serious people. The people of this area are very sensitive about their religious differences. In the United States, religious freedom and tolerance are the norm; in most of the world, and especially in the Balkans, such liberty does not exist.

Conclusion

NATO troops function in this area as peacekeepers, to ensure treaty compliance among the different sides of the "recent" conflict. American troops must be careful not to appear as if they are taking sides. Fairness, understanding (especially with the different religious groups of the area), and impartiality at every level should be the order of the day. We must approach this entirely different set of cultures in the former Yugoslavia with both concern and sensitivity. These people do not think like Americans or even like most Europeans. The people with whom American troops will be facing could shake their hands one minute, then pick up a gun and start shooting the next. Our soldiers should always remember that the Bosnian Serbs harbor deep mistrust of America. Again, these people do not forget a wrong. They appear to respect force and, only possibly, fairness. These American men and women will have to have the full support of the American people and their elected leaders during this peacekeeping operation.

Major Riekse is in the U.S. Army Reserve in Michigan. He is on active duty through November 1996 at Fort Benning, Georgia, as a historian for the U.S. Army Reserve Command documenting USARC participation in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. His reserve duty is as an instructor in Command and General Staff College courses in Lansing, Michigan. Major Riekse has a bachelor of arts degree in Political Science from the University of South Florida and two master of arts degrees from Western Michigan University, in Political Science and Education. Readers can contact the author at commercial (706) 689-0067 extension 2209 .

A Recent History of Bosnia-Herzegovina

by Captain Roger F. Cavazos and Second Lieutenant Sherman S. Powell

Editor's Note: Please see the map on page 13 for any geographical reference needed for the following article.

Yugoslavia, Serbia, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Croatia, Slovenia, Karadzic, Milosevic.... Just what is what and who is who in the Balkans? This article will try to answer questions like the following ones: What countries comprise the Balkans? Who are the major players in Bosnia-Herzegovina and what is their ideology? What does the Dayton Peace Accord say? What forces are in the region?

The Balkan region is generally defined as the area south of the Danube and Sava rivers. Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania (even though it is north of the Danube it is still considered a Balkan country), the European part of Turkey, and the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) all lie in the Balkans. FRY consisted of six republics: Bosnia,

Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Marshal Tito and Communist rule were the glue which held these heterogeneous religious and ethnic groups together. Yugoslavia showed signs of disintegration after Marshal Tito's death in 1980. Shortly after the Soviet Union broke apart in 1989, Yugoslavia was torn apart from within by nationalism. This raises the question of who would have reason to want to be separate from whom and how?

The Belligerents and Their Ideology

The people in the FRY are almost all ethnic Slavs. After that, all similarity ends. We will look at the three major groups, their religion, who they look to for international support, their leader, and some of their goals. Serbs account for over a third of the FRY population. The Croats are about one-fifth. Almost nine percent are Bosnian Muslims.

Radovan Karadzic

The Serbians are comprised of three basic groups—Serbians, Bosnians, and Krajinans. They use the Cyrillic alphabet and look toward Russia for international support. Some of the more well-known Bosnian Serbs are Radovan Karadzic, General Ratko Mladic, and Slobadan Milosevic. The first two are convicted war criminals. Milosevic is not. The army was mainly composed of Bosnian Serbs before FRY dissolved. This disintegration allowed the Bosnian Serbs to quickly attain the majority of their territorial objectives. The Krajinan Serbs simply wanted to keep their territory and prevent any Croat attempts to control Krajina. All the Serbs want a unified territorial entity—a "greater Serbia." Most of the Serbs live in the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This region is the self-proclaimed state of the Bosnian Serbs. Since the religion of most Serbs is Eastern Orthodox, the Orthodox church also supports a unified Serbia. The problem is that at least two other groups occupy part of the ground which the Serbians want.

One of the groups blocking a unified Serbia is the Roman Catholic Croats. They are headed by President Franjo Tudjman. The Croats want to keep open access to the Dalmatian coast. The Dalmatian coast was a large source of revenue in the prewar years. They also want to retake the third of their territory which the Krajinan Serbs usurped. The Bosnian Croats have joined forces with the Bosnian Muslims to help repel the Serbs. The Croats reflect their Western orientation through their written use of the Latin alphabet. The Croats generally find the Germans and Austrians are their biggest supporters.

The Bosnian Muslims are ethnically the same as everyone else in the region—Slavic—but they are more oriented to Turkey and the Muslim Arab countries. Their President, Alija Izetbegovic, wrote a treatise called the **Islamic Declaration: A Program for the Islamization of the Muslims and the Muslim Peoples**. His vision is to establish a "multi-ethnic" state. He reached an agreement with the Croats to create an eight-canton federation. Half of the cantons would be Muslim, two Croat, and two mixed. But first, he has to establish and maintain a unified state. The Bosnian Serbs hold almost three-quarters of the Bosnian Government's territory. The Bosnians must keep Sarajevo and some additional territory to remain a legitimate state. The Balkans and especially the FRY are similar to the Middle East in that both areas depict the juxtaposition of Islam and other religions contesting the same areas. Each side has arguably justified claims to be there.

The Dayton Peace Accord

The United States was losing credibility in the region, in the world, and in the Middle East because of its inaction. The Dayton Peace Accord represents the culmination of our diplomatic efforts to solve the situation.

Franjo Tudjman

The General Framework agreement consists of each of the three signatories recognizing the other two. Further, each one agrees to respect the sovereignty and equality of the others and to settle disputes peacefully. Each party also fully agrees to cooperate with all entities authorized to implement the peace settlement, and investigate and prosecute war crimes. (These include intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations, nongovernment organizations (the Red Cross, for example), and the United Nations Implementation Force or IFOR.) The rest of the agreement is spread over eleven annexes. We will briefly summarize what is in each one and highlight some specifics.

Annex 1-A: Military Aspects. The cease fire which began the agreement on 5 October 1995 continues in effect. Foreign combatant forces had to withdraw in 30 days or less. (Most worried about the Mujahideen, especially since we had armed them with Stingers and trained them.) All forces had to move approximately 4 kilometers behind a zone of separation (ZOS). Sarajevo and Gorazde had special provision. (Gorazde has a particularly large and efficient munitions plant. Almost every "safe haven" was turned into a munitions and manufacturing area.) All parties agreed to withdraw heavy weapons and troops into cantonment or barracks areas as a confidence-building measure. *IFOR has the right to use force as necessary. They will have unimpeded freedom of move-*

ment, airspace control, and status of forces protection.

Annex 1B: Regional Stabilization. The three signatories had to begin negotiating under the auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to agree on confidence-building measures. Part of this included agreeing on numerical limits of tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and helicopters. All parties agreed to forgo importing arms for 90 days. They also agreed to not import any heavy weapons, mines, military aircraft, or helicopters for 180 days.

Alija Izetbegovic

Annex 2: Inter-Entity Boundaries. There will be an inter-entity boundary between Bosnia and the Bosnian Serb Republic (the agreement does not recognize Karadzic or that he has a state). Sarajevo will be open to all. Gorazde will remain open and linked by a land corridor. They will determine the status of Brcko within a year.

Annex 3: Elections. All citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina who are older than 18 may vote. The electoral parties must grant citizens the right to vote secretly, express themselves, and have access to a free press.

Annex 4: Constitution. Bosnia-Herzegovina adopted a new constitution when they signed this agreement at Paris. Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue as a sovereign state with two entities. *No person who is serving a sentence or under indictment by the tribunal may be a candidate or hold any public office.* (Italics added)

Annex 5: Arbitration. The Federation and the Bosnian Serb Republic agree to binding arbitration (both sides must do whatever an outside arbiter decides). Also they agree to institutionalize an arbitration system to settle disputes peacefully.

Annex 6: Human Rights. Everyone agrees to grant basic human rights. They also agree to grant all organizations full access to monitor the human rights situation.

Annex 7: Refugees and Displaced Persons. All refugees and displaced people may safely and freely return home and regain lost property or receive compensation. A commissioner for refugees may decide on return of property or compensation.

Annex 8: Commission to Preserve National Monuments. The commission can declare property to be a national monument. All signatories will make every effort to protect and conserve national monuments.

Annex 9: Bosnia-Herzegovina Public Corporations. Corporations may be established to run road, rail, and port facilities. The provision also establishes joint ventures to run utilities and postal functions.

Annex 10: Civil Implementation. This annex installs a civilian hierarchy which *has no authority over IFOR* (emphasis added).

Annex 11: International Police Task Force. This provision allows for the training and advising of local law enforcement personnel. (This conforms to the U.S. view of *posse comitatus* and our prohibition against allowing the military to perform law-enforcement activities). The organization charged with making sure the signatories keep their promises is called the Implementation Force.

The IFOR

The IFOR is headquartered in Sarajevo and has three zones. The French command the Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina from Mostar. The United Kingdom has about 14,000 troops; its headquarters is in Gornji Vakuf. They cover western Bosnia-Herzegovina. The United States of America has a division-sized Task Force and some support elements; its area of responsibility covers northeast Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tuzla is the American sector headquarters in Bosnia. U.S. total troop strength is approximately 20,000. Several other countries have sent troops. A partial list of participating countries would include: Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, and Spain. As of this writing (late July 1996), IFOR has been fairly successful.

The free elections are scheduled to take place on 14 September 1996. That has IFOR worried about possibly having to play policeman. No matter how fair and impartial a country tries to be when playing this role, some entity is always dissatisfied with the outcome. Peacekeeping operations and even peace-enforcing operations require the peacekeepers or peace enforcers to appear impartial. If they are not, then those sent to keep the peace may find themselves in the line of fire.

Try the Internet

If you want to find more information on Bosnia, use the Internet (we did in writing this article). An especially helpful site is CNN.COM/world/bosnia/key/ groups.html. From there you can connect with several other related sites. BosNews has some interesting and up-to-date information. Other sites include www.acs.supernet/manu/briefhis.html and www.fsu.edu/-voijin/Risto.Mostarki/bosnia101.html.

Captain Cavazos is currently Commander, Alpha Company, 1-19 Infantry, Fort Benning, Georgia. His past assignments include Long-Range Platoon Leader, 165th MI Battalion; Bradley Platoon Leader, 3d Infantry Division (ID); and United Nations Command Security Force–Joint Security Area, Panmunjom, Korea. Captain Cavazos has a bachelor of science degree from the U.S. Military Academy and a master of science degree in International Relations from Troy State University. Readers can reach the authors through (706) 544-9163/9565, DSN 784-9163/9565, and via E-mail at rcava355222@aol.com.

Second Lieutenant Powell just left a position as the Executive Officer, Alpha Company, 1-19 Infantry, and is on orders for the 3d ID. He has a bachelor of arts degree from the Sloan School of Management at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

ASAS System Update and Planned RWS Fielding and Institutional Support

by Colonel Theodore G. Chopin

Editors Note: The following is the text of a message sent to all ASAS senior leaders, subject as above, DTD 311905Z JUL 96.

This message is an update, intended to clarify the existing versions of the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) Remote Workstation. It also explains what is institutionally funded for fielding and issuing and for hardware and software support.

Today's ASAS consists of four subsystems. They are—

- ☐ All source.
- ☐ Single source.
- ☐ The communications gateway subsystems.
- ☐ Remote workstation (RWS).

While numbers of machines and types of hardware vary, these functional groupings remain constant throughout all variations. Following replacement of the last of the old DEC 3800 all-source machines, all units are using the DEC ALPHA RISC hardware to run this powerful software. Single-source software is operating on ruggedized and commercial versions of Sun Sparc 2, 10, and 20 hardware. The communications gateway function is provided by the communications control set (CCS) or the Compartmented ASAS Message Processing System (CAMPS).

The RWS is so named because it is designed to be operated outside the Analysis and Control Element (ACE). There are currently two tested and approved versions of the ASAS RWS. While all the collateral enclave (CE) machines (the first version) that were part of the initial fielding have not yet been retired, the baselined software for the RWS most commonly in use is called Warlord software, but it is more correctly designated ASAS-RWS Version 1 (V1). This software operates on Sun Sparc 10/20 hardware. The older ASAS Warrior software is rapidly being replaced by the RWS V1.

All-Source Suites

The full suite of ASAS equipment exists in two forms. The original ASAS-fielded units have six single-source and six all-source machines in their ACE. The extended version of the ASAS has two single-source and three all-source machines (an additional Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) machine has been added to the ACE in both configurations). Both baselined system variations include two RWSs to provide the critical presentation and collateral workstation capabilities required. The extended version was created to get the identical software capabilities fielded to the force years ahead of the funded Army fielding schedule. This has been accomplished. Today all corps, divisions, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Corps Military Intelligence Support Element and echelons above corps MI Brigades (less the 66th MI Group) have an ASAS capability consisting of all four subsystems. The 66th will be fielded with the all-source capability in fiscal year 1997 (FY 97).

RWS Variations

The ASAS RWS variations and the planned institutional software support require additional explanation. They are best understood when discussed from a historical perspective. There were two collateral enclave remote workstations (CWSs) which were part of the original suite of fielded ASAS hardware. They operated on common hardware 1. The CWS incorporated the first interoperability requirements of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS). Their slowness and general lack of functionality limited their operational utility.

On the other hand, the software commonly referred to as ASAS Warrior had a good deal of the required functionality. The ASAS Program Manager (PM) brought the ASAS Warrior RWS into the baseline program. The ASAS Joint Prototyping Office (JPO) General Officer Review Board (GORB) directed the JPO contractor to build the next generation ASAS RWS by combining the ATCCS interoperability of the CWS with the intelligence functionality of the ASAS Warrior.

The result is ASAS RWS V1, the ASAS Warlord software. This software was designed to operate on the Sun platform that is ASAS common hardware II and has been tested; the Army is now fielding it as the approved ASAS RWS V1. As such, it is undergoing software support transition from the JPO's contractor, MYSTECH, to the U.S. Army Communications Electronics Command (CECOM) (the contractor is ILEX) for the post-deployment software support (PDSS). This transition will be completed by the end of FY96. Then, CECOM will have PDSS responsibility for two RWS V1s per ACE just as it does for the rest of the ACE ASAS machines and the CCS.

Only Two RWSs Per ACE Institutionally Supported

It is critical to note and understand that only two RWSs per ACE are institutionally supported. This fact has been fully and openly discussed during all the JPO GORBs. In every instance where a command decided to purchase additional hardware this was reviewed and understood by all. In fact, all commands that have large numbers of ASAS Warrior and Warlord RWSs now provide their own support in the way they feel is most efficient.

As CECOM finishes its transition to pick up PDSS responsibility for the RWS V1 software, it is offering to maintain all the additional Warlord software within the unit and theater at the unit's expense. This makes good operational sense for the using unit. Not only will one contractor be maintaining the RWS software, but that contractor will maintain a common interoperable baseline with all other parts of the ASAS as it continues to be improved.

CECOM has not been resourced to support the large number of additional RWSs that users have purchased. This situation exists because the Army has not yet funded the fielding of more than the two RSWs per ACE. The requirements for large numbers of ASAS RWS throughout the battlefield exist. The Army will resource and field them (and therefore institutionally fund them for support as the intelligence part of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). The sound initiative demonstrated by the units which purchased additional baseline systems (rather than buying new, unique systems) will continue to require unit software and hardware maintenance funding.

An Interim Option

As a related and interim measure, the ASAS program decided to provide a downscaled and more affordable version of the RWS software that could operate on an inexpensive personal computer (PC) (specifically a Pentium processor notebook or desktop model). Hence, it is called the "Warlord notebook." This will only be a unit purchase alternative to the more expensive Sun Sparc 20 platform which is required to run the current and future baseline version of the ASAS RWS.

The ASAS Program Manager (PM) is in the process of determining and completing the required level of testing to be able to release this software to the units desiring it. Again, it is vital to understand that the offering of this software is only an interim alternative for the units who need the RWS functionality now, but cannot afford to purchase the preferred Sun equipment. Again, the using units will have to individually contract for hardware and software support as needed.

After testing, the PM and the Training and Doctrine Command System Manager (TSM) will be prepared to offer maintenance alternatives to gaining units. Although it is similar to the RWS V1 software baseline (except for the database), this interim software version will not transition to life cycle support from CECOM. To reiterate, the purchase of the SUN equipment and use of the RWS V1 software is still the best alternative. Not only is the RWS V1 more mature software, this hardware platform will allow the transition to the next generation ASAS RWS now being created for the Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment.

Conclusion

While these variations of the ASAS are somewhat difficult to understand, they represent a "good news" story. Without this rapid and continuous activity toward capturing the latest hardware and software, the program would stagnate. We will work hard to make sure we give you all the support possible while providing inventive alternatives to get functionality to you as early as is physically and programmatically possible.

As always, your comments are invited. Contact us on the ASAS Internet Home Page at http://www.tsmasas.army.mil.

Corrected Current ASAS Status and Plan

The color portion of the figure depicting the ASAS fielding status and plan in the July-September 1996 issue of ***Military Intelligence*** was not printed. The figure was on page 11 in Colonel Chopin's excellent article, "ASAS: New Ways to Leverage Human Analytical Power." We regret the error. Below is a revised copy of the figure showing the systems already fielded and those due in 1997.



CONCEPTS & DOCTRINE

Force XXI: USAIC&FH Support to Information Operations

by Captain Mark D. Peasley

When the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Commander, General William W. Hartzog, recently signed the Intel XXI concept, he moved the Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) into a major support role of the Force XXI patterns of operations,[1] with the emphasis on the pattern *gain information dominance*. Information operations (IO) are—

> *continuous military operations within the MIE [military information environment] that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations. IO include interacting with the Global Information Environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities.*

When TRADOC gave the Intelligence Center the lead in determining IO implications for the Army, USAIC&FH established the Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) in May 1995. Its mission was to gain insights for concepts and doctrine for IO and command and control (C^2) warfare (C^2W) at the operational and tactical levels. The IOTF conducted wargames in November 1995. Based on the wargame results, the IOTF provided input to **FM 100-6, Information Operations**, and to the Information Operations CBRS Assessment with a DTLOMS Focus (IOCADF)[2] report, and drafted a corps-level C^2W tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) manual. **FM 100-6** is the first Army field manual to address information operations. Its purpose is to describe the challenge we face and how the Army should operate in an information-rich battlespace. Responsibility for the C^2W TTP recently passed to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, the Army's proponent for IO. There it will aid in implementing IO in the Battle Command Training Program and assist in the drafting of **FM 100-6-1, IO TTP.**

Intelligence is a critical element of IO. Intelligence supporting friendly operations helps produce a common, current, and relevant picture of the battlespace that reduces uncertainty and shortens commanders' decisionmaking process. Against the adversary, intelligence is vital in developing and executing effective C^2W operations, which degrade and distort the enemy's decisionmaking process, while protecting friendly C^2.

USAIC&FH's ongoing support to IO includes the rewriting of **FM 34-40** and renaming it **Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Support to C^2W.** We are tentatively hosting an IO/C^2W planning mobile training team from the Joint C^2W Center, and participating in September 1996 general officer symposium on the Department of the Army IO Action/Campaign Plan. Intelligence must help build the framework enabling the commander to use all available information, protect information capabilities, and manage information, as well as to exploit and deny the adversary's ability to do the same.

Endnotes

1. See Captain Neal Wegner's article, "The Intel XXI Concept II: The Operational Patterns," in the previous issue of ***Military Intelligence***.

2. CBRS is concepts-based requirements system. The expansion of DTLOMS is doctrine, training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldiers.

CPT Peasley is the Special Operations Liaison to Fort Huachuca, currently in the Directorate of Combat Developments. His most recent assignment was with the 1-10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). Readers can contact him at (520) 538-7212, DSN 879-7212 or peasleym@huachuca-dcd.army.mil.

Opposing Force Field Manual Update

by Major Erin J. Gallogly-Staver

In April 1996, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) disseminated **FM 100-63, Infantry-Based Opposing Force: Organization Guide**, which replaced the **TRADOC Pamphlet 350-13, Light Opposing Force: Organization Guide. FM 100-63** is the first of the seven field manuals (FMs) in the **FM 100-60** series to be published. The series documents a capabilities-based opposing force (OPFOR) in the seven volumes listed in Figure 1.

These manuals describe realistic flexible forces representing a composite of actual worldwide forces with varying capabilities. They constitute a baseline for training or developing U.S. forces, in lieu of a specific threat force, and may be used in all training venues. The capabilities-based OPFOR concept represents a break from past practices in several principal respects.

- ☐ The armor- and mechanized- and infantry-based OPFOR manuals are not just unclassified handbooks on the armed forces of particular nations. Each manual has its basis in the doctrine and organization of various foreign

armies. These new OPFOR manuals are composites deliberately constructed to provide a wide range of capabilities.

- ☐ The manuals do not provide a fixed order of battle. Rather, they provide the building blocks from which users can derive a nearly infinite number of potential orders of battle, depending on their training requirements.
- ☐ The FM which describes the OPFOR in stability and support operations represents many diverse threats; these OPFOR cover the entire technological spectrum and include forces of all sizes from a battalion-sized insurgent force to a small, direct-action terrorist cell.
- ☐ Keeping with the capabilities-based concept, the OPFOR equipment FM will provide users with baseline systems and potential substitutes.

The FMs in this series are in various states of production and publication. Figure 1 depicts the current publication schedule. Local reproduction of the TRADOC pamphlets is authorized; the Threat Support Directorate (TSD), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT), TRADOC, has limited quantities of pamphlets **350-14**, **-15**, **-16**, and **-17**. Staff Sergeant Stier at (913) 684-7921 or DSN 552-7921 is the point of contact for the TRADOC pamphlets. To order the FMs, refer to the Spring 1995 edition of the U.S. Army Publications and Printing Command's Publications Bulletin; for additional information contact the Logistics Management Division, (703) 325-6232 or DSN 221-6232.

FM No.	FM Title	Publishing Scheduled FY/QTR	Replaces TRADOC Pamphlet No.
100-60	Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR: Organization Guide (Block 5358)	96/4	350-12 (CAC& Fort Lvn. Pam 350-1)
100-61	Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR: Operational Art (Block 5362)	96/4	350-14
100-62	Armor- and Mechanized-Based OPFOR: Tactics (Block 5363)	97/4	350-16
100-63	Infantry-Based OPFOR: Organization Guide (Block 5359)	96/3 Pub 18 Apr 96	350-13 (CAC& Fort Lvn. Pam 350-2)
100-64	Infantry-Based OPFOR: Operations and Tactics (Block 5364)	97/2	350-15 and 350-17
100-65	OPFOR Equipment Guide (Block 5360)	98/4	Not pub as TRADOC Pam
100-66	OPFOR in SASO (Block 5365)	97/4	Not pub as TRADOC Pam

Figure 1. Status of OPFOR Field Manuals as of July 1996.

Major Gallogly-Staver is assigned to TSD at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. She has served with the 4th Psychological Operations Group and Special Operations Command-Korea. She attended the Post-Graduate Intelligence Program and holds a master of arts degree in Economics from North Carolina State University, and a master of science degree in Strategic Intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College. Readers can contact her at gallogle@leav-emh1.army.mil or DSN 552-7922, Comm: (913) 684-7922.

PROPONENT NOTES

Linguist Management Regulation Published

AR 611-6, Army Linguist Management, dated 16 February 1996, is now in the field for implementation. All commanders and language program managers need to be aware that the regulation raises the minimum proficiency requirements for qualified linguists to level 2 for listening and level 2 for speaking or reading.

A remediation period has been established for soldiers who are below the 2/2 requirement. First term soldiers may extend to complete remedial training. After remedial training, soldiers below the minimums must get a waiver from the Chief, Military Police, Military Intelligence (MI) or Language Branch to reenlist in their current military occupational specialties (MOSs). Mid-term and career soldiers have the following time frames to attain the required proficiency levels:

- ☐ Category I and II languages: one year.
- ☐ Category III languages: two years
- ☐ Category IV languages: three years.

Failure to attain 2/2 after this period subjects the soldier to involuntary reclassification.

Security Clearance Requirements for 98G

Soldiers reenlisting or reclassifying into MOS 98G (Voice Interceptor) are eligible to attend initial language training and advanced individual training with interim Top Secret security clearances. Soldiers must have been granted a final Top Secret security clearance prior to the award of the MOS. (The OCMI POC for language and this paragraph is

Ms. Charlotte Borghardt. Readers can reach her at (520) 533-1188, DSN 821-1188. or via E-mail at borghard @ pentagon-hqdadss. army.mil.)

Officer Issues

The FY 96 Major Promotion Board results were released 17 June 1996. Military Intelligence (MI) Branch had a primary zone selection rate of 72.2 percent (the Army average was 73.3 percent). Congratulations to all MI officers selected. (The point of contact (POC) is Captain Dannewitz. Readers can reach him at (520) 533-1180, DSN 821-1180, or E-mail dannewit@pentagon-hqdadss. army.mil.)

Warrant Officer Prerequisite Update

The U.S. Army Recruiting Command staffed the update to **Department of the Army Circular 601-94-1, Warrant Officer Procurement Program,** in March 1996. The Office of the Chief of MI provided updates to the prerequisites for all MI warrant occupational specialties. (The (POC) is Chief Warrant Five Williams, (520) 533-1183, DSN 821-1183, or E-mail at williamr @pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil.)

MI Corps Birthday Celebration

The Department of the Army Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) took time from their busy schedules to celebrate the birthday of the MI Corps on 1 July 1996. Lieutenant General Menoher presided over the ceremony, in which he talked about MI as a corps and a branch, its worldwide scope, and the MI professionals who died in the last year.

The MI Corps was established on 1 July 1987 at Fort Huachuca, Arizona; it was the 25th anniversary of the MI Branch. The activation of the MI Corps followed an Army Chief of Staff decision to extend the Army Regimental System to the entire Army to promote esprit de corps. On 1 July 1962, the Army created the Intelligence and Security Branch, later renamed the MI Branch. Formation of the branch was the culmination of a 40-year effort to give adequate recognition to the much needed professional intelligence specialist within the U.S. Army. Pictured cutting the cake are Corps members Lieutenant General Paul E. Menoher, Jr., the DCSINT, Ms. Nancy T. Stuzman, and Staff Sergeant Mark C. White.



U.S.Army photos

Military Intelligence Corps Association

by Colonel John H. Black, USA (Retired)

The U.S. Army Military Intelligence (MI) Corps has its own professional organization, the MI Corps Association (MICA). Organized for fraternal and educational purposes on 2 November 1995, MICA is a worldwide Army MI professional organization. This article covers the mission, background, and the wide variety of programs which have evolved over the past 20 months.

Mission and METL

To help us articulate MICA's fundamental purposes and tasks we have developed a mission statement and a mission essential task list (METL). The mission of MICA is to—

Provide a Military Intelligence Professional Organization to serve as a medium for members to share ideas and experiences, and to continually upgrade the intelligence profession.

The METL covers our basic tasks—

- ☐ Serve as MI's professional organization.
- ☐ Encourage esprit de corps.
- ☐ Broaden education and professionalism.
- ☐ Preserve our past and link lessons learned to the future.
- ☐ Establish and support the MI Corps Museum.
- ☐ Provide a medium for ideas and growth.
- ☐ Become leaders in information operations.

- * At least 10 MICA members who agree to join together to encourage the goals of MICA.
- * Have an organizational meeting and elect officers.
- * Write a constitution with bylaws.
- * Have the constitution approved by the Installation Commander if meetings are planned on an installation.
- * Submit the MICA Chapter Formation Checklist to the MICA Executive Committee.

Figure 1. MICA Chapter Formation Requirements.

U.S. Army photo

Dedication of the MI Museum by BG John W. Smith.

- ☐ Educate the rest of the Army about MI and the MI profession.

Membership and Chapters

MICA offers two types of memberships, individual and corporate. Individual membership is open to MI professionals and anyone who supports MI. Members receive a membership card; subscription to this publication; a MICA coin (designated the official MI Corps coin by the Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH)); and periodic updates from the national Executive Committee. Members are automatically part of the local MICA chapter. As of 1 October 1996, we had about 2,000 individual members, with a weekly growth rate of about 25 new members.

Corporate membership is open to any company, corporation, organization, or business which supports the objectives of MICA. Currently we have at least 60 corporate members who are making significant contributions to many of our programs.

As of August 1996, there were nine fully organized and operational MICA chapters. They are Huachuca (Fort Huachuca, Arizona), Hawaii (Fort Shafter, Hawaii), Chesapeake (Fort George G. Meade, Maryland), Airborne (Fort Bragg, North Carolina), Potomac (Washington, D.C. area), Heidelberg (Campbell Barracks, Germany), Phantom (Fort Hood, Texas), Pikes Peak (Fort Carson, Colorado), and Fort Lewis (Fort Lewis, Washington). There are various degrees of effort and organization at 12 other locations.

It is not difficult to form a MICA chapter; Figure 1 lists the basic requirements. If a MICA Chapter does not exist is your area or on your post, talk to the senior intelligence officer (SIO) about starting one.

MI Museum

Probably our single most enduring and positive accomplishment since MICA's organization has been the sponsorship and support to the establishment of the Army's MI Museum. The first anniversary of the formation of MICA, 2 November 1995, was a very proud day—our dedication ceremony officially opened the MI Museum. Four essential factors led to the Museum opening: the financial backing of MICA and the former Intelligence Museum Foundation, the volunteers who labored many weekends preparing the building, the outstanding support from Major General Charles W. Thomas and other leaders at USAIC&FH, and the expert efforts of Mr. Jim Finley and Mr. Tim Phillips of the Fort Huachuca "Post" Museum staff who built the displays.

Beginning with the Revolutionary War Period, the Museum theme displays progress through World War I, World War II, and Operation DESERT STORM. The evolution includes counterintelligence, signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, and MI in space. The museum, featuring 2,500 square feet of displays, includes a Cold War exhibit with a large piece of the Berlin wall and an armored Mercedes Benz used by the American Military Liaison Mission in East Germany.

MICA is planning many projects and improvements in the MI Museum. Current projects include the Knowlton Room (a research and meeting room) and a second exhibit hall which will feature a Korean War and Vietnam displays and human intelligence "tradecraft" artifacts. Also located in the museum is a small gift shop featuring MI-related items.

MICA encourages all of you to visit the new museum on your next trip to Fort Huachuca. It is at the corner of Christy and Hungerford Avenues in Building 41411 (the old post print plant). The operating hours are from 1000 to 1400 hours Monday, Wednesday, and Friday and on weekends from 1400 to 1600 hours.

Knowlton Award and Our MI Hero

Another accomplishment in which we take pride is the establishment of the Knowlton Award. Under the MICA METL of "encourage esprit de corps," we perceived a need for a special, distinctive, MI Corps award to recognize excellence in MI. After staffing a number of alternative choices for the MI hero, Major General Thomas selected Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Thomas Knowlton as the MI Corps and MICA "Hero." During the Revolutionary War, LTC Knowlton commanded the first intelligence and reconnaissance unit in the U.S. Army. Many regard the creation of his unit as the birth of U.S. MI. The Knowlton Award is presented for demonstrated excellence in intelligence or superior support to MI. Our philosophy has been to "power down" to the local intelligence leaders, and allow them to decide who deserves Knowlton Award recognition. At present, all G2s, installation SIOs, MI commanders in the rank of lieutenant colonel, MICA chapter presidents, and any MI colonel or MI general officer can approve the award. The Knowlton Award is a silver medallion with a MI-blue ribbon, worn around the neck on formal and special occasions. Presentation of the first awards was at the MI Hall of Fame Ceremony on 30

June 1995. Since then they have been awarded to deserving individuals throughout the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps in the Active and Reserve Components, and to civilians.

Summary

As you can tell, we are very proud and pleased with the tremendous response and support MICA is receiving throughout the intelligence community. One of our most encouraging observations is that there seems to be a great deal of interest and support not only from senior and retired intelligence officers, but also from the MI Corps noncommissioned officers, civilians, and junior officers. If you desire additional information about MICA, write to: MICA, P.O. Box 13020, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85670-3020 or visit our Internet Home Page at http// www. primenet. com/~usa mica/index.html. Let us know if you have any ideas on how we can improve and grow. We believe that MICA's time has come in the evolution of the MI Corps, and we are excited about the incredible growth and momentum MICA has exhibited.

Colonel Black (Retired) is the President of MICA. While on active duty, he served in numerous command and intelligence positions in Vietnam, Korea, Germany, the Middle East, and the United States, including Training and Doctrine Command System Manager for the Ground-Based Common Sensor. During Operation DESERT STORM, he served on the Third Army G2 staff where he devised the IEW Synchronization Plan and Matrix. Colonel Black has a master of arts degree in National Strategy from the Naval War College and a Master of Business Administration from Idaho State University; his bachelor's degree in History was from Fort Lewis College in Colorado. Currently, Colonel Black is a strategic planner for a defense contractor. Readers can contact him at (520) 458-9759 or via E-mail at 103525.1562@compuserve. com.

MI CORPS HALL OF FAME

Command Sergeant Major Clovis Drexel Ice (Deceased)

by Second Lieutenant Jeffrey Sargent

Clovis Drexel Ice highly deserves a place in the annals of intelligence history. Retiring from the Army as a command sergeant major (CSM), "Drex"—or "Frosty" as he was known to his friends—was a true pioneer of advancements in special operations intelligence. One of only two West Virginians in the MI Hall of Fame, CSM Ice entered the Army in 1950, at the age of seventeen, to support our country's efforts in the Korean War. His assignments in Korea were with armor and infantry units. Following Korea, CSM Ice served the next five years at Fort Knox, Kentucky; Augsburg, Germany; and Fort Ord, California. In 1960, after spending two years in Ethiopia, CSM Ice moved to Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

The next seventeen years of CSM Ice's career set him apart from the rest. He was assigned to the 317th Army Security Agency (ASA) Battalion where he began his work with communications and special operations. Following nine months with the 317th ASA Battalion, he joined the newly formed 403d U.S. Army Security Agency Special Operations Detachment (Airborne) (USASASOD(A)) as a team sergeant.

CSM Ice preferred special operations intelligence support and was truly a pioneer in this endeavor. He is noted for his involvement in developing the Army's first truly portable, manpacked intercept equipment. The "manpack" was specifically designed to support airborne operations. CSM Ice spent two tours in Vietnam with the 403d USASASOD(A) as well as more than two years with the 400th USASASOD in Okinawa, Japan. His final assignment was Command Sergeant Major of the 313th ASA Battalion at Fort Bragg.

After his retirement from the Army, CSM Ice was a police officer in Grantsville, West Virginia. He then worked in support of other military veterans as a veteran's affairs officer for a six-county area until his death in 1991.

U.S.Army photo

CSM Ice was an honorary member of the MI Corps and then a MI Hall of Fame inductee in 1988. Soldiers attending courses at the NCO Academy at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, may recognize CSM Ice's name—he was further honored in July 1993 with the dedication of Ice Hall. Ice Hall serves as the NCO Academy's main academic building.

Second Lieutenant Sargent is currently working at the Office of the Chief of MI prior to attending the MI Officer Basic Course. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-1180 or DSN 821-1180.

RESERVE COMPONENT

JOINT ENDEAVOR: The RC MI Perspective

Nearly 200 U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) MI soldiers are finishing their 270-day deployments in support of the Army's mission in Bosnia. A second 270-day rotation is entering the theater. Most of these Reserve Component (RC) soldiers are backfilling in U.S. European Command for Active Component (AC) soldiers as analysts, counterintelligence agents, and linguists. However, a number are working in Bosnia-Herzegovina and adjacent countries as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

The RC augmentation comes from the USAR's 1st MI Center in Phoenix, Arizona; 338th MI Battalion (Tactical Exploitation) at Fort Meade, Maryland; 272d MI Company (Linguist) in Bell, California; and the ARNG's 300th MI Brigade (Linguist) in Draper, Utah. The senior RC MI officer deployed in the first rotation was Lieutenant Colonel William P. Foster, commander of the 1st MI Center.

The effort has been judged a success thus far; quality is high, the augmentation permits more support in country, RC soldiers are working live missions, and the backfill concept works. The results validate the RC MI Force Design Update (FDU) unit structure which "stands up" at the beginning of Fiscal Year 1997 (FY 97), providing augmentation elements to the team level, as required, via derivative unit identification codes.

The mobilization did reveal a number of areas and issues which must be addressed and corrected if we are to retain RC soldiers and maximize their utility to the operation. These are as follows:

There is a recognized need to marry the AC requester to the RC augmentation at the beginning of the mobilization process, both for training and sponsorship. Pending job or duty position, weapons, uniforms, and transportation requirements can all be identified with the initial request for RC augmentation. In several cases, there was no clear identification of the AC chain of command. Having a RC ombudsman in the theater would help resolve many problems arising post-deployment.

The AC finance system was not prepared to support RC soldier requirements. Soldiers must identify and initiate financial entitlements and ensure they are processed prior to deploying. AC finance offices must coordinate with their RC counterparts.

RC soldiers arrived with incomplete records. RC soldiers should handcarry their validated records.

The records for the RC soldiers could not be loaded into the automated Standard Installation-Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) upon their arrival at their AC unit. The U.S. Total Army Personnel Command and the U.S. Army Reserve Command and National Guard Bureau need to establish a mechanism to incorporate the RC soldiers into SIDPERS.

RC soldiers sometimes felt abandoned, not supported by their AC chain of command. This issue encompasses most of the previous items. This perception, whether real or not, is critical to performance, morale, and retention. The AC must take ownership of their RC augmentees, recognizing that these are now their soldiers, not temporary hires. At the same time the AC chain of command must acknowledge that the USAR and ARNG report in to their gaining units with a special set of personal and personnel issues that need to be addressed if we want them to be full members of the force.

2QFY97	Southeast ARISC	Package 1
3QFY97	41st Infantry Bde	Package 2
3QFY97	116th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
3QFY97	278th ACR	Package 2
4QFY97	155th Armored Bde	Package 2
4QFY97	45th Infantry Bde	Package 2
2QFY98	218th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
2QFY98	76th Infantry Bde	Package 2
2QFY98	256th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
3QFY98	27th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
3QFY98	29th Infantry Bde	Package 2
3QFY98	30th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
2QFY99	53d Infantry Bde	Package 2
2QFY99	81st Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2
3QFY99	39th Infantry Bde	Package 2
3QFY99	48th Infantry Bde (M)	Package 2

NOTE: Package 1 consists of three All-Source Workstations, two Single-Source Workstations, two Remote Workstations (RWS) and a Compartmented ASAS Message Processing System (CAMPS). Package 2 consists of two RWSs and a half CAMPS.

Figure 1. RC All-Source Analysis System Distribution Priority.

Class #	PCC/PAC		Class Dates
97-02	X	X	21 Oct 96- 1 Nov 96
97-05	X		3 Feb 97-14 Feb 97
97-08	X	X	28 Apr 97- 9 May 97

Figure 2. Projected PCC and PAC Class Dates.

The RC MI FDU provides MI augmentation as cellular functional teams, the way the AC has requested. However, this emphasis toward smaller modular-team augmentation carries some baggage with it. There is typically not a senior leader with a RC background present. The teams come into an existing AC unit. It thus becomes the AC unit commander's responsibility to take care of these former RC soldiers. For this and other operational reasons, it would be unwise to break the teams down to individual fillers; that is what the individual ready reserve and individual mobilization augmentees are. The teams have trained and worked together, and maintaining team integrity could forestall many of the problems mentioned above.

ASAS Fielding to the Reserve Components

The Army will distribute sixteen All-Source Analysis Systems (ASAS) to the Reserve Components in FY 97 through FY 99. The USAR's Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center (ARISC) at Fort Gillem, Georgia, as well as each of the ARNG's 15 Enhanced Brigades will receive systems. The Army will field one system to each unit according to the distribution priority shown in Figure 1; the figure lists the fiscal year and quarter in which fielding will occur.

Revised Dates for PCC and PAC

The two-week MI Precommand Course (PCC) gives identified MI commanders and G2 designees a review of major doctrinal, organizational, and process developments ongoing at the MI Proponent and in the intelligence community as a whole. The senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) equivalent of the PCC is the Pre-Assignment Course (PAC). Class dates often parallel each other so that commanders and sergeants major may attend together.

Traditionally, a number of seats are set aside in each class for the ARNG and USAR. Currently planned class dates are shown in Figure 2; please call or E-mail the point of contact (POC) to confirm dates and quotas.

The POC for the PCC is Mr. Ken Welsh; you can contact him for more information at (520) 533-6527, DSN 821-6527, FAX 821-0540, or E-mail welshk@huachuca-emh98.army.mil. Staff Sergeant Thompson at the NCO Academy is the POC for the PAC. Readers can contact her at (520) 533-4245, DSN 821-4245, or FAX 821-4244.

Colonel John Craig is the USAR POC. Readers can contact him at (520) 533-1176, DSN 821-1176, and via PROFS/E-mail craigj%hua1@huachuca-emh11.army.mil. Major Steve Ponder is the ARNG POC; his telephone number is 821-1177 and his E-mail address is ponders@aol.com. Their fax number is 821-1762, and the mailing address is Commander, USAIC&FH, ATTN: ATZS-RA, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-6000.

Operation GRAPPLE

(Continued from page 26)

leaders, key locations for economic and other reasons, and the list goes on. When trying to split formally linked communities, everyone has their idea of who owns what.

- ☐ The **lines of communication** overlay with data from terrain and weather analysis and engineer intelligence, provided the convoy commander with invaluable information. It allowed for those normally unforeseen difficulties and prompted the forward basing of engineer plant equipment on one main supply route.
- ☐ **"Personalities"** really does become a 10th order of battle factor and not just a "miscellaneous" element of IPB. When faced with a military commander on one side who was a former JNA commander (disciplined, trained, etc.) and a local "hood" turned military commander on the other, this information becomes invaluable.
- ☐ **Courses of Action** really do multiply with Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, Mujahideen, and even U.N. Allies with their own third party interests. They all have potentially conflicting hostilities with us and everyone else.

Language. When faced with the problem of linguistic skills and having only limited resources within the Army, the obvious answer is to use locally employed interpreters. (It was useful to use Army linguists to monitor what they were actually saying.) Also, as the aid convoys crossed ethnic and military boundaries, these interpreters became an issue and were sometimes detained. Even the discretion of our own military linguists was sometimes in doubt if their languages were their "mother tongues!"

Security. Counterintelligence personnel cannot perform all their functions unless they are given the flexibility to operate in civilian attire when necessary. The commander must have the confidence in them to do this. You do not have to be "special" to perform

many liaison tasks—link this with an intelligence background and you can fulfill the requirement much more effectively.

Debriefing. We gained enormous value from debriefing anyone who was available and willing. They provided mostly low-level information gathered recently in the region. This was particularly useful when building up the database of personalities used for future dealings and negotiations.

Situation Awareness and Information Reporting. Even the "mail run" might pass that faction reinforcement convoy traveling otherwise unseen. Everyone must know the importance of reporting and how to do it. Mnemonics and acronyms were taught at every level:

- ☐ OVERWHELM. Ordnance, vehicle type, electronics, recognition features, when, how many, equipment seen, location, morale.
- ☐ WHAT. Wheels, hull, armament, turret.
- ☐ BBWT. Barrel, baffle, wheels, trail.

An understanding of different cross-cultural issues is essential, not of just the local population but also of your Allies. For example, to a Bulgarian a nod of the head means "no" and a shake, "yes." A basic knowledge of the language, if only to say "hello" or "thank you" or sometimes more importantly "stop" or "halt" is also very useful and conveys a message.

Conclusion

In conclusion, many of the national contingents involved in the UNPROFOR provided the backbone for the present peace accord. Without the efforts of Operation GRAPPLE and the UNPROFOR, the present mission would be peace enforcement and not peace implementation. The main problem for UNPROFOR was that old question of "objective" and the inevitable "mission creep" when they are not clearly defined. The perception of the outside world was that the mission of the UNPROFOR was simply peacemaking, -keeping, and -enforcement along with providing humanitarian aid. These missions do not mix in one force. One can move from impartiality to partisanship, but returning to the previous state is nigh impossible.

I concur with former Deputy Force Commander Major General J. A. MacInnis who feels that United Nations credibility has two principal components: capability and conduct. Capability includes combat effectiveness, equipment, and toughness. Conduct consists of restraint, discipline, firmness, consistency, cultural sensitivity, rule of law, and impartiality.

Endnote

1. Receipt of the British Empire Medal (BEM) is a major honor in a service which bestows significantly fewer medals than the United States does.

Major Marshall is currently the British Exchange Officer at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center, Fort Huachuca, Arizona. In his 21 years of service, he has had experience in eight types of stability and support operations including United Nations support, counterterrorism, and counterdrug operations. Readers can contact Major Marshall at (520) 533-6557, DSN 821-6557, and via E-mail at 103732.3514@compuserve. com.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Peacekeeping, Outspoken Observations by a Field Officer by James H. Allan (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1996), 200 pages, $18.95.

The "outspoken" are generally either well-informed and unhappy, or just loud. The author is a retired infantry colonel with thirty-seven years in the Canadian Army who served in peacekeeping operations in Cyprus, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. He appears to know what he is talking about, and he is clearly not totally pleased with what he saw.

Based on his observations, and with the candor typical of the retired, Colonel Allan details both successful U.N. peacekeeping operations and those that were not so successful. He provides the detail, documentation, and deduction one expects of a senior field grade officer (good professional soldier stuff) and his perspective begins with the soldier at the bottom of the food chain and progresses to the highest levels of both the United Nations and national policy. In the telling, he skips none of the successes and failures of either the operations or those working therein. This frankness will no doubt alienate the incompetent (a specific major in the Swedish Army, sizeable elements of the U.N. bureaucracy, and every general officer of the Canadian Army?). Whew, heady stuff, this!

Peacekeeping is both informative and troublesome to read. It could easily provide the core of a comprehensive course on the topic while outlining such gargantuan problems as the ineptness of the United Nations. Hidden bonuses are scattered throughout. One example is Ronald Steel's quote—

Zeal is not substitute for a coherent policy, idle meddling is not the mark of a great power. American troops and prestige should be envoked only when there is a grave American interest at stake.

One would think this book would be directly aimed directly at the United Nations; however, Colonel Allan clearly points out that as the United States leans, so does the United Nations. Thus, his effort beards the lion and pointedly addresses the U.S. role. He says peacekeeping will work, but is very difficult under the best of conditions. His is a soldier's perspective of a policeman's job and is deserving of serious study at the U.N. Secretary General level and at national levels worldwide.

As Colonel Allan states,

There is a central dilemma of U.S. policy following the Cold War. How do you articulate interests and moral foundation for policy in the absence of direct threat to U.S. strategic interests?

If you "the reader" accept this premise, you will find **Peacekeeper** a "must read."

Master Warrant Officer Five
Richard E. Cameron (Retired)
Sierra Vista, Arizona

The United Nations in the Post-Cold War Era by Karen Mingst and Margaret P. Karns (Boulder, Colorado: Westnau Press, 1995), 75 pages, $9.00.

Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Kuwait...the authors' address very adeptly and suc-

cinctly the current problems confronting the United Nations. For the MI (military intelligence) professional trying to unravel the "enigma wrapped in a mystery," which is decisionmaking in the United Nations, this study is essential reading. Mingst and Karns also provide valuable insights into why the United States so often ends up committing men and resources to United Nations operations.

According to the authors, the United Nations currently finds itself mired in three vexing dilemmas. First, the United Nations is stuck between the rock of states asserting their national sovereignty and the hard place of problems which transcend traditional political boundaries (e.g., weapons proliferation, economic interdependence, environmental degradation, and human rights concerns). Secondly, states and other international actors increasingly turn to the United Nations to solve these problems, yet they frequently falter in their resolve when asked to dedicate the necessary resources. Finally, while actors wish for the United Nations to exercise a more prominent role on the international stage, the diversity of national interests makes it difficult to achieve a consensus on decisions.

To a large extent, the problems which Mingst and Karns identify are not unique to the post-Cold War era; they are inherently dynamic to the United Nation's institutional structure. What is new, however, are the dual tendencies which the authors identify as part of the environment in which the United Nations must operate. On one hand, forces of integration and interdependence draw nations and peoples into closer community. On the other hand, forces are tearing old states asunder. Throughout Africa, Asia, and even Europe, nationalism, ethnic tensions, and racial malice rip at the seams which have held nation-states together since World War I.

The first two chapters provide a broad overview of the evolution of the United Nations and of the multitude of tasks assigned to it. Interestingly enough, Mingst and Karns trace the philosophical roots of the United Nations back to the Concert of Europe (1815). Then they describe the various actors who attempt to influence decisionmaking in the United Nations, and present an informative history of U.N. peacekeeping attempts and the problems which have traditionally beset them (e.g., achieving consensus, defining success for an operation, and determining who commits what resources). The authors then present Cambodia, Somalia, Haiti, Yugoslavia, and the Gulf War as case studies. They conclude that the Gulf War may be atypical of post-Cold War peacekeeping efforts. Policy-makers should draw on lessons from other cases before they reach any steadfast conclusions.

The book discusses United Nations attempts to promote economic development and raises the issue of the sustainable development viability. It provides valuable information on the economics which often lead to "conflicts other than war."

In the final chapter, the authors raise key issues which member-states are pushing onto the U.N.'s agenda. There is growing pressure to restructure voting and to reevaluate the status of states' membership on the Security Council. There is also growing concern over the nature of states' political and financial commitment to the United Nations.

Overall, the authors have presented an excellent overview of the dilemmas which currently confront the United Nations as it enters its second fifty years. The authors provide enough detail to broaden the reader's understanding. However, they do not cloud their discussion with facts which would only make reading tedious. The chapter on the problems facing the United Nations is unparalleled in its brevity and the degree of insight provided. Also, their analysis of U.N. peacekeeping operations deserves both close reading and critical analysis. For those MI professionals who wish to better understand the United Nations and its role in the international arena, the current study is invaluable.

Specialist Mark A. Thomas
Yongsan, Korea

America Twice Betrayed by George P. Morse (Silver Springs, Maryland: Bartleby Press, 1995), 376 pages, $23.50.

Any serious student of military history and national security recognizes war is more than maneuver on the battlefield, successful tactics, or an in-depth knowledge of terrain. War is waged on various levels and involves a multiplicity of factors such as leadership, demographics, a nation's industrial base, the psychological culture of the people, and economic, technological, and battlefield intelligence. Intelligence is perhaps the most fundamental element of warfare because it "paints the battlefield" for both leaders and commanders in chief on either side of a conflict. More than any other single factor, intelligence continuously plays a pivotal role in shaping the course of human events.

In his seminal book on national security, **America Twice Betrayed**, author George "Pat" Morse succeeds in brilliantly addressing critical historical, governmental, and national security issues often ignored by the American public and frequently neglected by both the print and television news media. With sublime succinctness, he discusses a complex web of political, military, and economic threats to world peace posed by foreign intelligence agents, the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the rise of extremists within the Islamic fundamentalist movement. With an excellent foreword prepared by convicted spy-master John Walker, this book goes beyond merely discussing current threats to U.S. strategic interests; it also identifies striking weaknesses within our system of government security and provides cogent, balanced, cost saving measures to correct many of the system's failings.

Some readers may greet this work as just "another dry, boring, technical book on national and governmental security by yet another expert in the field!" Morse's book is fascinating reading and definitely not for the squeamish! In the first chapter, "A Parade of Traitors," the author provides a devastating array of documented facts regarding some of the most sensational cases of espionage in our nation's history and their strategic implications. It is sobering to read how many fellow citizens sold our nation's secrets to the highest bidder. While the list is too long to recount here, it includes numerous employees holding sensitive, classified positions over a period of decades in the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Defense, Justice, Agriculture, the Office of Strategic Service (OSS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, as well as uniformed and civilian personnel of our Armed Forces. The human, military, and economic cost of their espionage activities is equally devastating. As the author also points out in poignant detail, countless prominent Russians put their lives on the line to subvert the totalitarian policies of their own government, only to be exposed and executed by the Soviets based on intelligence provided by American traitors.

As a charter member of the former OSS, Morse provides an excellent commentary on the fragile stability which characterizes the world today. Least anyone think the threats to our national interests have disappeared with the demise of the Soviet Union, the author provides an astute analysis of the dire geopolitical and economic consequences of the Soviet collapse. Prior to the fall of the Iron Curtain, world power was bi-polar in nature, with spheres of influence dominated by the two superpowers. Morse provides an interesting, informative, and highly instructive narrative on how world instability has increased despite the United States' emergence as the sole remaining superpower. The documented presence of spy "cells" within the most highly confidential councils of government also clearly conveys to the reader the undiminished threat which existed, and continues to exist, to our national interests, the ramifications of which become clearer each day as more information is obtained on past Soviet and current Russian intelligence collection efforts. Equally disturbing is the lack of concern demonstrated by many senior policy managers within our own government to take immediate and positive steps to identify the spies within our midst once their presence, if not their identities, has been established.

This book deftly demonstrates the connectivity between past and present and what augers for the future. For example, technological advances like the World War II development of radar allowed the British to devise air interdiction tactics which resulted in the Royal Air Force's successful defense of Great Britain. Without victory in that momentous air battle, Great Britain would have fallen to the Nazis. Conversely, no one can doubt the unfortunate consequences of the Soviets' successful theft of America's atomic, laser, and cruise missile technologies prolonging the Cold War at the cost of tens of thousands of American lives (Vietnam and Korean Wars) and billions of taxpayer dollars. The denial of America's secrets is therefore as crucial an element of our national security as is an educated citizenry or a strong econ-

omy. However, as a free and open society, America remains especially at risk.

The author writes that—

As a result of past [Soviet] acquisitions, sophisticated laser rangefinders on Soviet tanks are carbon copies of U.S. devices; precision transmission gears for heavy lift helicopters are forged on American made machine tools; MIG-25 FOXBAT jets are equipped with look down, shoot down radar systems comparable to those on America's sleek F-15s; and Soviet cruise missiles incorporate the same designs, and in some cases components, as their U.S. counterparts. The [Soviet] Atoll air-to-air missile is so closely based on blueprints of the American Sidewinder that even a left-hand-threading screw is repeated.

Scary stuff, but it is this kind of detailed narrative that makes this book so compelling.

Based on more than 30 years' experience in national security, to include such positions as Deputy Director of the Federal Security Agency and former World War II aide to OSS Director, Major General "Wild Bill" Donovan, Pat Morse succeeds in establishing the causal relationship between past historical events and current national security issues. The reader will not be disappointed with **America Twice Betrayed**. It is an exceptionally well written and meticulously researched work which addresses numerous issues spanning the full spectrum of national security to include its political, military, economic, and technological components. Equally important, this work does not merely address complex problems, but also presents concrete solutions. It is highly recommended to students of national security issues and military history and anyone in the public or private sector with an interest in the current threat and ongoing covert and overt war to protect this nation's vital secrets from both our competitors and our enemies.

Lieutenant Colonel
Michael R. Andriani
Washington, D.C.

Warrior Cults: A History of Magical, Mystical, and Murderous Organizations by Paul Elliot (New York, New York: Blandford distributed by Sterling, 1996), 208 pages, $24.95.

Mr. Elliott establishes the parameters of his book **Warrior Cults,** by stating that there is disagreement with the term "cult" and that he offers nothing new about any of his subjects. Since his field of expertise is ancient history, he elected to keep his discussion essentially to those years prior to 1900. His thesis then is to simply develop the origin of some secret societies (Greek and Roman magical cults) and thread their ritual into later ones (the Knights Templar). The author then shows parallels in other non-related but "secret" societies (the Middle Eastern "Assassins," the Thugs of India, the Ninja of Japan, and the Chinese Boxers).

The author obviously knows his material, his style is unassuming, and he generally presents his information in a pleasant but scholarly manner. However, Mr. Elliott disrupts an otherwise pleasant book with three things. First, like most books which bring together a number of otherwise unrelated topics (each ranging between 18 and 32 pages in length), Elliott leaves the reader wishing he provided more detail in some instances, less in others. Second, he tends to repeat tidbits of information in cross-referencing one topic with another. Third, components of the title, **A History of Magical, Mystical and Murderous Organizations** arguably does not reflect "warrior cults" very well.

Those looking for an insight to either "cults" (however you define the term) or any of the groups discussed will find this book of interest and its premises applicable today. Psychologists, sociologists, and historians will find it inadequate despite some well-presented material.

Master Warrant Officer Five (Retired)
Richard E. Cameron
Sierra Vista, Arizona

Recommended Reading:

The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina: Their Historic Development from the Middle Ages to the Dissolution of Yugoslavia by Mark Pinson (Harvard Press, 1994), 170 pages, $14.95.

Fighting by Minutes, Time and the Art of War by Robert Leonhard (Praeger Publishing, 1994), 186 pages $55.00.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 5)

commander and 344th MI Battalion S3, I participated in some of the discussions on the future of Army IMINT training once the Defense Sensor Interpretation and Applications Training Program (DSIATP) goes away. To this day, I am still not sure that we have a coherent vision of how we are going to train Army IMINT folks. A couple of hours in the MI officer basic and advanced courses, on the job (OJT) training, and maybe a few hours in the command and general staff and war colleges is not enough. As someone who never attended DSIATP or any 35C training, I can attest to the steep learning curve when you are assigned to "big picture" IMINT assignments with no formal IMINT training. While I was fortunate enough to work with folks in DIA, CIA, and throughout the intelligence community who gave me OJT, this is not the way to do business. We need a formal, coherent Army IMINT training vision and plan.

Beyond training, though, we also need to get more folks, preferably IMINT-smart folks, assigned to key national-level IMINT positions. DCSINT, the Army Space Program Office, and Army Space Command are not enough, as these are Army-only assignments. We need to assign more folks to the real power, multi-Service and multiagency positions, especially those in CIA, OADSC[3]I and NRO (and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency or NIMA, if it comes to fruition). Then, and only then, will we improve outstanding in the "big picture" IMINT arena and have enough people in key positions to influence the future of IMINT across the board.

As anyone who has worked inside the Washington-area Beltway can tell you, IMINT is like everything else in the Washington area—the "golden rule" predominates. People and agencies who know what they are doing and control the gold (i.e., funding) make the rules (determine which programs get funded, who gets what pot of money, etc.). If you have no Army folks assigned to or in a position to influence the "real" decisionmaking process, then you're stuck with what others decide.

While I applaud all Army efforts of the "small picture" IMINT variety, I don't think our vision and plan is broad enough. We should use Major Smith's article to start getting more MI professionals on the same IMINT sheet of music. Let's develop a more thorough Army IMINT component to Force XXI and Army XXI and take a leading role, rather than a back seat, in the "big picture" IMINT arena. Specifically, let's fix our IMINT training and assignment shortfalls.

Captain Patrick M. O'Sullivan
Monterey, California

224th MI Battalion
(Aerial Exploitation)

Oriental blue and silver gray are colors associated with U.S. Army military intelligence (MI). The crosswise arrangement of the background is a reference to the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry awarded to the unit for service in Vietnam in 1970 and 1971. The griffin is a heraldic creature combining the strength and courage of a lion with the vigilance and awareness of an eagle; as such, it is well suited to represent the ideals and capabilities of an intelligence unit. Its wings refer to the airborne mission, and the lightning flashes it grasps denote the mission of this unit.

On 1 June 1966, the 224th Aviation Battalion was activated in Saigon, Vietnam. The Battalion and its four subordinate companies began with only 36 aircraft and 169 personnel, but quickly expanded in size. In July 1967, the 224th Aviation Battalion and its subordinate units reached their highest combined strength of 1,066 personnel. Within two years, aircraft assigned to the companies totaled 80. On 19 May 1971, the Battalion was redesignated the 224th Army Security Agency (ASA) Aviation Battalion. The 224th participated in fifteen campaigns and received three Meritorious Unit Commendations along with the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm. On 3 March 1973, the colors of the 224th ASA Aviation Battalion transferred to Oakland Air Force Base, California, where the carrier table of organization and equipment caused formal deactivation of the unit.

The Army formally activated the 224th MI Battalion (Aerial Exploitation) at Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Georgia, on 1 June 1981. The mission of the Battalion is to provide rapidly deployable collection and exploitation of aerial imagery and communications and electronic intelligence (ELINT) in support of XVIII Airborne Corps worldwide contingency operations. The battalion received its first Army Superior Unit Award for outstanding service between 1 January 1987 and 18 June 1988. The award was for providing outstanding aerial intelligence support to both the 525th MI Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps, and the United States Southern Command, as well as for taking an active role in providing labor, food, clothing, and toys to Honduran orphans. The unit received its second U.S. Army Superior Unit Award for outstanding service and accomplishments while supporting the Quality Dragon mission from 19 June 1988 to 23 March 1990. In August 1990, the 224th MI Battalion (AE) supported Operation DESERT SHIELD by deploying four OV-1D Mohawks and the Alpha Company ELINT Platoon attached to the 15th MI Battalion (AE). The unit received a third U.S. Army Superior Unit Award for exceptional performance in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1 February 1992 to 31 January 1993. This award was for providing strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence during peacetime operations to include counternarcotics support.

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
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